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1
Workplace Justice in the United
States: An Introduction
Where there is no rule of law but only the command of persons,
where secrecy and arbitrariness reign, where one never knows
when or why the axe will fall, there justice weeps. (Wolterstorff
2001)
Human dignity at the workplace requires just treatment by those
holding authority. At the crux of this matter is protection from arbitrary
action—action that is based upon personality rather than merit, and is
not predictable on any reasoned basis. When a human being is treated
merely as a means to an end or a thing to be employed by others, rather
than as a person deserving justice, justice does indeed weep. This is
especially true where a person’s job is at stake. In our society, an indi-
vidual’s job is not only a source of economic goods, but also an impor-
tant part of how we define ourselves—and others define us—and our
role in society. Where workers can be terminated from their employ-
ment for any reason, or none at all, arbitrariness reigns. Yet, this is
historically the basic principle of the law of employment termination
in the United States.
The situation is quite different in Western Europe and nearly all
other countries. In these countries, there exists a general principle of
law that dictates that workers cannot be terminated without cause. This
principle is enforced either in labor courts, other specialized courts, or
in the general court system.
The American rule of employment-at-will—that a person can be
fired at any time for any, or no, reason—has deep roots in the nation’s
jurisprudence. It was announced in a legal treatise in 1877, and is
known as ‘‘Wood’s rule,’’ named for the author of the treatise, Horace
Gay Wood. He stated, ‘‘With us [in America, unlike in England] the
rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie at
will’’ (Willborn, Schwab, and Burton 1993, p. 15). It has remained the
general rule ever since. Its practical result is that, absent a statute or
contract to the contrary, workers have no right to insist upon a just
cause for their termination.
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2 Wheeler, Klaas, and Mahony
If employment were simply an economic transaction where a com-
modity called labor is bought and sold, we would need not concern
ourselves about justice. The conventional wisdom in economics takes
just such a view of employment. From this perspective, employment-
at-will simply reflects the reality of a market. However, it is reasonably
clear that, although there are aspects of employment that are congenial
to an economic view, the full reality of employment is much more than
that. As David Ewing, a former editor of Harvard Business Review,
has said: ‘‘A company is a kind of society, its management a type of
government, and managements that manage justly, as employees see
justness, gain potent advantages over managements that do not’’
(Ewing 1989, p. 3). For a society to be managed justly, the substantive
rules of workplace behavior must be just, and there must be mecha-
nisms in place that deliver procedural ‘‘due process’’ (Ewing 1989).
Corporations are social organizations arranged in a hierarchy in
which those at the top exercise authority over those at the bottom.
This inevitably means that control must be exerted over those who are
employed by others. In such circumstances, both human nature and
differing interests between the employed and the employer give rise to
a situation in which an abuse of power is not only possible, but highly
likely (Wheeler 1997). In the workplace, there are order-givers and
order-takers, and a common instrument of control by order-givers is
the threat of a termination of the relationship. Ultimately, employees
who do not behave as they are ordered will be separated from the
organization—fired.
Fortunately, since the days when Wood’s employment-at-will prin-
ciple was adopted by American courts in the late nineteenth century,
there has been considerable erosion of it. In fact, management attor-
neys have recently claimed that it is gone entirely, but the reality of the
matter is a bit more complicated than that. What has occurred over a
period of about 90 years is the construction of a patchwork of limita-
tions on employment-at-will. This has been aptly described as the grad-
ual slicing away of an entire pie of rights that at one time wholly
belonged to employers, until the remainder is only a remnant of what
once was (Bennett-Alexander and Hartman 2001). Yet, in truth, the
employer’s portion is still quite substantial. Arguably, it has grown
significantly by virtue of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions that will
be discussed later in this book.
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THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN
WORKPLACE JUSTICE
The road to the present system of workplace justice in the United
States has been long and convoluted. Perhaps the clearest starting point
is the enactment of the Clayton Act, effective in 1914. Hailed as ‘‘la-
bor’s Magna Carta’’ at the time, it declared that ‘‘the labor of a human
being is not a commodity or article of commerce.’’ Although the Su-
preme Court’s interpretation kept the Clayton Act from being a boon
to labor, at least the principle was recorded as a part of American labor
policy.
With the Great Depression and New Deal came the Wagner Act in
1935, which protected workers from termination based on their union
activity. Legislation adopted in the 1960s prohibited termination on the
basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, or age (Title VII,
Civil Rights Act of 1964; Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967). The Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 prohibited
employers from terminating employees for seeking remedies for safety
and health hazards. Based on this legislation, employees are protected
against discrimination on the basis of union activity, race, color, na-
tional origin, sex, age, and their actions to ensure a safe workplace.
In the 1980s, state courts began creating exceptions to the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine. Terminations that violated public policy, im-
plied-in-fact contracts (often based on employee handbooks or
company rules), and implied-in-law contractual obligations of good
faith and fair dealing were held to give rise to legal claims on the part
of employees. The manner of a termination, if abusive, could make the
employer liable for damages.
The 1980s and early 1990s brought a spate of employment legisla-
tion. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 prohibited em-
ployers from discriminating against legal aliens; the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 limited the use of lie detectors in
firing workers; and the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act of 1988 (WARN Act) required employers to give 60 days’ advance
notice of a plant closing or mass layoff.
One of the more significant changes in the law over several decades
was the adoption of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990. It
expanded protection to employees against termination for physical and
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mental disabilities. This was a right that had already been granted to
employees of federal contractors in the Vocational Rehabilitation Act
of 1973. Another major boon, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, gave em-
ployees the right to a jury trial, and to both compensatory and punitive
damages, when they were terminated for reasons of race, color, na-
tional origin, religion, or sex. Further, the Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) of 1993 protected workers from being terminated for tak-
ing unpaid leave for family and medical purposes.
At the same time that Congress was expanding the protection of
workers against unfair terminations for particular reasons, two other
things were occurring that gave workers a claim to just treatment as
a general right. First, beginning in the 1940s, collective bargaining
agreements came to commonly include a provision that workers could
be discharged or disciplined only for just cause. This obligation was
enforced through labor arbitration, in which a neutral third party (an
arbitrator) could make a legally binding determination that the em-
ployee had been unjustly discharged. Because the courts adopted a
policy of keeping their hands off this process in the Steelworkers Tril-
ogy of cases (United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co. 1960; United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. 1960; United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. 1960), there was virtually
no way that a labor arbitrator’s decision could be overturned on appeal.
This system has been generally viewed as highly successful, delivering
justice to employees without significantly interfering with manage-
ment’s ability to manage effectively. Its chief limitation is that, because
of the decline of unionization, it only covers a small proportion of the
private sector workforce (about 8.2 percent in 2003).
The second major development has been the voluntary, manage-
ment-initiated adoption of organizational justice procedures by non-
union employers, the more advanced forms of which have come along
relatively recently. Based on data gathered in the late 1970s, Fred
Foulkes (1980) found that, at that time, by far the most common em-
ployer device for handling employee grievances was the open-door
policy, which is a very rudimentary workplace justice procedure. More
advanced forms of nonbinding policies have included 1) installing an
ombudsman—a corporate employee who independently deals with
worker problems; and 2) mediation, where a neutral third party works
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to facilitate a resolution of the dispute (McDermott and Berkeley
1996).
An especially interesting organizational justice procedure origi-
nated in the 1980s—peer review panels. Here, a panel of employees
(and sometimes managers) makes a final decision or recommendation
regarding an employee’s grievance (Grote and Wimberly 1993).
The management-initiated organizational justice system to most
recently rise to prominence is employment arbitration. In employment
arbitration, a nonunion employer requires employees to agree to submit
any complaints (or sometimes any allegations of violation of law on
the part of the employer) to a neutral arbitrator whose duty it is to
render a final and binding decision on the matter (Clark 1997).
There are several questions that need to be answered in regard to
the various management-initiated workplace justice systems. First, do
they deliver substantive results that are fair and reasonably similar to
those obtained in other systems, such as the courts or labor arbitration?
Second, do they provide due process? Third, how do they compare to
one another on these dimensions? It is these questions that the study
reported in this book aims to address.
PLAN OF THE STUDY
The first task in which we engaged was a survey of the literature
on nonunion justice systems. This literature is quite extensive and will
be summarized both here and in Chapters 2 and 3.
The empirical portion of our study has several aspects. In order to
judge the substantive results obtained under these various procedures,
we analyze overall win/loss rates by employees in termination cases in
labor arbitration, employment arbitration, and the federal courts. The
most intensive research strategy is our attempt to determine the degree
to which the same result would be reached in the same cases across
different processes. This is tested by posing scenarios to labor arbitra-
tors, employment arbitrators, managers, members of peer review pan-
els, jurors in employment discrimination cases, and labor court judges
from other countries. By analyzing the responses to these scenarios, we
can compare the relative harshness or leniency of the systems toward
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employees for different disciplinary offenses, and the criteria used to
reach decisions.
Whether each procedure provides due process can only be judged
by examining them in some detail. We identify these procedures
through a combination of literature search and survey questions posed
to the various decision makers, and then compare them. The result is a
body of data and analysis that permits us to draw some conclusions on
the differences among these systems as to both outcome and procedure,
and to compare them on the basis of their merits.
THE LITERATURE ON WORKPLACE JUSTICE
What do we know about workplace justice without unions? The
scholarly literature is somewhat helpful in providing ideas and argu-
ments, but is woefully lacking in empirical studies. We will work our
way through the existing literature, dealing first with open door poli-
cies, ombudsmen, mediation, and peer review panels. We will then turn
to the body of knowledge regarding employment arbitration, in order
to consider this important and controversial process in some length.
Why Workplace Justice Systems?
As noted previously, David Ewing (1989) has written that the
workplace is a kind of society. As such, it requires a justice system.
This is consistent with the guiding principles that were instituted in the
founding of the American Republic. According to Ewing, ‘‘More than
any other procedure or device on the business scene, corporate due
process brings to the workplace the humanitarian philosophy that lit up
the American sky two centuries ago’’ (1989, p. 118). In the workplace,
it means that employees are entitled to the assurance that managers are
less likely to make arbitrary decisions about their lives (McCabe 2002).
Yet, these democratic political ideals have seldom been in evidence
in the American workplace. This has been attributed, in part, to a phi-
losophy of management described and prescribed by the early and in-
fluential management theorist Chester I. Barnard. Barnard (1938) held
that managers were the ones best able to distribute, at their discretion,
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the resources of work organizations. This is thought to justify auto-
cratic, rather than democratic, management. ‘‘America has been de-
scribed as a sea of freedom filled with islands of despotism . . .’’ (Scott
1988, p. 294). The American corporation has been one of the islands.
The rise of workplace justice procedures in nonunion firms has
been attributed to the rising importance lent by workers to the notion
of ‘‘due process’’ (McCabe 2002). This may amount to a revolution of
expectations on the part of workers, a ‘‘second civil rights revolution’’
(Ewing 1977, p. 39). Additionally, there are many reasons for firms to
adopt these procedures, including 1) ‘‘developing a relationship of mu-
tual trust and respect with employees’’; 2) holding unions ‘‘at bay’’;
3) ‘‘reducing litigation and litigation expenses’’; 4) ensuring ‘‘greater
compliance with the company’s personnel policies’’; 5) pressuring
managers to ‘‘deal constructively with their subordinates’ complaints
and solve them on the spot if possible’’; 6) providing feedback on the
effects of policies on employees; 7) boosting morale; and 8) attracting
and retaining good employees (Ewing 1989, pp. 6–9). Spotting and
solving problems at an early stage before they fester is yet another
advantage (McCabe 2002).
What is Due Process in the Workplace?
Some of the requirements of workplace due process are that there
must be a procedure; it must have—and follow—rules; it must not
be arbitrary; and it must be known to employees, predictable so that
employees know that previous decisions on worker rights will be fol-
lowed, ‘‘institutionalized,’’ easy to use, perceived as equitable, and ap-
plicable to all employees (Ewing 1977, p. 156). It must be ‘‘timely,
accessible and inexpensive,’’ include the right of the employee to rep-
resented by another employee, provide the right to present evidence
and rebut charges, have ‘‘as much privacy and confidentiality as is
practicable,’’ have ‘‘a fair and impartial fact-finding process and hear-
ing,’’ provide objective and reasonable decisions with appropriate rem-
edies, and be free from retaliation against the employee (Ewing 1989,
pp. 6–7). It has been argued that this should include the right to have
outside arbitration or some other mutually agreed-upon process (Wer-
hane 1985).
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‘‘Soft’’ Justice Systems
The justice systems which are the least intrusive upon management
prerogatives are those that are considered ‘‘soft.’’ These are procedures
that do not bind management to any particular outcome. Instead of
resulting in a legally binding determination, they provide a means of
working out an agreed-upon solution. They sometimes constitute the
early stages of more intrusive systems, and are comprised of three dif-
ferent procedures: the open-door policy, mediation, and the use of an
ombudsman.
Open-door policy
The most common of the corporate procedures for resolving em-
ployee complaints is the open-door policy. In its simplest form, it is a
policy statement that says that employees who have a problem are free
to discuss it with management. The basic idea is one of managerial
openness to employee complaints, even if this involves the employee
going over the head of the immediate supervisor.
A study published in 1980 (Foulkes) found open-door policies to
be quite ‘‘commonplace’’ (p. 300). The sample of policies reported by
Foulkes included some rather complex policies that utilize multiple
steps in the management hierarchy. They often include statements that
an employee can use the policy without fear of reprisal. Also, they
commonly encourage employees to settle their problems at the lowest
practicable level of supervision.
The intent of these policies is to encourage employees to talk with
managers in a friendly and informal fashion. The door of even such a
dignitary as the president of the company is sometimes held open, and
the human resources manager may be a step in the process (McCabe
2002). Open-door policies are often broader in their scope than union-
ized grievance procedures, encouraging employees to raise a wide
range of problems and questions (McCabe 2002).
The effectiveness of open-door policies appears to vary from com-
pany to company. The interviews with personnel staff and managers
reported by Foulkes (1980) show opinions ranging from avid approval
to the statement that the policy is merely a ‘‘myth’’ (p. 309). Many
times, although the door is supposed to be open, almost no one walks
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through it (McCabe 2002), or only trivial questions are raised. Employ-
ees may believe that they will not get a fair hearing because there is
considerable social distance between rank and file employees and high
company officials, which may discourage employees from using the
procedure to its fullest extent. Perhaps most critically, it is difficult to
convince employees that going over their bosses’ heads will not lead
to reprisals (McCabe 2002). In the case of employment termination,
many upper level managers feel a necessity to support the actions of
lower level managers, or employees may believe this to be the case.
This makes the use of the procedure an unattractive channel for a com-
plaint regarding a discharge.
Unfortunately, we have not been able to locate any rigorous empir-
ical studies of open-door policies. For the purposes of studying termi-
nation of employment, however, they are probably not a particularly
fruitful subject of inquiry.
Mediation
Mediation utilizes the services of a neutral third party to help the
parties to a dispute resolve it. The mediator is not a decision maker;
rather, mediators serve as facilitators. The use of mediation is a ‘‘soft’’
form of dispute resolution because it imposes on the parties no binding
result. Its methods are those of ‘‘win–win’’ bargaining, and as such, it
provides opportunities for the employer and the employee to work out
a mutually agreeable solution to an employment problem in a relatively
nonadversarial setting (McDermott and Berkeley 1996).
Mediation has been said to provide a forum that is more likely
to facilitate settlement than the more adversarial procedures involving
adjudication. It is confidential, may produce a settlement at an early
stage, provides an opportunity to redirect emotions, is adaptable and
flexible, and can provide feelings of personal empowerment in cases
such as those involving sexual harassment (Harkavy 1999).
The increase in formal grievance procedures for nonunion employ-
ees during the 1980s and 1990s has included an increase in the use of
mediation. It has been argued that the overall phenomenon of increased
mediation procedures has arisen partly because of ‘‘the increased will-
ingness of disgruntled employees to file lawsuits and administrative
agency complaints,’’ and the resulting increase in the desire of employ-
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ers to resolve these complaints by some means other than litigation
(Feuille 1999, p. 205). Also, the availability of punitive damages and
the right to jury trial given to workers claiming discrimination by the
1991 Civil Rights Act have encouraged employers to seek alternative
means of dispute resolution. The related phenomenon of the take-up of
employment arbitration by employers in the wake of the U.S. Supreme
Court decisions in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane (1991) and Cir-
cuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001a), discussed in Chapter 2, has
involved the increased use of mediation (Feuille 1999).
Surveys of employers conducted in the mid 1990s showed large
proportions of employers, particularly among the larger corporations,
using some form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), with media-
tion often being the preferred form (Feuille 1999). A study of five large
firms that had adopted employment arbitration by 1997 showed that
three of them had various forms of pre-arbitration dispute resolution
procedures, including mediation. In 1999, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) started encouraging employers to use
ADR in handling discrimination claims, and initial analyses of this
experience yielded positive results (Feuille 1999).
While mediation is widely admired as a dispute resolving process,
it may be difficult to apply in the highly stressed atmosphere of a termi-
nation case. This is especially true if, as is usually the case, it is utilized
subsequent to the discharge. Nevertheless, practitioners are generally
of the opinion that it can frequently be helpful and seldom harmful.
Therefore, it can be an important element in a workplace justice
system.
Ombudsman
The corporate ombudsman ‘‘is a neutral member of the corporation
who provides confidential and informal assistance to employees in re-
solving work-related concerns’’ (Kandel and Frumer 1994, p. 587). In
the mid 1990s, it was estimated that about 500 corporations, most of
them with 500 or more employees, had an ombudsman system in place
(McDermott and Berkeley 1996).
Two crucial elements of an ombudsman program are that the om-
budsman keep communications with employees confidential, and that
the ombudsman be independent of management (McDermott and
PAGE 10.......................... 10765$ $CH1 06-25-04 11:06:24 PS
Workplace Justice in the United States: An Introduction 11
Berkeley 1996). If ombudsman programs meet these conditions, they
have considerable potential for removing communication barriers and
helping to resolve disputes. A problem for ombudsmen is that they are
in a position that is fraught with danger for their own careers. On one
hand, they need to be independent of management, while on the other,
it is expecting a great deal of upper level managers to assume that
they will ignore the negative effects on the company’s supervisors and
finances that an energetic and assertive ombudsman can sometimes
produce. Therefore, it is difficult for an ombudsman to maintain inde-
pendence, and to be perceived by workers as being independent (Coo-
per, Nolan, and Bales 2000).
‘‘Hard’’ Justice Systems
There are several justice systems that, unlike the ‘‘soft’’ ones, may
impose a legally binding decision on the employer. These are peer
review, employment arbitration, and labor arbitration. Peer review is
actually something of a hybrid between soft and hard systems, since it
may or may not result in a final and legally binding decision, while the
others always do. We will discuss it here, leaving for later consideration
the purely hard systems.
Peer review, which originated in the mid 1980s, was originally
intended to be primarily a union-avoidance strategy. General Electric’s
Appliance Park plant in Columbia, Maryland, is where it started (Grote
and Wimberly 1993). Recent research (Colvin 2003) provides evidence
that union avoidance remains a significant motivation for the establish-
ment of peer review committees. These systems ‘‘shift some personnel
decisions from the company to the aggrieved employee’s peers’’ (Coo-
per, Nolan, and Bales 2000, p. 664).
The procedures used by peer review systems vary considerably
(Cooper, Nolan, and Bales 2000). However, they follow a general pat-
tern of having worker complaints go to a hearing-like stage where a
panel that is comprised of employees makes a decision regarding the
worker complaint. The panel usually includes some managers, but the
majority of the panel is made up of nonmanagerial employees. The
original General Electric panels consisted of three members who were
fellow workers and two who were managers (Grote and Wimberly
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1993), which is the same makeup used in the Marriott system (Wilen-
sky and Jones 1994).
The Marriott system is fairly typical. In it, 10 to 15 percent of
employees in each of 50 business units are trained to be peer review
panelists. Their names are placed in a box and drawn by the grieving
employee. The employee can draw up to six names of peers, from
which the employee chooses three. The employee then draws from a
box the names of up to four managers, from whom the employee
chooses two. The five persons chosen then make up the panel, which
is required to hear and decide the case within 10 days of their selection
(Wilensky and Jones 1994).
Other features of the Marriott system that are also considered typi-
cal require that the panel only interpret and apply company policies—it
does not have the authority to change or abolish company policies.
Generally, a human resources professional facilitates the operation of
the panel.
The Marriott panels make final and binding decisions. This last
element is one in which some companies’ procedures vary, as some
make the panel’s decision only a recommendation for management
action. However, making the panel’s decision nonbinding may subject
it to attack under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). The NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
to dominate or interfere with a ‘‘labor organization.’’ In the case of
Keeler Brass Automotive Group (1995), the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) held that an employee committee of this type that did
not make a final and binding decision was engaged in ‘‘dealing with’’
the employer over wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employ-
ment, and was therefore a ‘‘labor organization’’ under the law. Setting
up and managing such an organization is a violation of Sec. 8 (a)(2) of
the NLRA. In Sparks Nugget, Inc. (1977), the NLRB had decided that
a panel that made a final and binding decision was legal. Interestingly,
some companies have made a decision to make peer review panel deci-
sions only recommendatory, requiring the approval of management
when they uphold a termination, even though they recognize that this
likely violates the NLRA. The reason for a company to ignore the law
likely lies in the fact that there are no penalties for violating it, and the
worst that can happen is that the NLRB can order the company to
change its practice in the future.
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How well do peer review panels work? It is claimed that employees
like them, primarily because they deliver an objective and fair decision
(Wilensky and Jones 1994). Managers tend to like peer review because
it helps employees understand the management point of view, with
employees being less likely to blame managers for disciplinary actions
(Wilensky and Jones 1994; Cooper, Nolan, and Bales 2000). One firm
found that peer review dramatically reduced employee filings with the
EEOC (Wilensky and Jones 1994). In addition, there is some anecdotal
evidence supporting the belief of managers that peers will be more
harsh with employees than managers would be (Cooper, Nolan, and
Bales 2000). A result attributed to peer review that is to the advantage
of both workers and managers is that managers tend to be more careful
in making decisions if they know that those decisions will be reviewed
by a peer review panel (Wilensky and Jones 1994).
On its face, peer review appears to be an extraordinary delegation
of power by management to rank and file employees. From the point
of view of traditional analysis of management/employee relations, it is
certainly an anomaly. How, then, does one explain this from the stand-
point of managers’ self-interest? Is it simply that they believe in em-
powering workers and are willing to give up authority in pursuit of
this ideal? Is it that they believe that this will lead to efficiencies and
profitability? Is it mainly a union avoidance technique? Or, do they
believe that employees will be more severe than managers, so that they
are cynically delegating an unpleasant task at no cost, given that pun-
ishments will be upheld more often by peer review committees than
they would by upper management?
The answer may be some combination of several of the above con-
siderations. The explanation cannot be based simply on ideological
grounds. If management believes that satisfied workers perform better,
they might favor a procedure that would increase satisfaction, hoping
that this would lead to greater productivity. The prevention of litigation
would lead to lower costs, thereby contributing to efficiency. The
avoidance of unions is certainly among the motivations, and peer re-
view may provide a substitute for one of the main advantages of union-
ism—an effective grievance system. A human resources manager was
overheard to remark that her company’s peer review procedure had
worked well in its first test because management had won the case. This
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made it fairly clear what management’s criterion was for a successful
program—the peer review committee denying the grievance. Also, the
establishment of peer review committees has been found to be related
to the adoption of more general high-performance management sys-
tems (i.e., teams and the like) (Colvin 2003). This may indicate that
peer review is often just one aspect of an overall policy of employee
involvement.
The most important effects from both the employer and employee
perspectives may be more subtle and long-range. It may well be that
supervisors take greater care with disciplinary actions when they know
that a relatively objective review of these actions will be made. Clearly,
this is the hope for positive effects of the ‘‘hard’’ processes generally—
that the prospect of having a decision overturned will make for better,
more objectively justifiable decisions. It is precisely this that is a prime
requirement for the provision of human dignity at the workplace.
From a management perspective, it may be extremely helpful in
the long run to have a group of rank and file employees (trained peer
review panel members) who have a sympathetic understanding of the
difficulties that managers face in discipline cases. The role of a man-
ager is often a difficult one, and it can only be eased by making subor-
dinates aware of this fact.
There are many questions that remain unanswered about peer re-
views. Are they fair? How do their decisions compare with those
reached in other ‘‘hard’’ processes? Are they indeed more severe than
managers would be? Does the presence of managers and the participa-
tion of human resources professionals permit the co-opting of employ-
ees into accepting management decisions? Are peer review panel
members truly independent of management? We attempt to deal with
at least a few of these in this study.
PLAN OF THE BOOK
In the next two chapters, we will discuss the literature and evidence
on the most heavily studied of the ‘‘hard’’ management-initiated dis-
pute resolution procedures—employment arbitration. In the chapters
that follow, we will set out the methods and samples employed in our
study, the data gathered, our various analyses of the data, and some
general conclusions.
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Employment Arbitration
Employment arbitration is by far the most controversial of the
ADR systems for resolving disputes over termination of employment.
This is illustrated by the fact that in November 2002, the Consumer
Attorneys of California took the rather extreme step of announcing a
boycott of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), in a bitter
dispute between claimants’ lawyers and the AAA that has arisen out of
AAA’s opposition to recent California legislation that regulates this
process. The intensity of the controversy is derived from an increasing
popularity of employment arbitration among employers and strong re-
sistance to it by claimants’ attorneys, federal agencies, scholars, and
professional groups.
Employment arbitration is a process for resolving disputes among
nonunion employees and their employers. It provides an alternative to
litigation and, indirectly, to labor arbitration that is available to union-
ized workers. In an employment arbitration procedure, the employer
and the employee agree that claims of the employee against the em-
ployer will be taken to an arbitration tribunal rather than to court.
Sometimes this is limited to claims for which the law already gives a
remedy, such as discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national ori-
gin, religion, color, age, or disability, but the agreement may apply
more broadly to any type of claim by the employee against the em-
ployer, or by the employer against the employee. It is designed by the
employer. While there have been attempts to provide for arbitration
of employment discharge cases by state law, most notably the Model
Employment Termination Act adopted by the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, only Montana has adopted such a law (Bingham
1996).
The details of employment arbitration procedures vary widely.
They can range from a process that is clearly stacked against the em-
ployee to one that is relatively even-handed and provides the employee
with a fair process. The crucial ingredients are a binding decision by a
neutral outsider selected by the parties, and the avoidance of lawsuits.
It has been said that employment arbitration is not a substitute for
litigation, but rather litigation in a different forum.
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The most controversial aspect of employment arbitration is that it
is typically mandated by the employer as a condition of employment
prior to the dispute in question. Post-dispute voluntary arbitration is
universally praised as useful, and can be truly said to be at the option
of the employee. Pre-dispute employment arbitration contracts, on the
other hand, confront employees with a choice of agreeing to arbitration
or losing either their present job or the chance to be hired at a new job.
In addition, these are contracts of adhesion wherein there is no bargain-
ing and the procedure is offered to the employee on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis. This transaction has the further characteristic of usually being
between two parties of greatly unequal bargaining power.
In this chapter, we will discuss the growth of employment arbitra-
tion, the reasons for its growth, changes in the law pertaining to it, and
the literature on the pros and cons of employment arbitration.
THE GROWTH OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
Although there is no current comprehensive study of the incidence
of employment arbitration agreements, there have been a number of
scholarly and government efforts to document the increase in these
agreements during the 1990s. These provide us with a picture of a
phenomenon that is gaining in popularity, although perhaps not so rap-
idly as is sometimes assumed in the literature.
One recent study of the telecommunications industry (Colvin
2001) found that about 16 percent of the 302 establishments surveyed
had employment arbitration procedures in place. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, the same survey showed a similar (15.9 percent) rate of adoption
of peer review practices (Colvin 2003). A national survey of a sample
of 1,000 firms that included firms varying in size, location, and indus-
try found that 19 percent of the 123 respondent firms had an employ-
ment arbitration procedure (Galle and Koen 2000–2001). According to
the 2000 annual report of the AAA, there were over 500 employers
employing five million workers covered by AAA’s arbitration pro-
grams (LeRoy and Feuille 2002).
In the late 1980s, a study by Columbia University showed that 42
to 54 percent of nonunion employers had a written procedure, and
about 20 percent of these had third-party arbitration (Lewin 1990). A
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1994 survey by the U.S. General Accounting Office (USGAO) found
that, of their stratified random sample of 2,000 businesses that filed
Equal Employment Opportunity reports in 1992 and had more than
100 employees, 9.9 percent had employment arbitration procedures in
place. Of those that had ADR procedures in 1992, 19 percent used
arbitration (USGAO 1995, 1997). USGAO concluded in a 1997 report
that the use of ADR generally had increased since their 1994 report
(USGAO 1997). A 1997 study that received responses from 606 corpo-
rate lawyers from the 1,000 largest companies showed that arbitration
(not necessarily in its mandatory form) had been used in 62 percent of
their employment disputes (Lipsky and Seeber 1999). A survey of the
1,000 largest American corporations found that 79 percent of them
used arbitration to resolve a variety of disputes (Zimmerman 1997).
This, however, included many types of disputes, not just those regard-
ing employment. One mid-nineties survey (McDermott 1995) reported
that most of the 92 companies responding to the survey would consider
adopting employment arbitration.
One very broad and comprehensive survey of American workplace
practices (Freeman and Rogers 1999) provides some interesting data.
It found that 32 percent of workers were covered by a grievance proce-
dure that ended in third-party arbitration. Given that only 13.5 percent
of American workers are union members who are covered by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement’s provision for labor arbitration, this would
translate into approximately 18.5 percent who are covered by employ-
ment arbitration.
From the above data, we conclude that there has been some growth
in the use of employment arbitration during the 1990s. However, there
is no hard evidence regarding the extent to which this is currently oc-
curring across American industry.
REASONS FOR GROWTH OF EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION
Employment arbitration has enjoyed whatever popularity that it has
gained for two main reasons: First, employers have felt a need for it,
and second, the Federal Government has encouraged it. Congress has
encouraged ADR in several statutes, but most importantly, the U.S.
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Supreme Court has made it clear that pre-dispute mandatory employ-
ment arbitration agreements are enforceable under federal law. We will
briefly address the first of these reasons—the employers’ perceived
need—in this section, and then move on to a more extensive review of
the law.
Complaints filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission soared in the early 1990s. Between fiscal years 1991 and 1994,
the number of discrimination complaints to the EEOC grew by 43 per-
cent, from 63,898 to 91,189 (USGAO 1997). Between 1990 and 1998,
the number of employment discrimination cases filed in Federal Dis-
trict-Court Civil Cases rose from 6,936 to 21,540. In the same period,
civil rights cases in U.S. Courts of Appeal increased from 4,729 to
8,466, and 56 percent of these cases were employment cases (Litras
2000). This was paralleled by an increase in the number of discrimina-
tion cases decided in federal district courts from 2,418 in 1991 to 3,419
in 1994, and the cases decided annually rose to 5,400 by 2000 (Federal
District-Court Civil Cases 2002). The Federal Commission on the Fu-
ture of Labor-Management Relations (Dunlop Commission) concluded
that there had been a veritable ‘‘explosion’’ in lawsuits for enforcement
of employee rights (U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 1994).
However, this conclusion was challenged by one scholar (Stone 1999)
who argued that there were no more cases on federal dockets in the
mid 1990s than 25 years before, and that the average caseload per
judge had gone down. In spite of the fact that studies had lent support
to the view that the ‘‘so-called litigation explosion is a myth which has
little to support it,’’ it is one that ‘‘nonetheless plays a powerful role in
fueling moves to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms’’ (Stone
1999, p. 959).
Employment discrimination cases had already been on the rise
prior to the 1990s (Coleman and Pangis 2000–2001). In the 1970s
and 1980s, the number of employment discrimination cases filed had
increased an astonishing 2,166 percent (Donohue and Siegelman
1991).
In its 1997 report, the USGAO concluded that the increase in dis-
crimination cases resulted from the downsizing that was taking place
during this period, the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act
in 1990, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which provided for the right
to jury trial and compensatory and punitive damages. Under this new
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Civil Rights Act, compensatory damages can now be awarded for fu-
ture pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, and the like, but the
limit on compensatory and punitive damages is $300,000 for the
largest employers.
In addition to the increasing litigation involving violation of fed-
eral and state antidiscrimination laws, state courts continued to expand
a set of exceptions to the historic employment-at-will rule in the 1980s
and 1990s. In some states—particularly California—wrongful termina-
tion suits grew in both volume and money damages enough to give rise
to concern and calls for arbitration of these cases (Gould 1987–1988).
Employment-at-will is a matter of common law in all states except
Montana, which has a statute requiring cause for termination. The em-
ployment-at-will rule is that employers can terminate employees for
any—or no—reason, so long as they do not violate a particular statute,
such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or the NLRA. This cuts both
ways, in that the employee can also terminate the relationship at any
time.
The most commonly adopted exception to employment-at-will is
the public policy exception, with courts holding that an employee can-
not be terminated if the termination would violate public policy. Exam-
ples of this are the firing of a worker for refusing to commit perjury or
for compliance with a summons to perform jury duty. Other exceptions
are the implied-in-fact contract exception, where a handbook or set of
company rules can become binding upon the employer under certain
circumstances. The courts have also implied-in-law that there is an
obligation of good faith and fair dealing implicit in all employment
contracts, as it is in other contracts. Finally, liability can arise from
firing a worker in an abusive manner (Bennett-Alexander and Hartman
2001).
It is not only the frequency of employee claims and lawsuits that
has been increasing; the size of damage awards in jury verdicts has
been increasing as well. Between 1994 and 2000, the median jury
award in a discrimination case rose 177 percent, from $78,592 to
$218,000 (Jury Verdict Research 2002a). During the same period, the
chances of winning in front of a jury increased from 50 percent to 67
percent (Jury Verdict Research 2002b). In the arena of litigation in state
courts under exceptions to the employment-at-will rule, as well as in
statutory cases, there have been a number of very lucrative jury verdicts
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against employers that have been highly publicized (Eaton and Keefe
1999). In the 1980s, jury verdicts had already become quite substantial.
For example, in California between 1980 and 1986, the average award
for successful plaintiffs was $640,000 (Dertouzos, Holland, and Ebner
1988). This experience has led to a fear of extreme jury verdicts that,
although not entirely justified because of the low probability of their
occurrence, has caused employers to search for alternatives to being
subjected to the tender mercies of juries (USGAO 1995).
The Dunlop Commission concluded that it was the phenomenon
of increasing worker discrimination complaints and litigation that led
employers to search for ways other than litigation to resolve these
claims (U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 1994). One study
found that 75 percent of a national sample of 36 employers with em-
ployment arbitration had adopted it because of concerns about the cost
of litigation (Bickner, Ver Ploeg, and Feigenbaum 1997). This same
study found that only 10 percent cited union avoidance as a motivating
factor in the adoption of employment arbitration. This lends some sup-
port to the view that union avoidance is not the primary motivation
(Clark 1997). A number of writers have argued that these procedures
have been adopted primarily to avoid the costs and risks of litigation
(e.g., Clark 1997; Abraham and Voos 2000).
ENCOURAGEMENT BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The federal government’s encouragement of the use of employ-
ment arbitration has been both legislative and judicial. Congress en-
couraged the use of ADR by stating a preference for it in the American
with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (which encouraged federal courts to
use ADR). In 1992, the EEOC adopted regulations that encouraged the
use of ADR in its complaint processes. Likewise, in 1994, the Dunlop
Commission recommended increasing the use of ADR in resolving
employee claims of violations of discrimination laws (USGAO 1997).
The most powerful stimulus to the adoption of employment arbitra-
tion has come from two key decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court which
made it clear that pre-dispute mandatory employment arbitration
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agreements are enforceable: Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001a),
and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane (1991).
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, by a 5 to 4 vote, the court
reversed a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that had
held that a mandatory employment arbitration clause in an employment
contract was unenforceable. The employee—Adams—had signed an
employment application that contained a provision stating that he
agreed to take all claims arising from his employment, including statu-
tory ones, to arbitration rather than to court. He later filed a suit against
his employer for violating California’s Fair Employment and Housing
Act.
The Supreme Court ruled that the arbitration agreement was en-
forceable by finding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) covered
such contracts of employment. The court construed the FAA’s exclu-
sion of ‘‘contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in interstate commerce’’ to exempt
only transportation workers. The primary rationale of the court in so
construing the FAA exclusion was the legal principle of ejusdem gene-
ris, which holds that ‘‘where general words follow specific words in a
statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only
objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding
specific words’’ (pp. 114–115). Applied to the language of the FAA,
this meant that only workers similar to seamen and railroad employ-
ees—i.e., transportation employees—were covered by the exclusion
from the FAA.
Because federal law is supreme, the FAA as construed by the Su-
preme Court controls litigation in state courts as well as federal courts,
meaning that the authority of the federal government prevents the states
from making these agreements unenforceable (Southland Corp. v.
Keating 1984). The only basis for an arbitration agreement being
deemed unenforceable under the FAA is ‘‘such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’’ Thus, a contract to
arbitrate could be set aside, but only for the same reasons that would
make any other contract unenforceable, and this would generally be a
matter of state law.
Under the FAA, arbitration awards are not subject to meaningful
judicial review. They can be set aside only ‘‘where the award was pro-
cured by corruption, fraud, or undue means,’’ ‘‘where there [existed]
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evident partiality or corruption [by] the arbitrators,’’ where there was
misconduct by the arbitrators, or where ‘‘the arbitrators exceeded their
powers’’ (Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §510, 2000; Cooper, Nolan,
and Bales 2000). Courts have stated that an arbitration award can also
be set aside if the arbitrator acted in ‘‘manifest disregard of the law’’
(Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc. 1998). It has been held that manifest
disregard of the law exists where the award is: ‘‘unfounded in reason
and fact; based on reasoning so faulty that no judge, or group of judges,
ever could conceivably have made such a ruling; or mistakenly based
on a crucial assumption that is concededly a non-fact’’ (Advent, Inc. v.
McCarthy 1990, p. 8). This decision was based on dictum in a U.S.
Supreme Court decision, Wilko v. Swan (1953).
The stage for Circuit City Stores v. Adams was set by the earlier
case of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane (1991). In that case, the court
upheld an arbitration agreement contained in Gilmer’s application for
registration as a securities representative on the New York Stock
Exchange. The application provided that he agreed to ‘‘arbitrate any
dispute, including employment disputes.’’ Interstate/Johnson Lane
terminated him several years later when he had reached the age of
62, and Gilmer sued in federal court under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. The employer defended on the grounds that Gilmer
was compelled to arbitrate the matter, and the Supreme Court held that
the agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim was enforceable. It said
that this did not involve Gilmer giving up substantive statutory rights,
but only an agreement on his part to enforce these rights in a different
forum. It cited the strong federal policy favoring arbitration that was
reflected in the FAA.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane did not involve an agreement
between an employer and an employee, but rather one with the stock
exchange, therefore, the FAA exemption of employment contracts did
not apply. However, the court’s reasoning and approach to this case
strongly indicated that employment contracts to arbitrate would be en-
forceable. This decision had the effect of encouraging employers to
experiment with mandatory arbitration clauses in their agreements with
employees. Indeed, subsequent to the Gilmer case, all of the Circuit
Courts of Appeal except the Ninth Circuit had reached the conclusion
that such clauses were enforceable, even before Circuit City was de-
cided.
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Subsequent to Circuit City, the Ninth Circuit overruled its decision
in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens Co. (1998), in which it had held
that a mandatory employment arbitration covering statutory rights was
unenforceable, thus bringing the court into line with the others on this
point. However, on the Circuit City case itself, which was remanded to
the Ninth Circuit, the court held that the agreement in that case was
unenforceable because it was ‘‘unconscionable’’ under California law.
It based this decision on the fact that the agreement was offered on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis, did not require the company to arbitrate its
claims against the employee, provided for only limited relief to the
employee, and required the employee to pay half of the costs of arbitra-
tion (Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams 2001b).
As indicated by the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in the Circuit City re-
mand, there remain a number of questions to be answered with regard
to the enforcement of mandatory employment arbitration agreements.
Given that these clauses are enforceable as a general proposition, what,
if anything, is required of particular agreements in order for them to
survive judicial scrutiny under state law or under a developing federal
common law?
Partly because the author of the opinion is Harry Edwards, a well-
respected authority on employment law, the decision of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals in Cole v. Burns International Security
Services (1997) is widely cited on the subject of the standards that must
be met by employment arbitration agreements. In this case, the court
held that it would enforce an agreement to arbitrate, but only because
it did not impose on the employee the obligation to pay all or part of
the costs of the arbitration. Judge Edwards stated:
Indeed, we are unaware of any situation in American jurispru-
dence in which a beneficiary of a federal statute has been required
to pay for the services of the judge . . . [yet] arbitration is supposed
to be a reasonable substitute for a judicial forum.’’ (p. 1484)
In Cole, the court also stated that Gilmer required five safeguards for
a pre-dispute employment arbitration clause to be enforceable: 1) an
arbitrator who is neutral; 2) discovery that is more than minimal; 3) a
written award; 4) the availability of all remedies that would be available
in court; and 5) the absence of a requirement for the employee to pay
either costs that are unreasonable, or any part of the arbitrator’s fees.
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There have been a number of court decisions on an employee’s
obligation to share in the costs of arbitration proceedings, and on the
effects of that obligation on the enforceability of the employment arbi-
tration agreement. Some have agreed with Cole that any sharing of
cost renders the agreement unenforceable (Shankle v. B-G Maintenance
Management of Colorado, Inc. 1999; Paladino v. Avnet Computer
Technologies, Inc. 1998). Others have viewed the question on a case-
by-case basis to see if the particular cost-sharing arrangement is rea-
sonable under the circumstances of the case (e.g., Midworm v. Ashcroft
2002; Baugher v. Dekko Heating Technologies 2002). An appeals court
in Florida held that a provision that the employer and the employee
share equally in the costs of the arbitrations rendered the agreement
unenforceable (Flyer Printing Co. v. Hill 2001). The Ninth Circuit has
held that excessive costs being imposed on the employee, along with
other ‘‘oppressive’’ provisions, can render the arbitration agreement
unconscionable (see below for further discussion of this criterion), and
therefore unenforceable (Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Industries,
Inc. 2002). The Sixth Circuit has held that cost-splitting agreements
are unenforceable, but severed them from the balance of the arbitration
agreement, making it otherwise enforceable (Morrison v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc. 2003). Other courts have refused to sever unconscionable
cost provisions, causing them to invalidate the entire agreement to arbi-
trate (Plaskett v. Bechtel International, Inc. 2003). An interesting anal-
ysis of this issue has been written by LeRoy and Feuille (2002).
The California Supreme Court in Armendiaz v. Foundation Health
Psychcare Services (2000) held that, in order to be consistent with the
state antidiscrimination statute, and therefore enforceable, an agree-
ment needed to contain the Cole safeguards: 1) provide for a neutral
arbitrator; 2) not limit statutory remedies; 3) provide for some discov-
ery; 4) require written awards; and 5) not impose limits on the employ-
ee’s remedies without imposing the same limits on the employer’s.
Armendiaz has been applied to common law claims of termination in
violation of public policy (Little v. Auto Stiegler 2003).
In Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips (1999), the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the employer had violated its agreement to
arbitrate by setting up a process that was ‘‘utterly lacking in the rudi-
ments of even-handedness,’’ and therefore could not force the em-
ployee to submit to the employer’s process (p. 933). Hooters’ system
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required the employee, but not the employer, to provide the specifics
of the claim at the outset of the proceeding. The employee was also
required to provide the employer with a list of witnesses and a sum-
mary of the facts known by each. Here, also, there was no such require-
ment for the employer. The arbitrator was to be chosen from a panel
selected by the employer. The employer, but not the employee, could
add claims during the course of the proceeding, move for summary
dismissal, record the hearing, and vacate or modify the award. The
employer could cancel the arbitration process on 30 days’ notice, and
change the rules without notice at any time. The court characterized
this as a ‘‘sham system unworthy even of the name arbitration’’ (p.
940).
To the extent that employment arbitration agreements are adhesive
(i.e., form contracts presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis), they may
be unenforceable under state law if the terms are ‘‘not within the rea-
sonable expectation of the weaker party and . . . are unduly oppressive
or unconscionable’’ (Cooper, Nolan, and Bales 2000, p. 560); (see also
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. 1981). Unconscionability is said by the
courts to have two dimensions: substantive and procedural. To be unen-
forceable, a contract must be unconscionable on both dimensions. Sub-
stantive unconsionability ‘‘refers to contract terms that unreasonably
favor one party over another,’’ while procedural unconsionability ‘‘re-
fers to the process of contract formation, and encompasses the inequal-
ity of bargaining power and ability, and the use of fine print and
convoluted language’’ (Cooper, Nolan, and Bales 2000, p. 560). It has
been held that an adhesive agreement—one that is ‘‘drafted or other-
wise proffered’’ by the stronger of two contracting parties—is unen-
forceable ‘‘if two conditions are present: 1) the contract is the result of
coercive bargaining between two parties of unequal bargaining
strength; and 2) the contract unfairly limits the obligations and liabili-
ties of, or otherwise unfairly advantages, the stronger party’’ (Brown v.
KFC National Management Co. 1996, p. 167); (see also Stirlen v. Su-
percuts 1997). The U.S. Supreme Court, in Doctor’s Associates, Inc.
v. Casarotto (1996), held that defenses generally applicable in contract
cases, such as unconscionability, can be applied without violating the
FAA. Some practical guidance for employers drafting agreements that
are fair and defensible exists in the literature (Dichter and Ballard
2000–2001). More recently, the Ninth Circuit has held an arbitration
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agreement to be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable
(Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. 2003).
Arbitration agreements have been found to be unenforceable on a
few other counts. The Ninth Circuit has held that an arbitration clause
buried in a handbook does not constitute a ‘‘knowing waiver’’ of statu-
tory rights, and is therefore enforceable (Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad
Copper Corp. 1997). Another circuit has held that an arbitration clause
contained in a handbook is enforceable where it is separate from other
parts of the handbook and signed separately (Patterson v. Tenet Health-
care 1997), and yet another U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has refused
to enforce an arbitration clause that it deemed to be ‘‘illusory’’ because
it permitted the employer to change it at any time (Dumais v. American
Golf Corp. 2002). A federal district court in Ohio has held an agree-
ment to be unenforceable because it favored the employer on proce-
dural matters and required the Ohio resident employee to travel to San
Francisco for the arbitration proceeding (Hagedorn v. Veritas Software
Corp. 2002).
It is clear that a pre-dispute employment arbitration clause is not
per se unconscionable or unenforceable. However, whether a particular
agreement is unconscionable or, in terms of the analysis in the Hooters
case, is an agreement to arbitrate at all, probably depends upon whether
it meets accepted norms of fairness and due process.
A broad set of standards for fairness was laid down by the Dunlop
Commission in its 1994 report. According to the commission, arbitra-
tion systems should provide 1) a neutral arbitrator who is knowledge-
able about the law and the concerns of the employer and the employee,
2) a method that is both fair and simple by which the employee can
secure the necessary information to prosecute the claim, 3) a method
of sharing costs that is fair and ensures affordable access of the em-
ployee to the process, 4) the right to an independent representative,
5) the same remedies available in litigation, 6) a written opinion ex-
plaining the arbitrator’s reasoning, and 7) sufficient judicial review to
ensure that the arbitrator’s decision is consistent with the law.
Probably the most influential set of standards for employment arbi-
tration is the Due Process Protocol created and agreed to in 1995 by
the National Academy of Arbitrators, the AAA, the American Bar As-
sociation, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Federal Mediation
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and Conciliation Service, the National Employment Lawyers Associa-
tion, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (Zack
1999). The Due Process Protocol calls for 1) a neutral agency to de-
velop a roster of neutrals who are demographically diverse, 2) neutrals
who are trained in the statutes involved, 3) joint selection of the arbitra-
tor from the panel of arbitrators, 4) access by both parties to the names
of parties who had recently presented cases to the neutrals, 5) discov-
ery procedures allowing for a reasonable number of depositions, 6) a
representative of the employee’s choosing, 7) a written decision consis-
tent with the law, 8) a remedy consistent with the statute, and 9) limited
judicial review (Zack 1999). Interestingly, the NAA, one of the parties
to the Protocol, has taken an adverse position, in principle, to manda-
tory pre-dispute employment arbitration, although its members may
ethically hear such cases. The NAA is joined in its opposition to pre-
dispute employment arbitration by the EEOC (1997). In two 1995
cases, the NLRB issued unfair labor practice complaints based on em-
ployees’ termination for refusing to sign or abide by employment arbi-
tration agreements (Bentley’s Luggage Corp. 1995; Great Western
Financial Corp. 1995). However, it is not possible to know the NLRB
policy at the present time. In our view, it is likely that the 2004 version
of the board will look more favorably upon employment arbitration.
Two of the major agencies that administer employment arbitration
cases, the AAA and JAMS/Endispute, have adopted the protocol and
announced that they will handle cases only if they are based on agree-
ments that comply with the protocol. In addition, in November 2002,
the AAA announced that it had changed its rules to provide that the
cost of the administrative filing fee that could be charged to the em-
ployee was capped at $125, and that the arbitrator’s fee must be paid
in full by the employer (National Arbitration Center 2002a).
In our view, pre-dispute employment arbitration agreements will
have to meet the requirements of the protocol in order to be enforce-
able. In addition, an agreement that imposes more than de minimus
costs on the employee is highly likely to run afoul of the standards
set in Cole v. Burns International Security Services, and therefore be
unenforceable. Requiring the employer to foot the bill for arbitration
does seem eminently reasonable, given that it is the employer’s process
that is substituted for court proceedings at the employer’s insistence.
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Having spoken to the ability of the employee to assert his or her
claim for employment discrimination, there remains the question of
what, if any, effect an employment arbitration agreement has on the
ability of the EEOC to enforce the statutes under its purview. One of
the many arguments against employment arbitration is that it consigns
a matter of public law and policy to a private justice system. That is, it
is not just the individual right of the claimant that is involved, but rather
the public interest in the elimination of discrimination. An answer to
this criticism of employment arbitration is the continued ability of the
EEOC to enforce the law when it believes this to be necessary.
In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court
held that an employee’s agreement to arbitrate did not preclude the
EEOC from bringing an action of its own to enforce the law. Further-
more, the EEOC can recover judicial victim-specific relief for the em-
ployee, including backpay, reinstatement, and money damages.
However, if the employee has failed to mitigate his or her damages
(e.g., by attempting to find interim employment) or has accepted a
monetary settlement from the employer, this would limit the amount
that the EEOC could recover from the employer. This was followed by
a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision (EEOC v. Circuit City Stores,
Inc. 2002), holding that an arbitration agreement did not prevent an
employee from filing a charge with the EEOC, or the EEOC from
proceeding with a lawsuit seeking victim-specific relief.
This limit on the effects of an arbitration agreement may not be as
important as one might think, since the EEOC brings few lawsuits (in
2000 only 291 of the 21,032 discrimination lawsuits were brought by
the EEOC). The EEOC, with its limited budget and staff, can take only
cases with high publicity potential or where a very large amount of
money is at stake.
Employment Arbitration and Collective Bargaining
The interface between collective bargaining agreements and the
NLRA, and employment arbitration agreements is still unclear. There
are two questions that arise in this context. First, does the agreement
of a union to arbitration of employee grievances bind the individual
employee in the same manner that an individual’s agreement does?
That is, is an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement
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barred from bringing a lawsuit for violations of employment discrimi-
nation laws? Second, what should be the effect of an arbitration clause
on an employee’s ability to file charges under the NLRA? These are
questions that were believed to be settled but have been given new life
by Circuit City Stores v. Adams.
As to the first question, it has long been the law that neither the
existence of a collectively bargained right to arbitration, nor an em-
ployee pursuing arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement,
bars a lawsuit under federal antidiscrimination statutes (Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co. 1974). An employee can pursue a Title VII claim,
even after losing in arbitration.
The decision in Gardner-Denver was based in part on the view
that the statutory claim and the claim under the collective bargaining
agreement were separate. The fact that the same events gave rise to
both claims did not prevent the employee from pursuing them both.
The court also held that ‘‘there can be no prospective waiver of the
employee’s rights under Title VII,’’ (p. 51) and that, in any event, the
collective processes of collective bargaining could not waive the indi-
vidual rights of an employee under the law. In addition, the court held
that the arbitral forum was ill-suited to dealing with questions of public
law because the arbitrator’s duty was to enforce the contract, not to
enforce public law. Furthermore, the lack of legal training of many
arbitrators, and the differing procedures in arbitration, caused the arbi-
tral forum to be inadequate.
Obviously, Circuit City plays havoc with the rationale found in
Gardner-Denver. Although this decision has not yet been overruled,
the reasoning of the court in Gardner-Denver is no longer subscribed
to by the U.S. Supreme Court. Title VII rights, or at least the forum to
pursue them, can now be waived. The question is now what does it
take for a waiver to exist. In Wright v. Universal Maritime Service
Corp. (1998), the Supreme Court held that an arbitration clause did not
bar an action under the Americans with Disabilities Act because the
collective bargaining agreement did not contain a clear and unequivo-
cal waiver of the right of access to court. The court avoided saying
whether such a clear and unequivocal waiver by the union would be
binding on the part of the employee.
At this writing, it is still unclear whether a union can waive an
employee’s right, however there are a number of post-Wright cases that
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develop the law on this issue. It has been argued that there may be two
ways that a collective bargaining agreement can meet the standard of
having a clear and unequivocal waiver. First, the collective agreement’s
arbitration clause could specifically provide that employees agree that
they will submit to arbitration all claims that arise out of their employ-
ment. Second, the collective bargaining agreement could state that the
obligation to arbitrate applies to ‘‘all disputes,’’ or ‘‘all disputes con-
cerning the agreement,’’ while at the same time incorporating the dis-
crimination statutes into the agreement (Hodges 2001, p. 515). The
courts have tended to be rather strict in their requirements for such
waivers (see Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc. 1999; Kennedy v. Supe-
rior Painting Co. 2000; Quint v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. 1999).
However, the Fourth Circuit has held that a provision in a collective
bargaining agreement that arbitration would be the exclusive remedy
for ‘‘all claims regarding equal employment opportunities’’ barred a
suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Singletary v. Enersys
Inc. 2003).
Two circuits have held that union waivers of statutory claims of
individual employees are unenforceable (Rogers v. New York Univer-
sity 2000; Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co. 1997). The Third Circuit has
decided that a collective bargaining agreement arbitration clause does
not bar a lawsuit if the employee cannot demand arbitration without
the consent of the union (Martin v. Dana Corp. 1997). The Eleventh
Circuit has set out a three-part test for a collective bargaining agree-
ment barring an employee from litigation. Under this test, a suit is
barred only if 1) the employee has individually agreed to arbitrate,
2) the arbitrator is authorized to resolve federal statutory claims, and
3) the employee had the right to insist upon arbitration (Brisentine v.
Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. 1997). Another circuit has held
that the award of an arbitrator against the employee is strong evidence
that Title VII has not been violated, and, in the absence of a showing
of new evidence or partiality on the part of the arbitrator, the employee
fails to make out a prima facie case of discrimination (Collins v. New
York City Transit Authority 2002).
A more troubling question is whether the waiver of individual
rights to go to court on discrimination claims under a collective bar-
gaining agreement—if such a waiver would be valid—would be a man-
datory subject of collective bargaining under the NLRA. If it is not a
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mandatory subject of bargaining, then neither party can insist on their
position to the point of impasse. Also, it may be possible for the em-
ployer to bypass the union and require employees to sign individual
agreements to employment arbitration (Hodges 2001). One circuit
court of appeals has held that the right of an employee to pursue an
individual claim in court in the presence of an arbitration clause in a
collective bargaining agreement is not a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing under the Railway Labor Act. It concluded that an employer can,
therefore, require an employee covered by a collective bargaining
agreement to sign an agreement compelling him or her to arbitrate a
discrimination claim (Air Line Pilots Association v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc. 1999).
The matter of the union waiver of individual rights to pursue their
claims in court is one with respect to which a number of questions
remain. These will probably stay unsettled until the U.S. Supreme
Court rules definitively on them.
Another area of difficulty lies in the policies of the NLRB, with
regard to the arbitration of cases that may involve violations of the
NLRA. At present, the NLRB will defer to arbitration. It will generally
overturn an arbitration award only if the award is ‘‘clearly repugnant’’
to the NLRA (Spielberg Manufacturing Co. 1955; Collyer Insulated
Wire 1971; United Technologies Corp. 1984). However lenient the
NLRB’s standard of review, it still involves a review of an arbitrator’s
decision on its merits. This would seem to be a more severe review
than a court would give an employment arbitrator’s decision under the
NAA. Yet here, the employee’s claim is likely to get at least as capable
representation as it would get under employment arbitration. Here,
then, is another area of uncertainty in the law that will have to be
resolved, probably by the Supreme Court, in order for the law to have
the necessary degree of predictability.
LEGISLATION ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
The State of California is a hotbed of legislative activity on em-
ployment arbitration. In its 2002 session, the California legislature
passed six statutes having to do with arbitration. The governor vetoed
two of these legislative actions, but the four that became law affect
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employment arbitration in several respects. First, private arbitration
providers are required to publish certain information about their cases,
including who prevailed, the amount of the award, the arbitrator’s fee,
and the number of times the employer has been a party to arbitrations
or mediations administered by the provider. Second, private arbitration
providers are prohibited from having a financial interest in the parties
and attorneys, and the parties and attorneys are not permitted to have a
financial interest in the provider. Third, private providers are not im-
mune from lawsuits. Fourth, a court’s remand of an arbitrator’s award
cannot go back to the same arbitrator (AAA 2002; National Arbitration
Center 2000b). It is a dispute over this legislation that led the Con-
sumer Attorneys of California to boycott the AAA.
For several years, there have been efforts to pass federal legislation
prohibiting pre-dispute mandatory employment arbitration. In June
2001, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives entitled the
Preservation of Civil Rights Protection Act. It would amend the FAA
to make employment arbitration agreements unenforceable unless they
were voluntarily entered into by an employer and an employee after
the dispute arose. This bill was developed by the Congressional Pro-
gressive Caucus, and cosponsored by 35 Democratic members of the
House. It was endorsed by a number of civil rights, labor, and similar
organizations, including the Leadership Conference on Human Rights
and the National Organization for Women (Bureau of National Affairs
2001a). Similar legislation, entitled the Civil Rights Procedures Protec-
tion Act, was first introduced in the U.S. Senate in 1994 by Senator
Russell Feingold (D–WI) (Feingold 2002), but stands little chance of
passage in a conservative Republican Congress.
A contrary direction is taken in the Model Employment Termina-
tion Act that was adopted in 1991 by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws. This act would require ‘‘good
cause’’ to be present for the termination of a worker, and would permit
employers to require employees to submit future claims to arbitra-
tion—i.e., pre-dispute mandatory arbitration (Eastman and Rothstein
1995). At this writing, no state has adopted this model legislation.
THE PROS AND CONS OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
There is an extensive literature arguing the advantages and disad-
vantages of pre-dispute mandatory employment arbitration. While in-
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teresting and lively, much of it covers the same ground, making the
similar arguments to those already covered here in slightly different
ways. Accordingly, we will limit ourselves to summarizing the litera-
ture by setting out the main arguments and citing a representative set
of references for each one.
Arguments in Favor of Employment Arbitration
Public policy
From the standpoint of the courts, employment arbitration offers
some relief from the burdensome employment arbitration caseload that
has developed over the last few decades. The court process is slow and
costly, and better suited to ‘‘setting principles and establishing proce-
dures in test cases’’ than to handling a heavy caseload of employment
cases (Bales 1997, p. 9). Arbitration can free the EEOC from handling
routine claims and permit it to instead expend its efforts going after
wrongdoers who are systematically violating the law (Estreicher 1997).
It is said that the courts have been enduring a ‘‘tidal wave of employ-
ment-related litigation,’’ and need to deal with it by getting rid of some
of this burden (Clark 1997, p. 181). It has been persuasively argued
that the EEOC and the courts operating under Title VII have failed to
deliver what they should—‘‘access to a fair adjudicatory process’’ to all
employees, and the avoidance of employers having to ‘‘spend excessive
amounts of time and money defending baseless claims’’ (Sherwyn, Tra-
cey, and Eigen 1999, p. 147). Frivolous claims may be encouraged
while meritorious ones ‘‘slip through the cracks’’ and are lost (Sher-
wyn, Tracey, and Eigen 1999, p. 88).
Congress has emphatically approved employment arbitration. This
first occurred in 1925, with the enactment of the FAA. In 1991, Sec.
118 of the Civil Rights Act of that year encouraged arbitration as a
means of settling disputes arising under Title VII (Kaswell 1998).
Employers
Employers have an understandable dislike for the jury system,
which arbitration avoids. Employers have the view that juries are un-
predictable, often decide cases on grounds of emotion and sympathy,
and relate to employees more than to employers (Bales 1997; Clark
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1997; Sherwyn, Tracey, and Eigen 1999). Arbitrators are expected to
be less likely to award excessive damages than juries (Clark 1997).
Employers are attracted to employment arbitration because, com-
pared to litigation in the courts, it is fast and inexpensive (Bales 1997;
Clark 1997). It is argued that litigation nearly always involves attor-
neys’ fees of over $50,000, and often exceed $500,000, regardless of
the merits of the case (Sherwyn, Tracey, and Eigen 1999), and in most
cases, arbitration involves less publicity than a court proceeding (Clark
1997). Recent research (Colvin 2003) provides strong evidence that
avoidance of litigation is a powerful motive for employers adopting
employment arbitration.
Employees
Low-income employees have greater access to arbitration than to
the court system because their low salaries make large awards unlikely,
which in turn makes it difficult to attract attorneys, most of whom work
on a contingent fee basis. Because arbitration is quick, it is more likely
to attract an attorney for the employee. If the employee is unable to
find an attorney, he or she may be able to pursue the claim without
one, given the informal nature of arbitration. Litigation is highly ad-
versarial and, in addition to the costs involved, may require employees
to put their professional lives on hold for several years (Bales 1997).
It has been argued that the new nonunion ADR systems, including
employment arbitration, have grown to serve a new managerial and
professional class of employees. This is the most rapidly growing seg-
ment of the American labor force, currently comprising somewhere
between 31 and 40 percent of the labor force (Eaton and Keefe 1999).
It is well documented that there is a hostility on the part of federal
judges toward discrimination litigants and their claims. It is argued that
there is credible evidence to suggest that the crushing discrimna-
tion caseload in Federal courts has caused judges to look askance
at even meritorious discrimination claims, and that this attitude
may result in unfairness in the eventual result. (Kaswell 1998, p.
93)
Since ‘‘justice delayed is justice denied,’’ the fact that it takes years
to resolve discrimination cases does injustice to employee claimants
(Kaswell 1998).
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Employees may prevail more frequently in arbitration than before
courts and juries. A study comparing results under the securities indus-
try arbitration system and the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York showed employees winning more often in arbitration,
and more quickly. We will consider this and other studies below. Pre-
hearing dismissals, which are common in federal courts, are very rare
in arbitration (Kaswell 1998).
That strict rules of evidence do not apply in arbitration can work
to the advantage of employees. This allows all manner of evidence to
be admitted that would not be admissible in court. Also, the relative
informality of the procedures makes the process more ‘‘user friendly’’
for employees (Kaswell 1998, p. 96).
Both employers and employees
Both parties benefit because they have a dispute resolution mecha-
nism that is ‘‘faster, less costly and less divisive’’ (Estreicher 1997).
Arbitration has been successful for both parties in the securities indus-
try (Kaswell 1998).
Answers to the critics of employment arbitration
Under employment arbitration, an employee does not give up any
substantive rights—only the purely procedural right to a judicial forum.
This is not a new form of ‘‘yellow dog’’ contract under which employ-
ees give up important rights, but rather a simple change of forum. It is
argued that many of the critics of arbitration depict the worst case
scenario for arbitration and the best possible scenario for litigation,
which is misleading. The reality of the court system is that low-wage
employees have little access to it. The argument that employment dis-
crimination law will become a system of private law, where no guid-
ance from prior decisions will be generated, is wrong because under
any possible circumstances there will still be plenty of discrimination
cases for the courts to decide in order to develop the law (Estreicher
1997).
The argument that the loss of the right to jury trial is important
fails to take into account that a jury trial is a realistic alternative for
very few claimants. Even when cases with lawyers go to trial they are
usually disposed of by motions prior to being heard by a jury. Further,
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the jury trial is a relatively recent innovation in discrimination cases,
coming as late as 1991 in the case of Title VII and Americans with
Disabilities Act cases. The United States got along well without jury
trials for many years, as have the European countries. Also, from the
employer’s perspective, the prospect of a jury trial introduces so much
uncertainty that we may reach the point where employers will refrain
from hiring workers for fear of jury trials if they decide to fire them
(Estreicher 1997).
In reply to arguments that employment arbitration will inevitably
be biased in favor of employers because they can be repeat users and
therefore sources of future business for arbitrators, there are several
answers. First, adherence to professional standards of ethics may avoid
this problem. Second, the plaintiff’s bar, which is increasingly well-
organized, can police this. Third, the appointing agencies can monitor
this problem (Malin 2001). The recent California legislation mentioned
above is an attempt to deal with this.
In response to the concern that the removal of the threat of ex-
tremely large jury awards will take away a major incentive for employ-
ers to obey the law, there are several responses. One is that the fear of
losing the ‘‘lottery’’ in jury awards, where some employees receive a
lot and most receive nothing, may simply cause employers to construct
‘‘bulletproof’’ workplaces that adopt forms of fairness in order to cover
up a reality of discrimination. This can ‘‘feed an increasing judicial
appetite to grant summary judgment’’ because of judicial distrust of
outlier jury awards (Malin 2001, p. 609). The higher probability of the
successful pursuit of relief under arbitration may have a greater deter-
rent effect on lawbreaking than a remote chance of an employee win-
ning in court (Malin 2001). There is some evidence that most
employees who are discharged unlawfully receive only ‘‘modest or in-
adequate awards’’ that can be less than half of their economic loss, only
after three to five years in the courts (Malin 2001, p. 608; Summers
1992). Also, many of the extreme jury verdicts are reduced or set aside
on appeal (Summers 1992).
The more limited use of discovery in arbitration can be an advan-
tage to the employee. It shortens the process and makes it less expen-
sive for both the employee and the employer. Leaving the amount of
discovery in the hands of the arbitrator (AAA procedures require this)
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provides the requisite ability to determine the amount of discovery
based upon the situation in the individual case (Malin 2001).
Arguments against Employment Arbitration
Public policy
The private nature of arbitration means that it conceals from the
public the ways in which statutes are being interpreted and applied.
‘‘The public has a right to know and indeed a need to know how the
policy is being applied and if it is effective’’ (Zalusky 2002, p. 4).
The lessened exposure to damages will produce ‘‘a lessened employer
deterrent to employee abuse’’ in violation of a large number of laws
enacted for the protection of workers (Zalusky, 2002 p. 12).
The goal of employment legislation, particularly in the area of civil
rights, was to ‘‘change the way in which business was being done,’’ not
to make it possible for some workers to be benefited while companies
‘‘engaged in business as usual’’ (Silverstein 2001, p. 493). Employers’
increasing ability to buy their way out of the obligation to avoid dis-
crimination was not part of the legislative plan. Also, taking away the
belief that discrimination will result in legal action allows employers
to do the very things that the laws prohibit. When a waiver of the
statutory structure occurs, ‘‘the loser is the legislative decision to cor-
rect market failures through statutory regulation’’ (Silverstein 2001, p.
495).
Employers
As a practical matter, employment arbitration may furnish the best
chance for the ordinary employee to prevail in an employment discrim-
ination claim, meaning that this is the forum in which the employer
stands the greatest chance of losing (Green 2000, p. 399; St. Antoine
2001). This is partly because of the great difficulty, not present in
arbitration, that employees have in finding legal counsel to represent
them in a court action (St. Antoine 2001).
Some managers have concluded that arbitration is no less expen-
sive than litigation, and has the additional disadvantage of the loss of
the opportunity to appeal from an unfair result (Green 2000, p. 423).
A massive Rand Corporation survey of the Civil Justice Reform Act of
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1990, which encouraged the use of ADR in the federal courts, found
that there were savings neither in time nor cost. This seemed to stem
from the tendency of lawyers to do just as much work in preparing for
ADR as for trial (Green 2000).
The differences between litigation and arbitration have been nar-
rowed by the protocol and the adoption of its principles by administer-
ing agencies. The requirements of the protocol result in an employee’s
right to counsel, discovery, a neutral arbitrator who is familiar with the
statutory issues, and the same remedies that are available in court
(Green 2000).
There has been something of a ‘‘political backlash’’ against manda-
tory employment arbitration. This has resulted, for example, in the
National Association of Securities Dealers, whose process was sus-
tained in the Gilmer case, deciding to abandon mandatory arbitration
in 1997. There has also been hostility to mandatory employment arbi-
tration in the lower federal courts, which has led them to develop limi-
tations on and standards for employment arbitration systems (Green
2000).
The employers’ preference for arbitration because it keeps the dis-
pute private is based on an unrealistic assessment of their ability to
avoid public knowledge of what has happened in an arbitration case. A
number of high-profile arbitration cases have in fact made their way
into the public media (Green 2000).
Limits on discovery in arbitration can be a ‘‘double-edged sword’’
(Green 2000, p. 438). In litigation, employers have had considerable
success in bringing out the weaknesses in an employee’s case and then
obtaining summary judgment from a judge prior to trial. With discov-
ery being limited, the employer may find itself subject to surprise testi-
mony in an arbitration hearing, and may not have been able to fully
understand the basis for the employee’s claim prior to the hearing
(Green 2000).
Large employers, in particular, have a great deal to gain from stick-
ing with the court system. Most of the complaints about the enforce-
ment of civil rights laws revolve around their inadequacy in enforcing
worker rights. The obverse of this is that employers have a substantial
advantage in the legal system. The practical difficulties of employees
in meeting their burden of proof in discrimination cases, the inability
of many employees to afford legal counsel, and the increasing fre-
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quency of summary judgments against employees by a judiciary that
is hostile to discrimination claims all work to the advantage of employ-
ers. The EEOC’s limited ability to enforce the law, given its large back-
log of cases and limited budget, also affects the ability of employees
to vindicate their rights in the legal system. About 90 percent of dis-
crimination cases are lost by employees at the summary judgment stage
without reaching a jury. Employers simply do better in court than in
arbitration (Green 2000).
The fears of large jury awards appear to be exaggerated. As to
punitive damages, most large awards are overturned on appeal. The
costs of legal counsel in litigation, while high, may pay off in reduced
employee recoveries (Green 2000). Anecdotes about horrible costs in
frivolous cases ‘‘pale in comparison to the results favoring employers
in the courts’’ (Green 2000, p. 461). It is argued that, ‘‘. . . given the
overwhelming success for employers in the court system and absent
some empirical data showing a big bottom-line cost savings from em-
ploying arbitration instead of the courts, if it is not broken, why use
mandatory arbitration to fix it?’’ (Green 2000, p. 462).
Small employers have special problems with employment arbitra-
tion. For one thing, they are more likely to have employment arbitration
agreements than large employers. Also, small employers are much
more likely to lose to employees in arbitration than are large employ-
ers. However, the advantages in cost and avoiding the hassles of litiga-
tion may still make arbitration worthwhile for small employers (Green
2000).
It may be that, by having mandatory employment arbitration, em-
ployers will give up being at-will employers. The practical result of
having an employment arbitration agreement may be that the breadth
of employment discrimination laws, which cover whites as well as mi-
norities, will turn at-will employment into a situation where the em-
ployer will end up arbitrating all terminations of employees (Hayford
1995). There is the danger that an arbitrator might imply a just cause
requirement from the arbitration agreement, and the arbitrator could
decide to apply a fairness standard rather than the standards required
by the law. In addition, the arbitration agreement might well persuade
an arbitrator that there is a contract present to which the obligation of
good faith and fair dealing applies. Another situation in which a con-
tractual relationship other than at-will might be implied would be
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where the employer has waxed too enthusiastic about its comprehen-
sive dispute resolution system, making statements that indicate a
broader obligation on its part than what is stated in its written docu-
ments. An employer wishing to avoid this consequence probably needs
to state explicitly in the arbitration agreement that it applies only to
legal obligations imposed by statute (Bales 1997).
Employees
The National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA), which
opposes pre-dispute mandatory employment arbitration, cites the fol-
lowing disadvantages that employment arbitration has for employees:
Arbitration Often Limits or Eliminates Essential Procedural
Protections
• Arbitrators do not have to know or follow the law.
• Arbitrators do not grant injunctive or remedial relief.
• Arbitration does not contain the procedural safeguards of
court.
• Arbitrators do not have to abide by the federal rules of
evidence.
• Arbitrators do not have to abide by the federal rules of
discovery.
• Limited compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees
makes hiring a lawyer difficult.
• Arbitrators do not have to be lawyers.
• Arbitrators rarely issue written opinions.
• Arbitrators do not have to justify their rulings.
• Arbitrators are only regulated in two states.
Arbitration Interferes with the Ability to Fully Enforce Civil
Rights Laws
• The EEOC, the U.S. Department of Labor, and NLRB
agree that arbitration interferes with their agency’s ability
to fully enforce civil rights laws.
• Arbitration undermines Congress’ intent in passing civil
rights laws.
Arbitration Often Favor (sic) Employers
• Studies show that arbitrators favor large corporations.
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Arbitration Often Requires Workers to Pay for the Process
• High fees discourage or make it impossible for individu-
als to pursue their cases.
• Arbitration fees can reach the tens of thousands of dol-
lars, depending on the case.
Arbitrators Often Have Conflicts of Interest
• Some arbitration firms have financial ties to the compa-
nies they preside over.
—(National Employment Lawyers Association 2002)
Senator Feingold (D–WI) (1998) has argued that there is an inher-
ent inequality of bargaining power between employees and employers
that makes it necessary to outlaw mandatory employment arbitration
agreements. As he says, discovery, remedies, and the right to trial by
jury may be lost in arbitration. The private nature of arbitration and the
lack of meaningful court review renders it a severe impediment to the
development of civil rights laws. Senator Feingold’s primary objec-
tions are to the mandatory nature of employment arbitration and the
lack of court review. According to him,
In terms of fairness, it seems to me that these mandatory agree-
ments cannot be tolerated. It is the most involuntary act, to require
someone to sign away his or her right to something that every
other American, that everyone, should have as a condition of em-
ployment. It just seems to me that, on its face, this is something
that is rather abhorrent. (Feingold 1998, p. 10)
Congressman Alfonse D’Amato (D–NY) argues: ‘‘. . . if a person is
required to sign and say that I waive my rights to go to court as a
condition of employment, I don’t think it’s voluntary’’ (D’Amato 1998,
p. 24).
It is rather clear that ‘‘the empirical reality is that mandatory arbi-
tration does not result from a bargained for exchange,’’ but rather is
imposed on the employee (Malin 2001, p. 596). When an employee,
especially a long-term one, is presented with a choice between signing
an arbitration agreement and losing the job, ‘‘the employee has abso-
lutely no choice in the matter. There is nothing for the employee to
bargain’’ (Malin 2001, p. 596). While it may seem that a job applicant
has more choice, this is illusory: ‘‘. . . invariably the agreement to
arbitrate is presented in a systematic manner as part of the standard
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boilerplate—a manner designed to preclude questioning, much less
bargaining over it’’ (Malin 2001, p. 596).
As Malin (2001) argues, there is a problem of ‘‘asymmetric infor-
mation’’ (p. 596). While the employer is able to make some estimate
of the chances of an employee having a claim in the future, an applicant
for employment probably would not be taking the job if he or she
believed that there was a real chance that the employer may violate the
employee’s legal rights. Furthermore, a prospective employee would
be extremely reluctant to indicate that he or she wanted to preserve the
right to litigate against the employer for fear of having the employer
change its mind about hiring the job applicant. Except for highly paid
executives who may have their contracts negotiated by legal counsel,
it is clear that agreements to arbitrate are imposed by employers with-
out any bargaining taking place (Malin 2001).
Congressman Edward Markey (D–MA) (1998) has stated that, ‘‘In
essence, mandatory arbitration contracts reduce civil rights protections
to the status of the company car, a perk which can be denied at will by
the employer to the employee’’ (p. 5). A representative of NELA has
maintained that, when Congress passes laws, it should not be up to an
employer to pick and choose which laws are going to be obeyed. In
effect, pre-dispute mandatory employment arbitration allows employ-
ers to ‘‘opt out’’ of laws passed by Congress (Palefsky 1998, p. 17).
NELA wants federal laws to be interpreted by judges, not by persons
who may have little or no legal background. Further, arbitration is de-
signed primarily to provide finality, with less attention to achieving the
correct result under the law than the case would receive from a court.
This is inappropriate for the enforcement of civil rights laws. Contrary
to the argument that all employees lose is the procedural right to go to
a particular forum, the loss by employees of the right to have civil
rights laws correctly enforced is the loss of ‘‘the ultimate substantive
right’’ (Palefsky 1998, p. 78; Appelbaum 1998). Only pre-dispute—not
post-dispute—arbitration involves ‘‘a risk of allowing an employer to
contract out of the need to comply with the underlying employment
statutes’’ (Malin 2001, p. 600).
The EEOC’s legal counsel has pointed out that the weaknesses of
mandatory employment arbitration include the fact that arbitration is
not always less expensive and more efficient than the courts, and that
there are important questions raised about the fairness of arbitration
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because of problems of arbitrator impartiality and qualifications, the
absence of ‘‘reasoned decisions and substantive appeals,’’ limits on
discovery and remedies, and high forum fees (Vargyas 1998, p. 120).
There is a repeat-user bias in favor of some employers. In labor
arbitration, both the company and the union are regular consumers of
arbitration services, preventing arbitrators from leaning toward one
side or the other to increase their future business. In employment arbi-
tration, only the employer is a potential repeat player (Malin 2001).
Employers are far more successful in arbitration than before a jury, and
employees who prevail in arbitration do not recover as much money as
they would in court (Palefsky 1998). A representative of the National
Women’s Law Center says: ‘‘A strong reason for industry representa-
tives to insist on mandatory arbitration of employment disputes is that
in reality the deck is stacked, as we believe it is, in the employer’s
favor’’ (Appelbaum 1998, p. 105). Because employers design such sys-
tems, there is reason to fear that they will design systems that are
stacked in their favor. An outrageous example of this is provided by the
Hooters case discussed previously (Malin 2001). There are numerous
examples of employers systematically constructing systems that are
weighted heavily in their favor (Malin 2001). Employers who adopt
mandatory employment arbitration obviously believe that it works to
their advantage. There is some evidence that the stock market reacts in
a way that confirms this (Abraham and Voos 2000).
The prestigious National Academy of Arbitrators has adopted a
position in opposition to mandatory employment arbitration, as has the
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (Palefsky 1998). The
EEOC has also condemned mandatory pre-dispute employment arbi-
tration (EEOC 1997).
Employment arbitration is criticized for its private nature; it is in-
appropriate for arbitrators who are privately appointed to be adminis-
tering public law embodying public policy. The private nature of
arbitration awards hinders the development of the law on civil rights.
The limited discovery in arbitration is particularly a problem for em-
ployees because the information necessary to the case usually lies in
the hands of employers (Malin 2001).
The lack of meaningful judicial review is a serious disadvantage of
the mandatory employment arbitration system. By virtue of the courts’
traditional respect for the decisions of arbitrators, they may be abdicat-
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ing their responsibility for interpreting civil rights laws (Malin 2001).
It seems clear that the situation is different from that in which a labor
arbitrator is enforcing the terms of a contract in the context of industrial
common law. Here, we are dealing with statutory rights and duties, and
it is the duty of the courts to interpret and enforce these. While appeals
to the courts will lessen some of the advantages of arbitration (time
and cost), it seems that it is necessary that the courts retain the ability
to ensure that arbitrators are applying the law properly (Zalusky 2002).
The processes adopted for the federal district courts in the Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution Act (28 U.S.C. §§651–658, 2000) in 1998 have
been suggested as being better than those available under Circuit City
(Zalusky 2002). Under the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, the ar-
bitration award is not final, but can be set aside for a trial de novo
within 30 days after it is filed. The choice of going to arbitration is
made post-dispute rather than pre-dispute. The consent to arbitrate is
required to be knowing and voluntary.
The waiver of the right to jury trial in arbitration has been the
subject of intense criticism. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, liti-
gants under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act who claim discrimination
on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin have the
right to a jury trial. Jury trial is also a right under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, and there is a constitutional right to trial by
jury in certain cases. This right can be waived, which is what happens
when an employee signs an employment arbitration agreement. How-
ever, the law generally requires that a waiver of such a right be
‘‘knowing, voluntary and intelligent’’ (Sternlight 2001). It is highly
questionable whether this requirement is ordinarily met in mandatory
employment arbitration agreements.
It is argued that, at least for the employee, it is doubtful if there are
cost savings in arbitration. In arbitration, there is typically a forum fee
that, at least for the AAA, starts at $500 and increases for larger claims.
Arbitrator fees can run anywhere from $1,100 to $4,000 per day, and a
bill of $5,000 to $10,000 for arbitrator fees is what might be expected
(Zalusky 2002). However, as noted above, AAA has recently changed
its procedures to limit the employee’s cost on the filing fee to $125,
and prohibits the employee from having to pay any part of the arbitra-
tor’s fee.
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CONCLUSIONS ON THE LAW AND THE LITERATURE
It appears that the enforceability of pre-dispute mandatory employ-
ment arbitration agreements as a general proposition has been settled
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Circuit City and Gilmer cases. What-
ever the merits of this proposition, the Supreme Court has spoken and
is unlikely to change its mind any time in the near future. It also seems
clear that Congress will take no action on this, at least until the Demo-
crats regain control of both the House and Senate.
What remains unclear about the law are the specific criteria that
will be applied to test whether a particular employment arbitration
agreement is enforceable. It is probably the case that, whatever ratio-
nale the courts use, they will subject these agreements to some scrutiny
beyond the grounds explicitly stated in the FAA. They are, we believe,
most likely to apply the protocol standards. These require use of a
neutral agency, a well-trained neutral, joint selection of the arbitrator
from a panel of arbitrators, access to information about the arbitrators,
reasonable discovery rights, a right to counsel, a written decision, a
remedy that is consistent with the law, and limited judicial review.
Many of these criteria are subject to a variety of interpretations. Per-
haps the most challenging is the requirement of judicial review. With-
out it, the courts lose control of the laws that they are charged to
enforce. With too much of it, the advantages of speed and low cost will
be lost. The law will develop on a case-by-case basis with, hopefully,
additional guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court.
The arguments on the pros and cons of pre-dispute employment
arbitration are very diverse. There are powerful arguments on both
sides. At the root of most of the disagreements among the scholars
and practitioners who have engaged in this debate is qui bene—who
benefits—from arbitration. Answering this question requires that we
look at the experience of the parties in litigation and arbitration and
attempt to determine under which process the parties fare better. It is
to this question that we turn in Chapter 3.
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3
The Evidence on
Employment Arbitration
As can be seen from the discussion in the preceding chapters, much
of the debate about the merits of employment arbitration has to do with
what practical results it is likely to produce for employers as well as
employees. This includes considerations of win/loss ratios, amounts
recovered, time spent, and cost. With respect to all of these, the perti-
nent question is how employment arbitration stacks up compared to
the alternatives—principally, litigation in court and labor arbitration.
In this chapter, we will review and analyze the evidence on these points
that has been reported in empirical studies. We will also report the
results of our survey of employment arbitrators regarding the workings
of the employment arbitration process.
Our discussion will begin with a comparison of win/loss outcomes
between employment arbitration, court proceedings, and labor arbitra-
tion. Next, we will examine the modest literature on amounts recovered
by employees, and then the evidence comparing time and costs. Last,
we will report the results of our survey of employment arbitrators, and
then draw some conclusions.
COMPARING WINS AND LOSSES
The Literature
Let us first look at the evidence on how employees fare in winning
employment arbitration cases. In a widely cited study, Maltby (1998)
found that employees prevailed in 63 percent of the cases in a 1993–
1995 sample of AAA employment arbitration cases. A 1995 study
(Howard 1995) of AAA cases found employees winning 68 percent of
the cases. Lisa Bingham has reported employee win/loss percentages
in employment arbitration covering several periods. Analyzing cases
decided under the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules in 1992, she
PAGE 47
47
.......................... 10765$ $CH3 06-25-04 11:06:27 PS
48 Wheeler, Klaas, and Mahony
found no systematic bias in favor of employers (Bingham 1995). Look-
ing at cases decided in 1993 under both the Commercial Arbitration
Rules and the Employment Arbitration Rules, she found that employ-
ees won only 2 of the 11 cases involving termination of employment
(Bingham 1996).
A study of 270 AAA cases in 1993 and 1994 showed employees
winning 63 percent of the time (Bingham 1997). In a later study of
AAA cases decided in 1993–1995, the same author found employees
obtaining relief in 52 percent of the employment arbitration cases. Em-
ployees won 69 percent of the cases where an individual contract of
employment was being enforced, compared to only 21 percent where
provisions of a personnel manual were involved (Bingham 1998). In
this last study, she found that employers who were ‘‘repeat players’’ in
employment arbitration did significantly better than those who were
not. In another study, however, this effect did not appear (Bingham
1996). Very different numbers were found in an analysis of individual
employment arbitration awards between 1990 and 2001 by LeRoy and
Feuille (2001). They found that the employer won 61.8 percent of the
time, while 17.6 percent were split awards, and the employee won in
only 20.6 percent of the cases.
A study of employment arbitration cases decided in the securities
industry between 1992 and 1998 showed employees registered with the
New York Stock Exchange winning in 38.46 percent of the cases, and
those registered with the National Association of Securities Dealers
winning 32.57 percent of the time (Kaswell 1998). A study of cases
decided between 1990 and 1995 (Bompey and Stempel 1995) found
employees winning in New York Stock Exchange cases 41 percent of
the time and in National Association of Securities Dealers cases in
24 percent. Other studies have shown employees winning in securities
industry cases 43 percent (Bompey and Pappas 1993–1994), 55 per-
cent (USGAO 1994), and 48 percent (Howard 1995) of the time.
From all of this literature we conclude that there is a lack of evi-
dence of any clear pattern of employees winning or losing in cases
decided by employment arbitrators. The range found varies from 20 to
68 percent wins, depending on the data set and the period studied. This
makes it impossible to draw any conclusions from the existing litera-
ture. So, looking at employment arbitration win/loss outcomes in isola-
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tion is not particularly instructive, which would seem to call for the
gathering of new data.
Comparing the experience of employees in employment arbitration
to their experience in the courts complicates matters even further. A
major problem is that there are no reliable data on the proportion of
the cases that are settled in favor of employees prior to going to court.
There is anecdotal evidence that as many as 64 percent of employment
discrimination cases handled by lawyers are settled favorably to the
employee (Bell 2002). Since many of these cases may never get to
court, it must be kept in mind that it may well be that litigation or its
threat may be much more powerful than available statistics can show.
On the other hand, it seems that only a small proportion of claimants
are able to secure a lawyer to handle their claims. There is evidence
that only about 5 percent of the cases brought to employment lawyers
are accepted by them (Howard 1995; Meeker and Dombrink 1993).
Keeping in mind these limitations, let us view the evidence on the
success rates of employees litigating questions of unjust termination.
There is some limited evidence with respect to state court outcomes in
unjust termination cases. Two studies of wrongful termination cases in
California concluded that employees were winning between 68 percent
(Dertouzos, Holland, and Ebener 1988) and 70 percent (Jung and Hark-
ness 1988) of the time. Based on a data set maintained at Cornell Uni-
versity, which includes cases terminated between July 1, 1991 and June
30, 1992, state civil court filings were found to be decided in favor of
the employee 64 percent of the time (Estreicher 2001).
As might be expected, the greatest amount of scholarly attention
has been paid to the outcomes in federal courts. An early study of
employment discrimination cases in federal court found that employ-
ees received at least a partial remedy in 24 percent of the cases
(Burstein and Monaghan 1986). Maltby (1998) reported employees
winning 14.9 percent of their cases in 1994. A study of federal district
court cases decided in 1992–1994 found that only 8 percent of the
cases filed went to trial. On the other hand, where there was a disposi-
tion of the case, employees got ‘‘some recompense’’ 71 percent of the
time. When the case went to trial, however, employees won only 28
percent of the time, although they did better when a jury decided the
case, winning 38 percent of these cases (Howard 1995). A later study
(Litras 2000) found that employees won 23.8 percent of the discrimina-
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tion cases terminated by trial verdicts in 1990, and 35.5 percent in
1998. Research reported in the Wall Street Journal in 2001 found that
employees won in federal district court in about 30 percent of discrimi-
nation cases (Bravin 2001).
There have been a few studies of outcomes in particular kinds of
employment discrimination cases. An analysis of Age Discrimination
in Employment Act cases found that employees won 25 percent of the
time, and on appeal, the employer won 68 percent of the time (Eglit
1997). An American Bar Association study of Americans with Disabil-
ities Act cases between 1992 and 1998 showed employees winning
only 8 percent (Parry 1998).
The employee win percentages across the above-mentioned studies
are summarized in Table 3.1. In general, studies have shown success
rates to be somewhat higher in employment arbitration than in federal
courts, but not state courts.
A publication called Jury Verdict Research (2001) provides inter-
esting statistics on court cases. According to their data, in 2000 em-
ployees won 67 percent of the jury verdicts in all types of employment
cases, up from 50 percent in 1994. In discrimination cases, employees
won 65 percent in 2000, up from 46 percent in 1994. In federal district
Table 3.1 Studies of Employee Win Percentages in Employment
Arbitration and State and Federal Courts
Employment Arbitration
General Securities Industry State Courts Federal Courts
68 43 68 24
18 55 70 28
63 48 64 14.9
52 41 (NYSEa) 23.8
24 (NASDb) 35.5
63 38.46 (NYSEa) 30
32.57 (NASDb)
20.6 25 (ADEAc)
8 (ADAd)
aIndicates New York Stock Exchange cases.
bIndicates National Association of Securities Dealers cases.
cIndicates Age Discrimination in Employment Act cases.
dIndicates Americans with Disabilities Act cases.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from cited data.
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courts in 2000, employees won 75 percent, up from 39 percent in 1994,
and in state courts, the numbers were 60 percent in 2000 compared to
56 percent in 1994. In 2000, employees were most likely to win ver-
dicts in age discrimination cases, being successful in 78 percent of
these.
Of course, only a small proportion of the cases ever makes it to a
jury. By far the greatest proportion are either settled or decided on a
motion for summary judgment by a judge. One survey found that be-
tween 79 and 84 percent of the court cases were settled prior to final
adjudication (Howard 1995). Settlements of arbitration cases were not
as common—between 31 and 44 percent of the cases. It is believed
that this is because arbitration is but the final step in a process in which
most claims are resolved, which makes it likely that the possibilities
for settlement have been fully explored prior to filing for arbitration
(Howard 1995).
Litigation undertaken by the EEOC appears to have been more
successful. These cases are selected for litigation because of their legal
importance or magnitude. A study of the EEOC litigation program
between 1997 and 2001 (EEOC 2002) found that, in the 1,963 suits
filed by the EEOC during that period, a successful result (either by
court decision or settlement) was obtained in 90.72 percent of the
cases. Of the 83 trials conducted by the EEOC field legal units, there
was a success rate of 60.24 percent. The EEOC was also generally
successful in the appellate courts.
Another aspect of litigation in the federal court system is the role
and actions of the courts of appeal when cases are appealed to them
from the district courts. One study found bias against claimants in dis-
crimination cases. In such cases, employers appealing adverse lower
court decisions prevailed on appeal 44 percent of the time, compared
to other defendants appealing from district court, who achieved rever-
sals only 33 percent of the time. Employees appealing discrimination
decisions were successful only 5.8 percent of the time. This compared
to plaintiffs’ appeals in other types of cases being granted 12 percent
of the time (Bravin 2001).
Not taking into account settlements, and looking not just at jury
verdicts but rather at dispositions of cases either by a judge or a jury,
employee success rates in the federal district courts are quite low. In
the latest year for which data were available (2000), employees were
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winning only 11 percent of their cases. As shown in Table 3.2, between
1996 and 2000 they averaged 12 percent (Federal District-Court Civil
Cases 2001).
Judicial review of employment arbitration awards is a highly prob-
lematic area. One prime advantage of arbitration is finality, yet the
courts have not always permitted the arbitrator’s decision to be the last
word. A study of judicial enforcement of employment arbitration
awards between 1990 and 2001 (LeRoy and Feuille 2001) showed that
75.3 percent of the 33 court challenges were by employees. Federal
district courts confirmed the full award in 85.3 percent of the cases,
confirmed the award in part in 2.9 percent, and vacated the award in
only 11.8 percent. It was the employer who won the largest proportion
(67.6 percent) of the judicial challenges.
In addition to comparing employment arbitration to federal court
outcomes, it is interesting to make a comparison to outcomes in labor
arbitration. A 1987 study of 1,042 labor arbitration cases (Block and
Stieber 1987) found that 57 percent of these discharge cases were de-
cided in favor of the employee. The Block and Stieber criterion for an
employee victory was an order of reinstatement, with or without back
pay. These findings are consistent with the conventional wisdom
among labor arbitrators, which holds that employees win about half the
time.
One recent study compared decision outcomes under employment
arbitration and labor arbitration. In this research, Bingham and Mesch
(2000) took an approach similar to our procedure (described in Chapter
4). They used an experimental design, presenting different types of
decision makers with a hypothetical case and asking them to decide it.
The scenario was varied by gender of the grievant and by whether or
not there was a collective bargaining agreement. Where there was no
collective bargaining agreement, the subjects were directed to apply
the standard of ‘‘good cause’’ contained in the Model Employment
Termination Act, which has not been adopted by any state.
Bingham and Mesch’s sample consisted of 743 subjects, including
161 arbitrators who were members of the National Academy of Arbi-
trators, 210 labor arbitrators who were not members of the National
Academy of Arbitrators, 188 employment arbitrators, and 184 students.
Each subject was given all four versions of the scenario. The dependent
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variables were reinstatement of the employee and the awarding of back
pay.
Before the application of controls for other sources of variation,
Bingham and Mesch found that employment arbitrators reinstated em-
ployees significantly less frequently than did any of the other groups.
However, once they controlled for other variables, such as the profes-
sion of the arbitrator, decision-making groups did not have a significant
effect, nor did the gender of the employee. All arbitrators reinstated
more often under a collective bargaining agreement’s just cause stan-
dard than under the Model Employment Termination Act good cause
standard. Students were more likely to award back pay than the other
groups.
Our Research
The data
In order to obtain information on employee win rates under the
different procedural alternatives, it was necessary to utilize a variety of
sources. We were fortunate to find a source of employment awards
online (although this service has now been discontinued), and printed
digests of these awards from the AAA. In addition, Labor Arbitration
Reports, which is mainly an outlet for labor arbitration awards, does
contain a small number (34) of employment arbitration awards, identi-
fied by having ‘‘Individual Grievant’’ as one of the parties. Labor Arbi-
tration Reports furnished a large sample (580) of labor arbitration
awards. Since many arbitration awards are not published, however,
Labor Arbitration Reports does not provide a complete set of all exist-
ing arbitration awards, though it is by far the most commonly used
research sample and consists of the awards that are most visible by
virtue of their being published. Results of cases involving Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act were gathered from an online Web site.
The analysis
Table 3.2 shows a simple cross-tabulation of our sample of em-
ployment arbitration cases and labor arbitration cases, along with the
numbers of employee wins reported in federal district courts. One of
us, who is both an arbitrator and a lawyer specializing in employment
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Table 3.2 Employee/Employer Win Rates
Procedure Percent employee wins Percent employer wins
Employment arbitrationa 33 67
Overall
n  216
Federal discrimination 22 78
statute involved
n  59
Employment contract 56 44
n  52
Burden of proof on employer 60 40
n  57
Labor arbitrationb 52 48
n  580
Federal district courtc 12 88
1996–2000
n  26,841
1987–2000 16 84
n  53,248
aSOURCE: Bureau of National Affairs (1994–2002); American Arbitration Associa-
tion (1999–2001).
bSOURCE: Bureau of National Affairs (1994–2002).
cSOURCE: Federal District-Court Civil Cases (2001).
law, as well as a teacher of arbitration and employment law, read the
employment arbitration and labor arbitration cases. The employment
arbitration cases were analyzed in some depth, while the labor arbitra-
tion cases were viewed only in order to determine whether the em-
ployee won. All of the arbitration cases dealt with terminations. As in
the Block and Stieber (1987) study, it was judged that an employee
had won an arbitration case if he or she was reinstated to the job, with
or without back pay. A back pay award without reinstatement (which
is rare) was not judged to be an employee win.
Although the overall win rate of employees in employment arbitra-
tion compared to those in the other two procedural alternatives is of
some interest, the most meaningful comparisons are between results in
particular categories of employment arbitration cases and other sys-
tems. The pertinent comparison with court cases that involved claims
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of discrimination in violation of a federal statute is employment arbi-
tration cases involving that same claim. Similarly, outcomes in labor
arbitration discharge cases, which turn upon a claimed violation of a
collective contract, should be compared to employment arbitration
cases that involve a contract violation and/or have adopted the same
rules as labor arbitration with respect to burden of proof.
In employment arbitration cases where a federal discrimination
statute was involved, employees won 22 percent of the cases, which
compares to only 12 percent in federal district courts in the most recent
five-year period. Thus, the chances of an employee winning in employ-
ment arbitration would appear to be much greater than in court when
the case goes to a final adjudication. As noted above, there have been
studies that conclude that employee lawyers only accept 5 percent of
the cases that come to them (Howard 1995), meaning that the cases
going to federal court have gone through a rather rigorous screening
process (St. Antoine 2001). It is unlikely that the employment arbitra-
tion cases are as carefully screened.
In labor arbitration cases under a collective bargaining contract,
unlike court cases enforcing a federal statute, the employer has the
burden of proving misconduct, and the propriety of the penalty. Usu-
ally the standard is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. However,
for more serious cases, proof by clear and convincing evidence, or even
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, may be required.
Employees won 56 percent of employment arbitration cases in
which there was a claim of an employer violating an individual contract
of employment. This compares favorably to the 52 percent win rate in
labor arbitration cases enforcing a collective contract. Employees won
60 percent of the employment arbitration cases in which the arbitrator
imposed the burden of proof on the employer. This also compares fa-
vorably to employees winning 52 percent of the termination cases
heard by labor arbitrators.
COMPARING AMOUNTS RECOVERED
It is likely that the fear of large adverse verdicts is one of the prime
motivators behind employers’desire to avoid going to court. Conse-
quently, the amounts recovered by employees in employment arbitra-
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tion cases is of interest. Unfortunately, like win/loss statistics, the
numbers on this issue are not straightforward.
An early study (Summers 1992) of wrongful discharge litigation
in state courts in California showed that most wrongfully discharged
employees received inadequate awards, frequently less than half of the
economic losses that they suffered. Even employees who obtained high
jury verdicts often had these reduced on appeal, and the contingent
attorney fees that they paid also reduced the amount of money that they
actually received. So, even though high jury verdicts received a great
deal of attention, the reality was that the successes of employees in
these suits were quite modest. However, another early study of wrong-
ful discharge cases in California (Jung and Harkness 1988), covering
the years 1978–1987, found that employees won a median award of
$124,150, and a mean award of $486,812.
Perhaps the most sophisticated analysis of this question was done
by Maltby (1998). In addition to comparing mean awards in employ-
ment arbitration and federal district courts for a period, he analyzed
these results in terms of the percentages of the amounts demanded
that were awarded to all claimants. Maltby found that when he simply
compared AAA 1993–1995 employment arbitration awards to 1994
federal district court decisions, the mean award in arbitration ($49,030)
was considerably less than the mean award in court ($530,611). How-
ever, when he looked at what he called the ‘‘adjusted outcome’’ (the
percent of the demand awarded to all plaintiffs, including those who
recovered nothing), he found that employees received almost twice as
great a share of their demand in arbitration (18 percent) than in court
(10 percent).
In a 2001 article, Estreicher describes the results of several inter-
esting studies, some of which were unpublished at this writing. These
had to do with the median awards in employment arbitration. He cites
data showing median employment arbitration awards of $52,737 prior
to the adoption of the Due Process Protocol, and $39,279 thereafter
(based on Bingham and Sarraf (2004)). He refers to another study of
AAA awards in cases decided in 1999 and 2000 that found a median
award of $34,733. Bingham (1998) found a mean award of $49,030 in
a sample of 91 AAA cases decided during the period 1993–1995.
When one looks at awards by courts, the numbers do appear to be
higher than in employment arbitration. It is worth noting that this may
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partly be a result of the longer period necessary to resolve court cases,
leading to greater amounts of back pay owed (Sherwyn, Tracey, and
Eigen 1999). A body of data on the federal district courts collected at
Cornell University (Federal District-Court Civil Cases 2001) show a
mean award in discrimination cases in 2000 of $885,640, while the
median was $115,000. Table 3.3 shows the numbers of awards, and
mean and median awards for the period 1987 to 2000.
As shown in Table 3.3, the median award has gone from $59,118
in 1987 to $115,000 in 2000. It is obvious from the lack of a pattern in
the mean awards that a few extremely high settlements can strongly
bias the statistics on mean awards. This might lead one to ignore this
statistic in favor of the median. However, it may be precisely those
extreme awards that bias the statistics that motivate employers to avoid
going to court by adopting employment arbitration procedures.
Another source of data on outcomes of employment litigation is
Jury Verdict Research (2001). They report median and mean awards
for all employment practice liability cases, including both state and
federal courts for the period 1994–2000. According to their statistics,
the median award has increased from $93,000 to $218,000 during that
period, and the mean from $300,799 to $712,636, with an overall me-
Table 3.3 Federal District Court Awards in Employment Cases,
1987–2000
Year Cases terminated Mean awarda Median awarda
2000 22,553 885,640 115,000
1999 23,721 843,886 91,992
1998 23,606 1,202,072 100,852
1997 21,492 1,199,728 95,488
1996 19,381 1,271,245 90,394
1995 15,705 1,165,313 84,744
1994 12,833 622,460 67,064
1993 10,787 611,756 53,626
1992 11,318 1,178,720 68,119
1991 8,371 1,544,417 93,559
1990 8,459 2,134,309 192,358
1989 8,937 682,388 48,320
1988 9,055 748,011 45,475
1987 9,140 1,223,751 59,118
aAwards in 2000 dollars.
SOURCE: Federal District-Court Civil Cases 2001.
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dian for the period of $150,000 and a mean of $519,116. For discrimi-
nation cases, which would be expected to be mainly decided in federal
courts, they show an increase in the median award in that period from
$78,592 to $218,000, and the mean from $236,232 to $783,926, with
an overall median for the period of $150,000 and a mean of $531,780.
The Federal District Court data collected at Cornell (shown in Table
3.2) yields an average annual median of $92,219 and a mean of
$1,027,192 for the same period (1994–2000).
Jury Verdict Research also analyzed settlements. Over the period
1994–2000, for all employment practice cases, the median settlement
was $62,000, with a mean of $1,863,406. For discrimination cases, the
median was $60,000 and the mean was $2,157,563.
Although one must be concerned about the substantial differences
in the numbers produced by Jury Verdict Research and the Cornell
Federal District Court data, they still lead to the same conclusion. This
is that litigants do recover larger amounts of money in court than they
do in employment arbitration. However, this does not speak to the con-
clusion reached by Maltby (1998), noted above, that an analysis that
takes into account the amounts demanded in court proceedings and
employment arbitration might lead to a different determination. Ulti-
mately, the only way to conclusively prove the existence of differences
in outcome produced by differences in procedures is to pose to employ-
ment arbitrators and judges and/or jurors exactly the same cases and
observe what, if any, differences in outcomes result.
COMPARISONS OF COST AND TIME
The alleged advantages of employment arbitration over litigation
include its relative speed and low cost for both parties. This is often
cited by advocates of arbitration as a positive feature for both employ-
ers and employees.
Cost
A thorough discussion of the issue of costs in employment arbitra-
tion versus those in court is contained in a recent article by LeRoy
and Feuille (2002). These authors conclude that, although arbitration
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generally does have advantages in this regard, this may not be true in
particular cases. Litigation has the advantage of the direct court costs
being less expensive. Employment arbitrators charge an average of
$2,000 per day, compared to zero cost for the time of a judge. AAA
charges a filing fee of $500 and an administrative fee of $150 per day
of hearing. Attorney’s fees can also be substantial and employment
arbitrators often deny employee’s claims for their attorney’s fees, even
though this is provided for in the applicable statute. Offsetting these
costs is the relative informality of arbitration, which may permit the
employee to make do without a lawyer, thereby saving attorney’s fees.
Also, because discovery procedures are more limited in arbitration than
in court, this very time-consuming (and therefore costly in terms of
attorney’s fees) phase of the court process can be reduced. Also, costly
appeals through the court system are avoided by the rule that the deci-
sion of an arbitrator is final and binding and not subject to review by
the courts except in extraordinary circumstances. However, in another
paper, LeRoy and Feuille (2001) cite evidence that employment arbi-
tration is much more expensive than labor arbitration in terms of arbi-
trators’ fees.
In ‘‘Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Man-
datory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims,’’ Green (2000) argues
strenuously that employment arbitration does not save costs. He cites
studies of ADR procedures in other settings that show that ADR can be
quite expensive. One writer attributes this to the tendency of employer
attorneys to work just as hard (and therefore put in just as many billable
hours) in an arbitration case as in a court case. There are horror stories
of cases, such as one involving Intel Corporation, that lasted seven
years and cost $100 million.
A 2002 report claims that the cost of initiating arbitration is nearly
always more expensive than filing a court suit. The example is given
of the difference between a $221 filing fee in the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois, and a fee paid to the National Arbitration Forum of
$10,925 for the same claim. The AAA would charge up to $6,650 and
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services up to $7,950. In arbitration
forums, there are also fees for such things as issuing a subpoena, re-
questing discovery, and having a continuance. For instance, it may re-
quire going to court to enforce a subpoena for a witness. If the
PAGE 59.......................... 10765$ $CH3 06-25-04 11:06:32 PS
60 Wheeler, Klaas, and Mahony
employer refuses to comply with the award, it is necessary to go to
court to enforce it (Public Citizen 2002).
On the other hand, it seems that attorney’s fees are cheaper in
employment arbitration than in court. As noted in Chapter 2, it is this
hope that is a primary motivator for employers turning to arbitration
(Bickner, Ver Ploeg, and Feigenbaum 1997). A Rand Institute study in
the mid 1990s showed that the average cost of defending a wrongful
discharge action in court had risen from $80,000 in 1988 to $124,000
in 1994. Another study (Howard 1995) found that the average cost of
defense was $20,000 in arbitration compared to $96,000 in court.
Clearly, the greater likelihood of a final resolution without going
through an appeals process is financially attractive.
Time
There is very little evidence that permits a comparison between
employment arbitration and court proceedings with respect to the
length of time required to complete the process. Clearly, time saved
is one of the traditional justifications of labor arbitration, and ADR
generally.
In contradiction to the conventional wisdom, there are studies of
ADR that find that it does not save time (see Green 2000). Neverthe-
less, it is quite clear that court proceedings can be quite lengthy. The
early study by Summers (1992) mentioned previously found that courts
in wrongful discharge cases frequently took three to five years after the
employee’s discharge to provide a remedy. The data on the Cornell
University Web site (http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090) show that in
2000 it took, on average, nearly a year (355 days) from the time the
case was filed in Federal District Court until it was decided. This was
down slightly from the 368 days required in 1987, and was fairly typi-
cal for the period 1987–2000. One study (Litras 2000) found that, in
1998, the average time from filing to a verdict in trial was 18 months.
Of course, a case that is appealed to a court of appeals takes much
longer. Maltby (1998) estimated that it took about half the time to
resolve a claim in arbitration than it did in court.
The literature on employment arbitration leaves a number of practi-
cal questions unanswered. These include the undocumented propor-
tions of employees bringing claims that are professional or managerial
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employees, and are represented by counsel. There is also a question
regarding the competence of their counsel. What is the extent of the
use of discovery and how worthwhile is it? How are costs distributed?
Who has the burden of proof, and what is the quantum of proof re-
quired? What is the quality of the arbitration process for employers
and employees in terms of serving the interests of each? Is employment
arbitration an efficient and effective mechanism for resolving disputes?
We surveyed employment arbitrators in order to attempt to answer
these questions.
SURVEY OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATORS
Over a period of several months in 2002 and 2003, we surveyed
employment arbitrators. The sources of their names and addresses were
1) NAA members who identified themselves as practicing employment
arbitration, 2) a list of employment arbitrators provided to us by the
AAA, a supplier of employment arbitrators, and 3) arbitrators identi-
fied and located from information available on the website of Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. (JAMS), another supplier of
arbitrators. The aim of the survey is to gain information on the practical
workings of employment arbitration and to determine the perceptions
of employment arbitrators as to the quality of the process. Question-
naires were sent to 807 employment arbitrators. We received 176 use-
able responses, for a response rate of 21.8 percent.
Table 3.4 describes the characteristics of the arbitrators included in
the sample. Overall, the average respondent held a law degree or higher
and had a considerable amount of prior experience serving as an arbi-
trator. The amount of experience as an arbitrator varied from 1 year to
39 years, with a median length of 9 years, and more than 95 percent of
the respondents had 3 or more years of service. Similarly, there was
significant variation in the number of cases heard, with two respondents
reporting never hearing a case while the upper 25 percent reported
hearing 30 or more cases. Not surprisingly, many (61 percent) reported
prior experience serving as either a labor arbitrator or judge. Nearly
half of all respondents reported prior experience as an advocate for
employers.
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Table 3.4 Respondent Characteristics
Average length of service as an arbitrator (years) 10.4
Average number of employment arbitration cases heard 39
Percentage of respondents who are/were also labor arbitrators 45.5
Average number of labor arbitration cases heard 516
Percentage of respondents who were judges 16
Average length of service (years) 10.3
Percentage of respondents who previously served as an advocate
Employer 47.7
Employee 18.2
Graduate degree held (%)
JD/LLB 90
Ph.D. 3
Other 3
n 176
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from survey data.
The types of cases heard by this sample of employment arbitrators
was as follows: 1) statutory cases, 37.6 percent; 2) employment con-
tract cases, 25.4 percent; 3) cases involving a nonbinding handbook or
policy, 14.7 percent; 4) contractual issues other than cause for termina-
tion, 17.8 percent; and 5) other, 4.4 percent. Although statutory and
employment contract cases make up the majority of cases, together
they still amount to only 63 percent of the cases, a somewhat smaller
proportion than we expected.
Fifty-five percent of the cases involved professional or managerial
employees. In the majority of cases, therefore, the employee is one
who would likely have the resources to pursue litigation, and whose
salary would be high enough to warrant substantial damages being
awarded if the employee prevailed. Such claims would be the ones that
we would expect to be most attractive to a lawyer, meaning that for
this 55 percent, obtaining counsel for a lawsuit would likely not be a
problem.
As to the practical workings of the process, there are several issues
of interest. First, employees were represented by attorneys in 80.9 per-
cent of the cases. They represented themselves in only 10.6 percent of
the cases, and were represented by a coworker or a friend in 8.5 per-
PAGE 62.......................... 10765$ $CH3 06-25-04 11:06:34 PS
The Evidence on Employment Arbitration 63
cent. The employment arbitrators believed that representation was gen-
erally competent for both employees and employers. On a four-point
scale (Never  1, Rarely  2, Sometimes  3, Always  4), the
average arbitrator response was 3.2 for employees (standard deviation
0.47) and 3.6 for employers (standard deviation 0.53). The difference
between employee representation and employer representation was sta-
tistically significant (p  0.005). This suggests that employers tend to
have competent representation more often than employees, which is
what one would expect to find, given the greater resources and sophisti-
cation of employers in employing legal counsel. On the same four-
point scale, the average score on our question regarding how frequently
a policy or contract provided for the employee to have a representative
prior to arbitration was 2.4 (standard deviation 0.89). This means that
having a representative provided for in the early stages of a claim was
somewhere between being a rare and occasional occurrence. In labor
arbitration, the employee would almost always be represented by a
union steward or other official at the very earliest stages of the griev-
ance procedure.
Second, discovery took place in 80 percent of the cases. This evi-
dences a very high rate of use for this procedure, the lack or inadequacy
of which is one of the major criticisms of employment arbitration as
compared to courtroom litigation. When asked whether discovery was
worth the time and costs involved, on the same four-point scale the
average response was 3.1 (standard deviation 0.65) in favor. This
means that discovery was perceived to be only sometimes worth the
time and costs.
Third, employees were found to have paid all of the costs of arbi-
tration in 3.7 percent of the cases, a substantial share in 22.6 percent, a
minimal portion in 30.8 percent, and none in 42.9 percent. This means
that in about a quarter of the cases, the employee was assuming such a
burden of costs that it is highly likely that a court would refuse to either
compel arbitration or enforce the award (see Cole v. Burns Interna-
tional Security Services 1997, and discussion in Chapter 2).
Fourth, we gathered some data on the allocation of the burden of
proof and the quantum of proof required by employment arbitrators.
We found that 29 percent of employer contracts and policies expressly
provided that the burden of proof to show a violation of his or her
rights was placed upon the employee. In the absence of an express
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provision allocating the burden of proving the case, 70 percent of the
employment arbitrators would place the burden on the employer and
30 percent on the employee (n  164). This contrasts with labor arbi-
tration, in which the burden would always be on the employer (Brand
1998), and court processes where the burden would always be on the
employee. Of the employment arbitrators who have also served as labor
arbitrators, 78 percent would place the burden on the employer, and 22
percent on the employee. Of those who have not served as labor arbi-
trators, only 64.5 percent would allocate the burden to the employer,
and 35.5 percent to the employee (the difference between those with
and those without labor arbitration experience is significant at the 0.10
level). As expected, experienced labor arbitrators are more likely to
place the burden of proof on the employer. This is important, given our
findings shown in Table 3.2 that employees win 60 percent of the cases
in which the employer has the burden of proof, compared to only 33
percent overall.
Table 3.5 shows the decision rules used by employment arbitrators
with respect to the quantum of proof required in their cases. There
are two striking findings revealed in Table 3.5. First, a majority of
employment arbitrators would not overturn a termination for violating
a clearly unreasonable rule. In contrast, it is a nearly universal practice
for labor arbitrators to overturn a termination that is based on an unrea-
sonable rule (Brand 1998). Here, we see a majority of employment
arbitrators behaving more like peer review committees than like labor
arbitrators. Second, the fact that the employer acted in good faith would
not be a defense in labor arbitration, yet a third of employment arbitra-
tors said that they would uphold a termination, so long as there was
good faith on the part of the employer.
Table 3.5 Employment Arbitrators’ Decision Rules as to Quantum
of Proof
Quanta Yes (%)
Sometimes require proof beyond a reasonable doubt 5.2
Sometimes require proof by clear and convincing evidence 39.1
Overturn termination for violating clearly unreasonable rule 46.6
Uphold a termination if employer acted in good faith 33.3
NOTE: n  170
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The last portion of our questionnaire asked for employment arbi-
trators’ perceptions as to the quality of employment arbitration from
the respective standpoints of employers and employees. Table 3.6 sets
out these results.
We find from Table 3.6 that employment arbitrators perceive em-
ployer interests to be served better than those of employees in all three
types of cases. The difference, however, is smaller in cases involving
employment contracts. Indeed, although it is statistically significant,
the difference between 4.17 and 4.30, both indicating agreement that
the respective interests are served in cases involving contracts, is prob-
ably too small to be practically significant. In contrast to these findings
as to contract claims, the mean scores with respect to both statutory
claims and cases involving handbooks or policies are under 4. This
means that the score on these questions is not high enough to lead
one to conclude that the employment arbitrators agreed that employee
interests were well served. This is consistent our findings in Table 3.2,
which shows employees winning 56 percent of the employment arbi-
tration cases involving an employment contract, compared to only 22
percent where a statutory issue is involved.
When asked to what degree they agreed that the employment arbi-
tration system is an efficient way to resolve employment disputes, the
Table 3.6 Employment Arbitrator Perceptions as to System Serving the
Parties’ Interestsa
Standard
Employment arbitration does a good job protecting:b Mean deviation
Employee statutory rights 3.87** 0.93
Employer rights in statutory cases 4.09 0.70
Employee rights under employment contracts 4.17** 0.76
Employer rights under employment contracts 4.30 0.58
Employee rights and interests under nonbinding 3.67† 0.91
handbooks and policies
Employer rights and interests under nonbinding 4.30 0.58
handbooks and policies
NOTE: ** Significant at 0.05 level; † significant at 0.005 level.
an 170, except as to the item regarding employee rights and interests under nonbind-
ing handbooks and policies. For that item, n  166.
b1  Strongly disagree; 2  Disagree; 3  Neither agree nor disagree; 4  Agree;
5  Strongly agree.
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employment arbitrators generally agreed that it was (mean  4.34 on
the five-point scale that went from Strongly disagree  1 to Strongly
agree  5). A similar result was reached when they were asked about
agreement that employment arbitration is better than the court system
(mean  4.21).
CONCLUSIONS
Win/loss rates, amounts recovered, and cost and time advantages
are quite difficult to compare among the various dispute resolution pro-
cedures. This is especially true on the crucial question of win/loss ra-
tios. Employees win a little better than half of the time in labor
arbitration; in employment arbitration, they seem to do about as well,
at least where the issues and burden of proof are similar; and in court
cases, the question is a good deal more complicated.
There is evidence that those few employees who obtain legal coun-
sel do reasonably well in the court system. Although they win only a
small proportion of the cases decided in the Federal District-Court
Civil Cases, there is anecdotal evidence that there is a substantial prob-
ability of a favorable settlement. When they go to a jury, they have a
good chance of recovery.
Amounts recovered in court proceedings are substantially higher
than in employment arbitration. Those employees who win often win
big. This has been called a ‘‘lottery’’ (Summers 1992, p. 466), which
is arguably unfair, yet the fear of a big jury verdict may serve to force
employers to be careful to comply with the law—or seek an alternative.
What makes one somewhat uncomfortable with employment arbitra-
tion is that it has the appearance of giving employers an alternative to
complying with the law—adopting a process that doesn’t have the same
potential for extreme awards to employees. This would mean that the
most beneficial effects of the law—stimulating lawful behavior by em-
ployers—would be removed. After all, it is not compensating the mi-
nority of employees whose rights are violated that should be the
principal aim of employment discrimination laws. Instead, it should be
ensuring lawful behavior toward the vast majority of employees who
never find their way into a courtroom or arbitration hearing.
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With the exception of the Bingham and Mesch (2000) study com-
paring labor and employment arbitration, the crucial question that is
not answered by any of the extant studies is whether there are differ-
ences in results across different dispute resolution systems in similar
cases. The cases going to court, employment arbitration, labor arbitra-
tion, peer review panels, or European labor courts may differ systemat-
ically. There may also be systematic differences among the parties and
advocates involved in the cases arising across these systems (Ware
2001; Bingham 1997). As explained in Chapter 5, it is precisely this
point with which our research attempts to deal.
From our survey of employment arbitrators, we find a predominant
proportion of cases to be either statutory (37.6 percent) or contract
(25.4 percent). However, the proportion of cases that are neither of
these (22.2 percent) was higher than expected. Most of the debate in
the literature has to do with statutory cases. While a substantial amount
of employment arbitration deals with these issues, this does not repre-
sent anywhere near a majority of cases. Fifty-five percent of the cases
involving professional and managerial employees is, perhaps, a lower
percentage than we might expect. This means that employment arbitra-
tion involves a substantial number of lower level employees as well.
A very high proportion of employees (80.9 percent) have legal
counsel representing them in employment arbitration. The representa-
tion of employees is generally judged to be competent, but employers
are significantly more likely to have competent representation. An em-
ployee having a representative prior to arbitration is quite rare, which
contrasts with labor arbitration, where union officers represent an em-
ployee at all steps of the process. This is surely one of the critical
differences between labor and employment arbitration. Discovery was
commonly used, but believed to be only sometimes worth the time and
costs involved. In over a quarter (26.3 percent) of the cases, employees
pay all or a substantial share of the costs of the case. This is an issue
over which the courts continue to struggle, and a characteristic of an
arbitration system that might well cause a court to either invalidate it
or at least refuse to enforce that condition of it (see discussion in Chap-
ter 2).
The allocation of the burden of proof is an interesting issue since,
as noted above, employees have much greater success when the burden
is on the employer to prove cause for termination. Employment arbitra-
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tors who also have experience as labor arbitrators are significantly more
likely to impose the burden of proving misconduct on the employer.
As to what needs to be proved, as shown in Table 3.5, employment
arbitration differs from labor arbitration in two respects. First, a major-
ity of employment arbitrators would not overturn a termination for vio-
lating a clearly unreasonable rule. Second, a substantial proportion
would uphold a termination if the employer showed that it acted in
good faith. On both of these points, labor arbitrators would disagree.
Employment arbitrators, perhaps predictably, view employment
arbitration favorably. They agree that it is an efficient system and that
it is better than the courts in handling employment disputes.
Having looked at the evidence on the processes of employment
arbitration in the United States, we will next turn to examining the
processes on termination in other countries. Following that, we will
compare substantive outcomes across different systems of reviewing
termination of employment.
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An International Perspective
Only in the United States, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and Israel
is there no general right for employees not to be terminated without a
justifiable reason (Crotty et al. 2000), whereas in other countries em-
ployees have this general right. This means that in most industrialized
countries, unlike the United States, there is a systematic body of law
that deals specifically with termination of employment. This set of laws
furnishes an interesting benchmark for analyzing and evaluating the
American system of workplace justice without unions.
In international bodies, there has long raged an intense debate on
termination of employment. This is because of what has been called
the ‘‘dire economic consequences’’ to employees, and the view of em-
ployers that strict regulation of worker dismissal undermines the flexi-
bility of management in such a manner as to render enterprises
unproductive and inefficient (Crotty et al. 2000, p. 7).
The right not to be unjustifiably terminated has various justifica-
tions in both common law systems that follow the English model and
civil law systems that follow the continental European model. Com-
mon law systems have based this right on such grounds as a concept of
individual justice that resists arbitrary treatment of workers, and the
promotion of employment security. Civil law systems often view this
as a matter of basic human rights, even incorporating it into their con-
stitutions (Crotty et al. 2000).
There have been numerous studies of the practical effects on em-
ployment levels of the regulation of employment termination, and the
evidence is mixed. A 1999 study by the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) found no evidence that overall
employment levels were affected by regulation of termination. On the
other hand, an International Labor Organization (ILO) report con-
cluded that there is some evidence that ‘‘excessive regulation’’ may
deter employers from hiring workers for fear of difficulty in getting rid
of them (Crotty et al. 2000, p. 10). This would especially affect low-
skill workers. There is some experience with countries (France, Spain,
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Argentina) making their laws more flexible without improving employ-
ment levels (Crotty et al. 2000). As concluded by the OECD (1999),
however, factors other than regulation of employee dismissal seem to
be more important in determining unemployment rates.
In this chapter, we will discuss the law of termination of employ-
ment from an international perspective. We will start with a consider-
ation of international standards on termination, and follow with a
country-by-country summary description and analysis of law and prac-
tice in a sample of 11 countries from which we have been able to gather
some data on actual practices. A narrative discussion of the laws in
these countries can be found in Appendix A. Although mainly Euro-
pean, the sample includes Australia and countries from the Middle
East, Asia, and Africa.
The country-by-country discussion in this chapter will include de-
scriptive data on legal practices in termination cases in these 11 coun-
tries. These data were collected from judges who attended a meeting
of mostly European labor court judges under the auspices of the ILO
in Geneva, Switzerland, in December 2001. At least one judge from
each of these countries filled out our questionnaire regarding the opera-
tion of their legal system with regard to the termination of employment.
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON TERMINATION
OF EMPLOYMENT
The most visible international standard is the Termination of Em-
ployment Convention, adopted by the ILO in 1982 (ILO 1982). As a
tripartite body (employers, unions, governments) and one of the oldest
United Nations agencies, the ILO speaks with authority in the field of
labor.
The Termination of Employment Convention, like most other ILO
conventions, has not been adopted by the U.S. government. Therefore,
it does not have legal effect within the boundaries of the United States.
However, it does reflect the views of the international labor, manage-
ment, and government community as to what the law should be in all
of the member countries of the ILO, including the United States.
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The crucial language of the Convention is found in Article 4:
The employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there
is a valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity
or conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements
of the undertaking.
By this standard, workers should be terminated only for a lack of abil-
ity to do the job, misconduct, or redundancy. The only exclusions are
for employees under fixed-term contracts, on probation, or ‘‘engaged
on a casual basis for a short period’’ (Article 2).
The convention goes on to list some specific reasons for termina-
tion that are not valid, which include 1) union membership or activity;
2) serving as a workers’ representative or seeking such office; 3) par-
ticipating in proceedings against an employer regarding an alleged
violation of the law; 4) ‘‘race, color, sex, marital status, family respon-
sibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or
social origin;’’ or; 5) being absent from work for maternity leave (Arti-
cle 5). Also, temporary absence from work due to sickness or injury is
not a proper cause for discharge (Article 6).
The convention sets out some rudimentary procedural guarantees.
A worker is to be given an opportunity to defend against allegations of
misconduct against him/her before he/she is terminated; the worker has
a right to appeal his/her termination to an impartial body; and the bur-
den of proof is to be placed on the employer to establish alleged mis-
conduct (Article 9).
A number of other international human rights instruments lend
support to this convention. Two of the more important sources of these
documents are the United Nations and the ILO. The right to work and
to be protected against unemployment is included in the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights of the United Nations (Article 23) (United
Nations 1948). The right to pursue ‘‘material well being’’ with ‘‘eco-
nomic security’’ is in the Constitution of the ILO in Declaration of
Philadelphia, para. II (a), Annex to the Constitution of the ILO (ILO
1948).
It is clear that the American common law employment-at-will doc-
trine is at odds with the convention. U.S. law does cover by statute
many of the specific examples of invalid reasons for termination (e.g.,
race, sex, union activity). However, as a broad proposition, the rights
set out in the ILO Termination of Employment Convention do not exist
in the United States.
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TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT IN VARIOUS
COUNTRIES
Although nearly all countries provide workers with a guarantee
against unjust termination, they do this in a variety of ways. Some,
such as France, Italy, and Germany, state this in very broad terms,
while others, such as many Latin American countries, spell out the
acceptable reasons in some detail. A number of countries specify pro-
cedural requirements that an employer must meet, including written
notice of reasons for termination (e.g., Germany, Greece), an interview
with the worker (France), or consultation with the works council (Ger-
many) (Crotty et al. 2000).
In those countries that mandate notice of termination, this require-
ment applies only to contracts of employment of indefinite duration.
Length of notice may depend on length of service, whether the em-
ployee is paid on a weekly or monthly basis, blue- or white-collar
status, or age. An employer who fails to give proper notice will gener-
ally have to pay wages for the notice period (Crotty et al. 2000).
The bodies to which a worker can appeal his termination also vary
considerably. A number of countries (e.g., Belgium, Germany, United
Kingdom) have separate labor courts, while special labor magistrates
exist in Spain and several other countries. The labor courts in some
countries, including Germany and Belgium, are tripartite (Crotty et al.
2000), including both professional judges, and labor and management
‘‘wingmen’’ who are practitioners. This compares to the United States,
which uses private labor arbitrators as well as ordinary courts and the
NLRB.
The burden of proof in termination cases can rest on either the
worker or the employer. In some countries it rests on neither, and it is
simply the obligation of the tribunal to obtain the necessary informa-
tion and make an impartial decision (Crotty et al. 2000).
There is little consistency across countries in regard to remedies.
In the Termination of Employment Convention of the ILO, the remedy
that is favored is reinstatement. Although reinstatement is provided for
in many countries, lost wages are often awarded in lieu of putting the
worker back on the job. Severance pay is sometimes awarded even
where the employee is at fault (Crotty et al. 2000).
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In the following section, we will examine the law and practice of
termination of employment on a country-by-country basis. This will
cover 11 countries: Australia, Finland, Germany, Israel, Italy, Malay-
sia, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
We will deal chiefly with terminations arising from the capacity or
conduct of the worker, as dismissals on the grounds of redundancy are
beyond the scope of the present study.
All of the 11 countries are in compliance with international labor
standards as set forth in the ILO’s Termination of Employment Con-
vention. That is, where there are no reasons for termination related to
the operations of the firm, they guarantee workers against termination
except for reasons related to their ‘‘capacity or conduct.’’
As we can see from Table 4.1, most of these countries guarantee
fair treatment in dismissals by statute. Two countries (South Africa and
Spain) also have constitutional provisions on this subject. Israel utilizes
collective agreements. Malaysia generally relies upon common law
principles, and generally exempts foreign companies and domestic
firms in its export sector from the provisions of Malaysia’s statutory
labor laws (Kuruvilla 1995).
The standards that must be met to justify a termination often vary
according to whether the termination is an ordinary one (which usually
requires notice) or a summary dismissal. For summary dismissal,
‘‘grave misconduct’’ (Germany), ‘‘very grave misconduct’’ (Italy),
‘‘gross breach of duty’’ (Norway) or ‘‘culpable non-performance’’
(Spain) are among the standards used. Dismissal with notice can be for
‘‘justified reason’’ (Italy), be ‘‘objectively justified’’ (Norway), or for
‘‘objective reasons’’ (Spain). Some systems do not make such a distinc-
tion, requiring that the employer not be ‘‘harsh, unjust or unreason-
able’’ (Australia), have an ‘‘empirically weighty reason’’ (Finland), a
‘‘valid reason’’ (Israel), ‘‘just cause’’ (Malaysia), ‘‘serious misconduct
making continuation intolerable’’ (South Africa), that the dismissal be
‘‘materially justified’’ (Sweden), or that the employer acted as a ‘‘rea-
sonable employer’’ (United Kingdom). However they express the rule,
it appears that, across these countries, summary dismissal requires very
serious misconduct on the part of the employee. For dismissal with
notice, the standards vary somewhat. What is constant is the require-
ment of objective, provable grounds for dismissal.
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Table 4.1 Summary of Termination of Employment Laws in Eleven Countries
Country Source Standard
Notice
required
Notice
length
Notice
determined Foruma Remedies
Australia Statute Not harsh, unjust, or
unreasonable
Yes, if not
serious
misconduct
1–6 weeks Service, age Industrial
Commission,
ordinary
courts
Reinstatement,
damages, 6
months’ pay
(monetary
limit)
Finland Statute Especially weighty
reason
Yes 1–6 months Service Ordinary
courts, labor
court
Normalized
indemnity, 3–4
months’
wages
Germany Statute Socially justifiable,
grave misconduct
(summary)
Yes (not for
summary)
1–7 months Service Labor court Reinstatement
and up to 12
months’ pay
Israel Collective
agreement
Valid reason Yes 15–30 days Service Ordinary
courts or labor
courts
Damages
Italy Statute Justified reason
(with notice), very
grave misconduct
(summary)
Yes Varies by
collective
agreement
Collective
agreement
Ordinary
courts
Reinstatement
and damages
Malaysia Common
law, statutes
Just cause Yes, except
misconduct
4–8 weeks Service Industrial
court or labor
court
Reinstatement
and damages
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Norway Statute Objectively
justified (with
notice) gross
breach of duty
(summary)
Yes, except
summary
1–3 months Service, age Ordinary courts
(special
procedures)
Reinstatement
or
compensation
South Africa Constitution,
statutes
Serious
misconduct
making
continuation
intolerable
Yes 1–4 weeks Service Commission for
Conciliation
Arbitration and
Mediation; or
labor court,
ordinary courts
Reinstatement,
up to 12
months’
wages
Spain Constitution,
statutes
Objective
reasons, culpable non-
performance
Yes, for
objective
reasons
30 days All same Labor court Reinstatement,
lost wages, up
to 42 months’
pay
Sweden Statute Materially
justified
Yes, unless
immediate
effect
2–6 months Age Labor court Reinstatement
or financial
compensation
United Kingdom Statute Employer acted
as a reasonable
employer
Yes 1/2 week,
unlimited
Service, age Industrial
Tribunal,
arbitration, or
ordinary courts
Reinstatement,
awards up to
monetary
limits
aFor all cases except discrimination on prohibited grounds.
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Where notice of termination is required, length of notice varies to
a great degree across countries—it ranges from a few days to seven
months. In a particular national system, the amount of notice to which
an employee is entitled usually depends upon length of service, how-
ever, age is sometimes a factor.
Most, but not all, of these countries have specialized forums for
hearing termination of employment cases. Remedies generally include
reinstatement and compensation for lost wages, and sometimes other
damages. One gets the impression that reinstatement is a remedy nearly
universally available, but rarely used.
The practices in the courts in 9 of the 11 participating countries
are summarized in Table 4.2. Here we see that proof of misconduct, or
lack of capacity, proved by a preponderance of the evidence (or a bal-
ance of the probabilities, which is very similar), is the requirement in
most of these countries. However, one country (Finland) requires clear
and convincing evidence. It should be noted that the United Kingdom
ultimately asks the question of whether the employer acted as a reason-
able employer.
We see that the parties are generally competently represented in
the tribunals that hear dismissal cases. However, there is some indica-
tion that competent representation may be more likely to be present in
some countries (Italy, Malaysia, South Africa) for employers than for
employees. Sufficient information for an informed decision seems to
be generally present, and discovery processes appear to work reason-
ably well where they are available. Overall, the court systems are seen
as being good for both employers and employees, except perhaps for
employers in Italy. The systems are seen by these judges as being
efficient in all of these countries except Italy and Malaysia. Specialized
tribunals are viewed as being better than ordinary courts wherever they
exist.
COMPARISON WITH U.S. EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
Because there are some parallels between the questionnaires sent
to employment judges in other countries and American employment
arbitrators, it is possible to make some rough comparisons between the
U.S. system of employment arbitration and the systems in these coun-
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Table 4.2 Court Practices in Nine Countriesa
Country
Burden of
proof
Employer
competently
represented
Employee
competently
represented
Sufficient
information
for decision
Worthwhile
discovery
processb
System
good for
employees
System
good for
employers
System
efficient
Better than
ordinary courtsc
Australia Preponderance Usually Usually Usually Sometimes Agree Agree Agree Agree
Finland Clear and
convincing
Usually Usually Usually Always Agree Agree Agree Not applicable
Germany Beyond reasonable
doubt
Usually Usually Usually Not applicable Agree Agree Agree Agree
Italy Preponderance Always Usually Usually Not applicable Agree Neutral Disagree Not applicable
Malaysia Preponderance Usually Sometimes Usually Usually Agree Agree Neutral Strongly agree
Norway Preponderance Always Always Always Not applicable Agree Agree No response Not applicable
South Africa Balance of
probabilities
Usually Sometimes Usually Usually Agree Agree Agree Strongly agree
Spain Proof by employer Usually Usually Usually Usually Agree Agree Agree Strongly agree
Sweden Preponderance Usually Usually Always Always Strongly
agree
Strongly
agree
Strongly
agree
Agree
aIsrael and the United Kingdom are excluded from this table, owing to lack of agreement among the several respondents from these
countries (see text discussions of these countries in Appendix A).
b
‘‘Worthwhile discovery process’’ is not applicable where there is no discovery process.
c
‘‘Better than ordinary courts’’ is not applicable where there is not a separate labor court system.
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tries. This gives us an additional frame of reference within which to
view employment arbitration.
When asked whether employers and employees have competent
representation in their tribunals, foreign judges were generally positive
as to representatives of both employers and employees. In the nine
countries analyzed on this point, with respect to employers, judges
from two countries said that representation was always competent, and
those from seven countries said that it was usually the case. As to
employee representatives, only one said that this was always the case,
six said it was usually true, and two stated that this was only sometimes
the case. Although these last results are not directly comparable be-
cause different scales were used on these items on the two question-
naires, as noted in Chapter 3, in U.S. employment arbitration the mean
score on the questions regarding employer representation of 3.6, and
for employee representation of 3.2 (on a four-point scale where 1
Never, 2  Rarely, 3  Sometimes, 4  Always), appears to be
similar. That is, both by judges in other countries and U.S. employment
arbitrators, representation for both sides was judged to be competent
more than sometimes, but with the frequency of having competent
counsel somewhat more common for employers than for employees.
Discovery was available in only six of the nine countries shown in
Table 4.2. In comparison, as shown in Chapter 3, this is something that
was used in about 80 percent of the U.S. employment arbitration cases.
In those countries where discovery was available, it was perceived as
being worth the time and cost either usually (three countries) or always
(two countries) in five of the six countries. In only one was it judged to
be only sometimes worth the time and cost. Again, because of a differ-
ent scale, it is not possible to make a direct comparison with employ-
ment arbitrators’ perceptions. However, it appears that discovery may
be perceived as slightly more worthwhile by the judges in other coun-
tries than it is in American employment arbitration.
Regarding the quantum of proof required, of the nine countries in
Table 4.2, in some cases only one country requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and one requires proof by clear and convincing evi-
dence. By comparison, as shown in Table 3.5, 5.2 percent of American
employment arbitrators said that they would sometimes require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Clear and convincing evidence would
sometimes be required by 39.1 percent. It is difficult to compare these
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results, so perhaps the most that can be said is that the requirement of
proof by a greater quantum than by a preponderance of the evidence
(i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt or by clear and convincing evidence)
is present both in some other countries and in American employment
arbitration. In American labor arbitration, arbitrators are likely to use
at least a clear and convincing evidence standard, or even proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, in cases where it is alleged that the employee com-
mitted an offense involving moral turpitude such as theft or acts of
violence (Brand 1998; Volz and Goggin 1997).
Both the judges from other countries and American employment
arbitrators were surveyed regarding their views about the quality of
their systems. As to the protection of the interests of both employees
and employers, the judges generally either agreed or strongly agreed
that the interests of both parties were well protected by their systems.
The only exception is Italy, where the judges were neutral as to
whether employer interests were well protected. As shown previously
in Table 3.6, American employment arbitrators were reasonably posi-
tive as to the interests of both employers and employees. However, as
to all types of cases, American employment arbitrators were more
strongly in agreement that the rights of employers were protected. This
difference was especially pronounced where nonbinding handbooks
and policies are concerned.
As can be seen from Table 4.2, the judges from outside the United
States largely agreed that their system was efficient, although the Ital-
ians disagreed with this, and the Malaysian judge was neutral on this
point. As shown in Chapter 3, employment arbitrators in the United
States were somewhat more approving of their system, with an average
score of 4.34 (five-point scale with Agree  4, Strongly agree  5).
On the other hand, the judges were more positive when asked whether
their system worked better than using the ordinary courts. All who
had a specialized system (six countries) either strongly agreed (three
countries), or agreed (three countries) that this was so. American em-
ployment arbitrators were also reasonably positive on this question
(4.21 on a five-point scale), but perhaps not quite as approving as the
judges.
We conclude that there are no striking differences between the
processes in other countries and employment arbitration in the respects
in which we compared them. Both in U.S. employment arbitration and
in the courts of other selected countries, both sides were believed to
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generally have competent representation, but that employers are more
likely to have competent representation than employees. Discovery
seems to be more favored in other countries than in employment arbi-
tration, and practices as to quantum of proof are similar.
As to the system’s effectiveness in protecting the rights of the par-
ties, it would seem that American employment arbitrators are more
likely to perceive employers as being better served than employees. It
is notable that judges in one country—Italy—were neutral as to their
system protecting the interests of employers. American employment
arbitrators seem more likely to be approving of the efficiency of their
system, but the judges are somewhat more likely to say that their sys-
tem is better than the ordinary courts.
Having examined, in general terms, the laws and processes on ter-
mination of employment in international perspective as well as in the
United States, we will now proceed to describe an empirical analysis
of decision making in dismissal cases in the United States and several
of these countries.
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Judging the Merits of
Terminations:
Does It Matter Who Decides?
As discussed in earlier chapters, within the unionized sector, labor
arbitration plays a critical role in determining what decisions are made
with regard to employee termination. Furthermore, the norms and pro-
cedural elements governing labor arbitration have been extensively
studied and are well understood by both labor and management (Coo-
per, Nolan, and Bales 2000). The joint role of unions and management
in the arbitration process combined with clearly established just cause
requirements imposes a particular, reasonably well-understood balance
with regard to employee and employer rights (Werhane 1985). Knowl-
edge of other forms of workplace justice that have emerged in associa-
tion with the decline of unionization is not as far advanced, however
(Ewing 1989). As noted earlier, in some nonunion organizations, peer
review procedures have been introduced as a substitute for labor arbi-
tration to help minimize the threat of unionization (Colvin 2003). In
other firms, the HR function plays an increasingly important role in
addressing whether a given termination is permissible (Kandel and
Frumer 1994). In still other firms, employment arbitration systems have
been introduced—a development expected to increase in light of the
recent legal developments addressed in previous chapters. And in many
other organizations, disputes that traditionally would have been re-
solved within labor arbitration now find their way into the judicial sys-
tem (Bales 1997).
According to some arguments, the different institutional arrange-
ments that have emerged over the last two decades for resolving dis-
putes regarding termination will have few implications for actual
outcomes. Decision makers (irrespective of institutional constraints)
are expected to apply universal standards regarding fairness, and these
norms of fairness will have a significant effect on outcomes—
regardless of the rules and procedures governing the dispute resolution
process (Wheeler, Klaas, and Rojot 1994). For example, while the pri-
mary task of juries in statutory cases is to determine whether there was
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illegal discrimination, jurors may be influenced by whether they be-
lieve the employee was treated justly—independent of the issue of ille-
gal discrimination (Abbott 1993; MacCoun 1989). To the extent that
these fairness norms dominate decision making, few differences are
likely to be observed across different procedures for making decisions
about whether a termination is justified.
However, it is important not to discount the significance of differ-
ences across institutional arrangements in the rules and procedures that
govern how decisions about termination are to be made. Evidence sug-
gests that, while fairness norms may affect a wide variety of decision
makers, these individuals are still influenced by institution-specific
rules regarding how decisions should be made (Klaas and Feldman
1994). More or less universal norms of fairness may well exist, but
such norms are rather general and often offer insufficient practical
guidance for decision makers. It is within this context, then, that differ-
ences in institutional norms and procedures may come to play a role
in affecting decisions about terminations. For example, within labor
arbitration, just cause standards inform arbitrators how they should
judge the issue of fairness (Block and Steiber 1987). By contrast, peer
review panelists judge fairness by determining whether the termination
is consistent with company rules and procedures (Ewing 1989). While
peer review deliberations may indirectly cause the modification of or-
ganizational rules, the fundamental focus of the peer review panel is to
assess whether the termination is consistent with existing policies and
procedures.
In addition to differences in the institutional procedures used to
guide decision making, differences in the background, training, and
interests of the decision maker exist across alternative forums. For ex-
ample, while HR managers and peer review panelists may well have
an interest in ensuring the fair treatment of employees, they also are
likely to have an interest in ensuring the effective functioning of the
firm (Klaas and Feldman 1993). This interest in protecting the firm
may cause them to differ from third-party decision makers, whose con-
cerns about the firm’s success may not be as compelling. Similarly,
differences may exist between labor and employment arbitrators in
terms of their professional experience and training. For example, be-
cause labor arbitrators must be acceptable to both unions and manage-
ment, the typical profile of a labor arbitrator may differ from the typical
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profile of an employment arbitrator (Bingham and Mesch 2000).
Within employment arbitration, advocates (e.g., management-side em-
ployment lawyers or plaintiff-side employment lawyers) are permitted
to serve on arbitration lists, which is not generally permitted within
labor arbitration.
To understand how the decline in unionization affects workplace
justice, it is appropriate to compare how decision makers from different
institutional forums would respond to similar cases involving employee
termination. With respect to labor arbitration, it should be noted that
the effect of decision maker or case characteristics has previously been
studied by analyzing actual decisions (using the written decision pro-
vided by the arbitrator). For example, the effect of decision maker or
case characteristics on outcomes has been estimated, controlling for
factors described within the written opinion of the arbitrator in Block
and Steiber (1987). While examining actual cases offers some advan-
tages, it is often difficult to ascertain from the arbitrator’s written deci-
sion the exact nature of the offense, the evidence against the employee,
and mitigating circumstances. As such, it is difficult to control for the
severity of the offense or the available evidence—characteristics that
might well be expected to differ across the different institutional fo-
rums being examined here. Further, detailed written decisions are not
available from many of the alternative institutional forums that have
grown in importance in association with the decline of unionization.
The approach taken here was to develop hypothetical cases regard-
ing employee termination, and to ask different types of decision makers
to indicate whether they would find in favor of the employee or the
employer in light of the facts presented. Asking subjects to respond
to paper and pencil scenarios is, of course, a common social science
methodology. While questions have been raised about the degree to
which subjects can anticipate how they would actually behave in re-
sponse to the facts presented, evidence suggests that subjects who have
made similar decisions in the past are typically capable of drawing on
their experience in order to judge how they would behave if actually
faced with the facts presented in the scenario (Locke 1986). Here, all
subjects examined have had experience making decisions about
whether to rule in favor of an employee in a termination case—either
as a labor arbitrator, an employment arbitrator, a juror, a peer review
panelist, or an HR manager.
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It should be noted that while labor arbitrators, employment arbitra-
tors, and HR managers all make decisions on an individual basis, peer
review panelists and jurors make decisions as part of a group. By ask-
ing jurors and peer review panelists to respond as individuals, we are
capturing how they would form their initial judgment about how to
respond. It must be understood that such initial judgments could
change as a result of group deliberations.
The overall approach taken here was rather straightforward. First,
we drew upon theory and research to identify how and why decision
makers within different institutional forums might respond differently
to a variety of cases involving employee termination. Second, we de-
veloped written scenarios that are realistic termination cases. They vary
in terms of salient characteristics such as evidence of discrimination,
strength of the evidence, mitigating circumstances, and procedural
compliance on the part of the employer. Third, we administered the
scenarios to experienced decision makers from different institutional
forums. Fourth, we systematically compared the responses to the sce-
narios from the different decision makers. We did this to determine
whether the results show the differences that we expected to find, based
on theory and previous research. And lastly, we addressed the implica-
tions of these results for our understanding of workplace justice.
In this chapter, after a brief discussion of the decision makers and
the hypothetical cases with which they were presented, we outline our
expectations for each group of decision makers. We then present the
results of our analysis and the implications of these results. In Appen-
dix B, we more fully describe the sample of decision makers that took
part in this research, and how the data were gathered. In this appendix,
we also set out in more detail summaries of the hypothetical cases that
we posed to the decision makers.
THE DECISION MAKERS AND THE CASES
In this study, we are examining how the role of the decision maker
affects decisions made regarding rulings in favor of an employee
challenging a termination. We compare labor arbitrators; employment
arbitrators instructed to evaluate claims of a statutory violation, as well
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as claims of a violation of a ‘‘for-cause’’ provision in the employment
agreement; peer review panelists; HR managers operating within a
nonunion environment; and jurors with experience in employment ter-
mination cases. Also included for comparison purposes is a small sam-
ple of judges from countries where ‘‘for-cause’’ standards exist and are
enforceable in their court systems.
Before proceeding further, we would like to make one note regard-
ing methodology. All subjects were asked to respond to a number of
different termination cases. Although these decision makers are from
different forums, it is reasonable to expect that the content of a case
could be the same across forums. For example, within labor arbitration,
emphasis is given to whether the employer has just cause for termina-
tion. Just cause tests do not directly pertain to issues raised in cases
involving allegations of illegal discrimination. Thus, there might be
questions about whether a labor arbitrator would even hear a case that
is similar to what is heard by a jury. In response to such questions, it
is important to note that it is often suggested that labor arbitrators may
commonly hear cases that otherwise would have been translated into a
case involving allegations of a statutory violation. For example, within
labor arbitration, it is common for a claim to be made that the employer
did not have cause for termination. Often, that substantive claim is
combined with a contention about the actual motives of the employer—
motives that might include allegations about discrimination on the
basis of race, gender, age, or some other protected category. While the
labor arbitrator may focus on the issue of whether there is cause for
termination, claims made regarding discrimination are likely to be con-
sidered to the extent that they inform judgments about whether there is
just cause (Cooper, Nolan, and Bales 2000). Further, in the absence of
labor arbitration, it might well be that an employee would pursue his/
her case within the judiciary system with the primary focus being upon
the alleged discrimination. However, factors relating to evidence
against the employee, procedural compliance, or the employee’s work
record would inevitably be addressed within judicial proceedings.
Thus, the facts of the case would remain the same as they would be in
labor arbitration. The differences observed across forums would re-
volve around different questions addressed by the decision maker, and
in differences in emphasis with respect to various aspects of the case.
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All of the cases that were posed to respondents to this study were
designed to enable comparisons across the different dispute resolution
forums.
The cases were developed by reviewing relevant cases from labor
and employment arbitration. Cases were designed to be realistic for
labor arbitrators, employment arbitrators evaluating statutory claims,
employment arbitrators with for-cause requirements, peer review pan-
elists, jurors, HR managers, and labor court judges. While the facts of
each case remained constant across decision makers, we did vary the
instructions provided. For example, labor arbitrators were informed
that the contract contained a ‘‘just cause’’ requirement for termination,
and employment arbitrators evaluating a statutory claim were told the
employee was an at-will employee. Relevant material regarding the
interpretation of the statute in question was included to ensure that
the decision setting reflected information that would be present when
the respondent was actually deciding such a case. As an additional
example of how the instructions differed, peer review panelists were
instructed that they should assess whether they would rule in favor of
the employee if such a case appeared before them in their peer review
system. Consistent with the structure of the peer review system in the
organizations sampled, subjects were told that the peer review body
had the authority to overturn management’s action and that their ruling
would be final and binding within the company. They were further
instructed that their task was to determine whether the termination was
consistent with the policies and procedures of the company. As one
final example of how the cases varied in terms of the instructions given
to the decision makers, labor court judges were from countries where
the for-cause requirement is embedded in statute, common law, or col-
lective bargaining agreements with near-universal coverage. Reference
to employment-at-will was eliminated from instructions that they re-
ceived. Judges were simply informed to make their determinations in
accordance with norms that existed in their judicial system.
Before finalizing the scenarios, feedback on them was obtained
from experienced labor arbitrators, employment arbitrators, HR man-
agers in firms where peer review is used, and HR managers who have
primary responsibility for authorizing termination.
Cases varied in terms of content and in terms of the degree to
which a finding in favor of the employee would be expected. Our inten-
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tion was to create scenarios where the case against the employee was
strong but not incontrovertible, scenarios where there were substantial
problems with the case against the employee, and scenarios where po-
tential problems with the case against the employee were combined
with other factors that might be seen by some as supporting a case for
termination.
Table 5.1 summarizes how the 12 cases reviewed by the subjects
varied across key dimensions. Further details regarding each case are
provided in Appendix B. As can be seen in Table 5.1, the cases involve
a number of different disciplinary offenses, ranging from absenteeism
to theft. The cases also vary in terms of the degree of evidence against
the employee. In some cases, the evidence against the employee is
strong, whereas in other cases, questions could legitimately be raised
about whether there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the em-
ployee is guilty. While some of the cases revolve solely around whether
there is a violation of a ‘‘for-cause’’ requirement within an individual
or collective contract, others contain allegations of illegal discrimina-
tion. For these latter cases, evidence of discrimination ranges from
weak to substantial. The cases also vary in whether the rule allegedly
violated by the employee might be viewed as unreasonable. Procedural
compliance by the firm also varies: in 10 of the cases, the firm’s actions
are consistent with procedural requirements, while in 2 of the cases,
questions could be raised about whether the firm’s actions are consis-
tent with its own procedural requirements. Finally, the cases vary in
terms of whether there are mitigating or extenuating circumstances
present, and whether there is any evidence that inappropriate behavior
by the employee might have been provoked by his or her supervisor.
ARE THERE DIFFERENCES AMONG DECISION
MAKERS?
Before launching into an extensive analysis of the differences in
outcomes across our sample of decision makers, it is helpful to take an
overview of our data to see whether there is any evidence that there
are differences worth explaining. That this is the case is shown rather
clearly by the analyses shown in Tables 5.2 through 5.5.
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Table 5.1 Summary of the Characteristics and Strength of the Case against the Employee
Case
Nature of
alleged offense
Strength of
evidence against
employee
Allegations of
discrimination
Reasonableness
of rule
Issues of
procedural
compliance
Mitigating or
exacerbating
circumstances Provocation
1 Theft Strong None Reasonable None Very short tenure
(1 year)
None
2 Theft Strong Weak evidence
of racial
discrimination
Reasonable
None
Very short tenure
(1 year)
None
3 Insubordination Modest Modest
evidence of
gender
discrimination
Reasonable Questionable
noncompliance
Short tenure (4 years),
highly productive
None
4 Theft Strong None Possibly
unreasonable
None Very long tenure
(20 years)
None
5 Fighting Modest None Reasonable None Short tenure
(4 years),
negative work record
None
6 Absenteeism Strong None Possibly
unreasonable
None Very long tenure
(15 years),
family problems
None
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7 Poor performance
and
insubordination
Strong Weak evidence
of age
discrimination
Reasonable None Short tenure
(4 years),
prior warnings
None
8 Poor performance
and
insubordination
Modest Weak evidence
of age
discrimination
Reasonable Clear
non-compliance
Short tenure
(1 year),
poor work record
None
9 Poor performance
and
insubordination
Modest Substantial
evidence
of age
discrimination
Reasonable None Short tenure
(4 years)
None
10 Poor performance
and
insubordination
Modest Weak evidence
of age
discrimination
Reasonable None Short tenure
(4 years),
poor work record
Evidence of
provocation
11
Poor performance
and
insubordination
Modest Weak evidence
of age
discrimination
Reasonable None Very long tenure
(22 years),
poor work record
None
12
Poor performance
and
insubordination
Modest Weak evidence
of age
discrimination
Reasonable None Short tenure
(4 years),
poor work record,
family problems
None
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We begin by providing descriptive statistics about the decision
making on the 12 cases described in Appendix B. Table 5.2 shows the
average ratings across all decision makers for each of the 12 cases
rated. The results are anchored on a seven-point Likert-type scale,
where a rating of 7 indicates the strongest likelihood of a ruling for the
employee by overturning the termination, and a rating of 1 indicates
the strongest likelihood of ruling against the employee by letting the
termination stand. A higher rating favors the employee, while a lower
rating favors the termination. The seven-point scale is constructed in
such a way that a score of 5 or above reflects a decision to overturn the
termination of the employee, while a score of 3 or below reflects a
decision to confirm the termination. A rating at the midpoint (4) indi-
cates that the rater is uncertain about the outcome.
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the likelihood of a ruling in favor
of the employee was lowest for Case 7, followed closely by Case 2 and
Case 1. This is to be expected because in all three of these cases,
evidence against the employee was relatively strong, there was little
evidence of discrimination, there was no evidence of procedural viola-
tions by the company, and with the exception of Case 7, there were no
mitigating circumstances.
The likelihood of ruling in favor of the employee was highest in
Case 3, followed closely by Cases 11 and 8. In all three cases, evidence
Table 5.2 Likelihood of Overturning Termination across Decision Maker
Types: Means and Standard Deviations
Case number Mean Std. dev.
Case 1 2.82 1.53
Case 2 2.71 1.31
Case 3 5.00 1.38
Case 4 4.22 1.67
Case 5 3.77 1.49
Case 6 3.67 1.59
Case 7 2.32 1.43
Case 8 4.74 1.56
Case 9 4.35 1.65
Case 10 3.98 1.46
Case 11 4.97 1.56
Case 12 4.31 1.58
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination.
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of employee wrongdoing was relatively modest, and this was combined
with either procedural problems with the termination (Cases 3 and 8),
or long tenure on the part of the employee (Case 11).
Table 5.3 shows the mean likelihood of a ruling in favor of the
employee broken down by type of decision maker. As can be seen,
employment arbitrators evaluating statutory claims were the least likely
to rule in favor of the employee across all of the cases. Employment
arbitrators with a for-cause requirement were the next least likely to
rule in favor of the employee, followed by jurors, peer review panelists,
HR managers, labor court judges, and labor arbitrators. Mean ratings
ranged from a low of 3.38 (employment arbitrators evaluating statutory
claims) to a high of 4.41 for labor arbitrators.
Another way of looking at this same issue can be seen in Table 5.4.
Across all the cases, labor arbitrators indicated that they would be
likely to rule in favor of the employee a minimum of 55 percent of the
time. This can be contrasted with employment arbitrators evaluating
statutory claims, who indicated that they would be likely to rule in
favor of the employee a minimum of 25 percent of the time. Interest-
ingly, even with the for-cause requirement, employment arbitrators in-
dicated they would be likely to rule in favor of the employee only 33
percent of the time, which is still less than jurors (at 38 percent) who
had no for-cause requirement. Decision makers from within the organi-
zation (peer review panelists and HR managers) fell between employ-
ment arbitrators and jurors at one end of the scale and labor arbitrators
Table 5.3 Likelihood of Overturning Termination across Cases: Means
and Standard Deviations by Decision Maker
Decision maker type Mean Std. dev.
Labor arbitrator 4.41 1.55
Employment arbitrator 3.38 1.49
(evaluating statutory claim)
Employment arbitrator 3.70 1.42
(for-cause requirement)
Peer review panelist 3.99 1.70
Juror 3.82 1.75
HR manager 4.00 1.75
Labor court judge 4.37 1.76
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination.
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Table 5.4 Percentage of Rulings Likely to be in Favor of the Employee
across All Cases: by Decision Maker
% of cases where ruling in
Decision maker favor of employee is likely
Labor arbitrator 55
Employment arbitrator (statutory claims) 25
Employment arbitrator (for-cause requirement) 33
Peer review panelist 45
Juror 38
HR manager 46
Labor court judge 51
NOTE: A ruling was classified as likely to be in favor of the employee when a decision
maker selected a response of 5 or higher on the 7-point response scale. A scale value
5 was anchored with ‘‘likely to rule in favor of the employee.’’
and labor court judges at the other end. These overall differences might
well be expected in light of our prior discussion about differences in
the decision task. One possible exception to this is for employment
arbitrators that were assigned to the for-cause condition. Given the na-
ture of the decision task, one might have expected jurors to have been
less likely to rule in favor of the employee than employment arbitrators
with the for-cause requirement. However, the overall difference might
well be understood if one considers the differences in both the decision
task and in the interest of the decision maker, as well as differences in
tendencies to identify with one party versus another (jurors being more
likely to identify with the employee).
These differences suggest that the role of the decision maker is
likely to play a significant role in determining what decisions are made
when employees challenge termination decisions. However, as noted
earlier, we expect that differences between decision makers will vary
across different types of disciplinary cases as well. Accordingly, we
now turn to examining how the decision makers differed for each of the
12 cases examined here. Our goal is to perform all possible pairwise
comparisons for each of the 12 cases examined. But before making
these pairwise comparisons, it is necessary to examine whether deci-
sion maker type explains a significant amount of variance in each case.
As can be seen in Table 5.5, using analysis of variance procedures,
we found that decision maker type accounted for a significant portion
of the variance in outcomes for each of the 12 cases. While there is
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Table 5.5 Effect of Role of the Decision Maker on Likelihood of
Overturning Termination
Case number F-value
Case 1 9.29**
Case 2 5.66**
Case 3 21.08**
Case 4 6.20**
Case 5 11.93**
Case 6 4.33**
Case 7 2.77*
Case 8 15.73**
Case 9 3.14**
Case 10 8.00**
Case 11 12.35**
Case 12 9.35**
NOTE: *p  0.05; ** p  0.01
variation in the level of significance across these cases, decision maker
type played a significant role for each. This result justifies an examina-
tion of pairwise differences.
In the balance of this chapter we will present, for each compared
pair of decision makers, our discussion regarding the results that we
expect to find, why we expect those particular results, and the results,
which will be presented in Tables 5.6 through 5.26.
PAIRWISE COMPARISONS OF DECISION MAKERS
Labor Arbitrators vs. Employment Arbitrators Evaluating
Statutory Claims
Expectations
Many employment arbitration agreements specify that, while em-
ployees are required to submit claims regarding statutory violations to
employment arbitration, the employee remains an ‘‘at will’’ employee.
Under such agreements, the employment arbitrator’s sole task is to
determine if a statutory violation occurred (Bales 1997). In cases where
a statutory claim is made by an employee, the employment arbitrator
is likely to focus on factors that offer evidence as to whether illegal
discrimination occurred. Under such agreements, the employment arbi-
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trator (much like a juror or a judge) is not directed to assess the fairness
of the termination for the employee or the wisdom of termination from
the standpoint of the business.
In discrimination cases, both in the courts and (we would expect)
in an employment arbitration tribunal, the initial burden of coming
forward with the evidence, as well as the ultimate burden of persuasion,
lay upon the employee. In cases of sex, race, natural origin, color, or
religious discrimination, if the employee fails to show a prima facie
case, the employer is not obligated to defend or justify its decision
(Bennett-Alexander and Hartman 2001). Thus, absent credible evi-
dence of discrimination or of circumstances giving rise to an inference
of it, employment arbitrators are unlikely to reach questions regarding
procedural fairness or the quality of the evidence against the employee.
In indirect evidence cases where the employee has not provided direct
evidence of discrimination but only circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination, the employer can prevail by merely articu-
lating (not proving) a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its ac-
tion. If the employer does this, the employee can prevail only by
showing that the articulated reason is a mere pretext (Bennett-Alexan-
der and Hartman 2004). It is only at this point that general considera-
tions of fairness come into play. In mixed-motive cases, once the
employee has shown that a discriminatory motive played a part in its
action, the employer will be found to have violated the law. However,
if the employer can demonstrate to the court that the employee would
have been terminated in the absence of the discriminatory motive, the
employer will be excused from paying any damages (Bennett-Alexan-
der and Hartman 2004; Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc. 2002).
We would expect an employment arbitrator to adopt this same kind of
analysis. Therefore, at the point of showing pretext, or the employer
attempting to demonstrate that the employee would have been termi-
nated in the absence of discrimination, there would be an opportunity
for the employee to argue the inherent unfairness of the employer’s
decision. In cases of age discrimination a similar analysis applies, ex-
cept that in mixed motive cases the employer will not be found to be in
violation of the law if the employee was terminated for cause (Bennett-
Alexander and Hartman 2004).
Similarly, at least in the absence of a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation, little consideration is likely to be given by an employment arbi-
trator to the employee’s work history or mitigating circumstances that
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might limit the degree of blame or indicate that the misconduct would
be unlikely to reoccur. By contrast, these same factors are likely to be
highly relevant to labor arbitrators. Application of just cause standards
would require that consideration be given to such factors, regardless of
claims relating to illegal discrimination (Cooper, Nolan, and Bales
2000). Thus, labor arbitrators are more likely than employment arbitra-
tors to find for the employee where there is only a moderate amount
(less than a preponderance) of evidence of both discrimination and of
misconduct that provides a just cause for termination. This difference
derives from the fact that the employee must prove discrimination,
while it is the employer who must show that there is just cause for
termination (Bennett-Alexander and Hartman 2004; Bales 1997). So
long as the employer is unable to affirmatively establish just cause, the
labor arbitrator will find for the employee.
Questions might be raised about likely differences between em-
ployment arbitrators and labor arbitrators when there is both substantial
evidence of discrimination and of a possible violation of the just cause
standard by the employer. The differences that will be observed will
likely depend on the degree to which the evidence of discrimination is
conclusive (rather than being plausible but inconclusive). When evi-
dence of discrimination is conclusive, employment arbitrators are
likely to find little reason to doubt whether a statutory violation oc-
curred. For labor arbitrators, conclusive evidence of discrimination is
likely to give rise to questions about the employer’s accusations against
the employee, leading to concerns about whether there is just cause for
termination.
However, differences between employment arbitration and labor
arbitration are still likely to be observed when the evidence of discrimi-
nation is plausible but inconclusive. While norms regarding burden of
proof are not clearly established within employment arbitration, within
the judicial system the employee has the initial burden of proof and the
ultimate burden of persuasion (Bales 1997). To the extent that this
norm is followed within employment arbitration, it is likely that there
will sometimes be hesitation to conclude that the employee met the
burden of proof if evidence of discrimination is not conclusive. More-
over, this hesitation is unlikely to be mitigated by the presence of possi-
ble problems with the termination that we call ‘‘just cause violations’’
by the employer, unless these violations inform the arbitrator’s judg-
ment about whether discrimination occurred. By ‘‘just cause viola-
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tions’’ we refer to both 1) substantive problems of lack of evidence of
wrongdoing, and of ignoring mitigating circumstances; and 2) proce-
dural problems of the company acting in a manner that is inconsistent
with its own policy, and of procedural irregularities in the manner of
the termination.
In labor arbitration, the arbitrator is not required to determine
whether or not the employee can show evidence of discrimination.
While such evidence may inform the arbitrator’s judgment about
whether there is just cause, the employee does not have to prove this
in order to prevail. Thus, in cases where there is a potential violation
of a just cause standard by the employer, labor arbitrators may readily
rule in favor of the employee if the evidence of discrimination falls
into the category of ‘‘plausible but inconclusive.’’
Questions might also be asked about whether differences between
labor and employment arbitrators would be observed when the employ-
ee’s case is weak on multiple dimensions. For example, consider a case
where the employee claims that termination is not justified and that a
prohibited form of discrimination may be the real reason for the termi-
nation. However, evidence of discrimination is lacking, and further-
more, no violations of the employer’s just cause obligation are
apparent. Evidence of employee wrongdoing is substantial, termination
for the offense is justified under organizational policy, there are no
procedural violations, and there are no mitigating circumstances. While
one might argue that no differences between employment and labor
arbitrators would be observed under such conditions, we argue that
differences might still be observed. A key assumption behind this argu-
ment is that at least some ambiguity remains regarding the evidence of
wrongdoing or the severity of the offense. Where there is such ambigu-
ity, some decision makers are likely to be affected by a fairly natural
reluctance to terminate an employee. This reluctance to take severe or
harsh action against the accused or a ‘‘deviant’’ has been observed
across a number of settings and circumstances when some ambiguity
remains as to the justification or need for harsh action (Feldman 1984).
This reluctance is likely to be heightened in instances where the deci-
sion maker identifies psychologically with the employee (Tajfel 1979,
1981). Under such circumstances, concern about the consequences of
job loss for the individual could result in decision makers requiring
high levels of certainty and justification before taking severe action.
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We argue that this reluctance to terminate is less likely to affect
decisions made by employment arbitrators. In order for an employment
arbitrator to rule in favor of the employee, he or she must find that the
employer engaged in illegal discrimination. Any reluctance to termi-
nate may well be offset by a reluctance to declare that the employer
discriminated—particularly if there is limited evidence in this regard.
By contrast, a labor arbitrator can rule in favor of an employee by
declaring that the employer failed to show just cause. In addition, it
should be noted that within employment arbitration, advocates are al-
lowed to serve as arbitrators. In fact, data reported here previously
suggest that a higher percentage of management-side advocates (com-
pared to plaintiff-side advocates) serve as employment arbitrators.
Having worked with management teams throughout their career, such
individuals may come to identify with the management team involved
in the case, therefore, they may be more sensitive to the costs for the
management team of ruling that they engaged in illegal discrimination.
Sensitivity to these costs may counteract any reluctance to terminate.
A final factor that may counter any reluctance to terminate is the
cost to the employment arbitrator associated with ruling in favor of the
employee when management’s case is strong. In employment arbitra-
tion, employers (but not employees) may be seen as repeat players by
the employment arbitrator (Bingham 1997). As such, ruling against the
employer when the employer’s case is strong (due to a reluctance to
use termination) is likely to strongly affect acceptability of the arbitra-
tor within the employer community. While this same effect is likely
within labor arbitration, the perceived costs may be less because labor
unions also play a significant role in arbitrator selection. Therefore, the
costs of damaging acceptability with the employer community may be
seen as somewhat offset by increased acceptability with the other side.
Taken together, these arguments suggest that employment arbitrators
are more likely than labor arbitrators to rule in favor of the employer
when the case against the employee is strong.
Findings
The mean rating in terms of the likelihood of overturning termina-
tion for both labor arbitrators and employment arbitrators examining
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statutory claims is shown in Table 5.6. Also, as will be the case with
other tables in this chapter, t-values for the differences between the
means are shown for each case, and tested for statistical significance to
see whether the differences observed in our sample are sufficiently
likely (at least 95 percent) to be present in the universe from which the
sample is drawn.
Note that differences are not reported in Table 5.6 for Cases 1,
4, 5, and 6, in order to limit this comparison to labor arbitrators and
employment arbitrators who were considering only a statutory claim.
For these four cases that are not reported in Table 5.6, the employment
arbitrators were instructed to respond as if there was a for-cause state-
ment in the employment agreement. These four cases are reported in
Table 5.7 (which is for employment arbitrators who received the for-
cause condition).
The analysis in Table 5.6 compares—with the decisions of labor
arbitrators—only the decisions of those employment arbitrators who
were deciding whether there was a statutory violation. Of the eight
Table 5.6 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between Labor
Arbitrators and Employment Arbitrators Evaluating
Statutory Claims
Mean rating for
employment
Mean rating for arbitrators evaluating t-value for mean
Case number labor arbitrators statutory claims difference
Case 1 2.89 — —
Case 2 3.00 2.39 3.60**
Case 3 5.92 4.29 10.02**
Case 4 5.05 — —
Case 5 4.25 — —
Case 6 4.06 — —
Case 7 2.73 2.22 3.27**
Case 8 5.49 3.67 9.05**
Case 9 4.67 4.49 0.97
Case 10 4.57 3.32 6.62**
Case 11 5.56 4.05 7.47**
Case 12 4.70 3.50 5.84**
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
—  not applicable; **p  0.01.
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cases analyzed in Table 5.6, significant differences were observed in
all but one. For Case 9, while the difference was in the direction ex-
pected (i.e., labor arbitrators were more likely to rule in favor of the
employee than employment arbitrators), the difference was not sig-
nificant. It is important to note that Case 9 was the only case in which
there was substantial evidence of discrimination. While we expected a
difference in outcome in Case 9 because of differences in the burden
of proof, and in the interests and identification patterns of the decision
makers, these results did not significantly support this expectation.
It is also interesting to note that a significant difference was ob-
served when the case against the employee was strong and there were
no countervailing procedural problems or mitigating factors. This was
true in Case 2 and Case 7. In both of these cases, a significant mean
difference is observed, which is consistent with our argument that em-
ployment arbitrators have a stronger incentive to overcome any reluc-
tance to terminate when there is a strong case against the employee. It
should also be noted, however, that the mean difference for Case 2 and
Case 7 is substantially smaller than for cases where there are potential
violations of the just cause standard. This suggests, consistent with
differences in how the decision task is structured, that differences be-
tween employment and labor arbitrators will increase when potential
employer just cause violations are present.
Labor Arbitrators vs. Employment Arbitrators with
‘‘For-Cause’’ Requirements
Expectations
Fewer differences are likely to be observed between labor arbitra-
tors and those employment arbitrators who are required to apply a ‘‘for-
cause’’ standard. When the employment agreement specifies that termi-
nation must be ‘‘for-cause,’’ employment arbitrators can find for the
employee even if they fail to find evidence of discrimination. Accord-
ingly, factors such as evidence of employee wrongdoing and lack of
compliance with proper procedures on the part of the employer are
likely to play a more significant role, making it easier for the employ-
ment arbitrator to rule in favor of the employee. However, some re-
search indicates that employment arbitrators are less likely to rule in
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favor of the employee, even where a ‘‘for-cause’’ standard exists (Bin-
gham and Mesch 2000).
What is less clear is why such differences exist. One possible ex-
planation is that, relative to labor arbitrators, employment arbitrators
consider a smaller set of factors when determining whether there is just
cause. In labor arbitration, strong norms exist regarding the determi-
nants of just cause. These norms may give emphasis to factors that
might be deemed less relevant when judging a case from the standpoint
of traditional contract law requirements (Cooper, Nolan, and Bales
2000). It is possible, for example, that employment arbitrators would
give less emphasis to mitigating and extenuating factors, which have
traditionally been considered by labor arbitrators. Where such mitigat-
ing circumstances are present, we would expect that labor arbitrators
would be more reluctant to rule in favor of the employer than would
employment arbitrators. This prediction is likely to depend, however,
on the background of the employment arbitrator. Some employment
arbitrators have worked extensively in labor arbitration. It may well be
that they would utilize norms from labor arbitration when judging ‘‘for-
cause’’ cases. So, while a sample of employment arbitrators is likely to
behave differently from a sample of labor arbitrators, there is likely to
be variation across employment arbitrators as to the degree to which
any such difference is observed.
Clearly, however, it is likely that some factors relevant in labor
arbitration from a just cause standpoint would be of equal relevance
when evaluating—from a more narrow framework—whether there is
cause for termination. For example, evidence of employee wrongdoing
and employer compliance (with its written policies and procedures)
are likely to be critical in employment arbitration when a ‘‘for-cause’’
requirement exists in the employment agreement (Cooper, Nolan, and
Bales 2000). Because such factors would be relevant in both employ-
ment and labor arbitration, one might expect little difference in out-
comes when a termination case centers around a lack of evidence and/
or clear employer procedural violations.
It was argued earlier that employment arbitrators assessing whether
there is a statutory violation would be less likely than labor arbitrators
to rule in favor of the employee when there is weak evidence of both
discrimination and just cause for termination. One reason that was of-
fered for this expected difference is that while there is a natural reluc-
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tance to support termination, this reluctance might be more limited
among employment arbitrators because they could find for the em-
ployee only by concluding there was illegal discrimination—a signifi-
cant accusation. Where a ‘‘for-cause’’ standard exists, employment
arbitrators can—like labor arbitrators—find for the employee by sim-
ply declaring that evidence of cause was not shown. As such, the differ-
ence between employment and labor arbitrators might be less
significant in instances where the case against the employee is strong
if a ‘‘for-cause’’ standard exists. However, differences might still be
expected. The repeat-player argument (Bingham 1997) still applies, as
does the argument that suggests that employment arbitrators (to the
extent that they have served as management-side advocates) may iden-
tify psychologically with the management team. Both arguments sug-
gest factors that would counter the natural reluctance to terminate
which would otherwise be expected among decision makers.
Findings
Table 5.7 compares decisions made by employment arbitrators,
when a for-cause standard exists in the employment arbitration agree-
ment to decisions made by labor arbitrators. As can be seen in Table
5.7, the likelihood of a ruling in favor of the employee was higher
for labor arbitrators than for employment arbitrators with a for-cause
requirement for all of the cases analyzed, and significantly so for all
cases except Cases 5 and 9. With Case 5, there is only modest evidence
against the employee. No other just cause violations by the employer
were present. The lack of a difference between labor and employment
arbitrators with this case is understandable since strength of the evi-
dence is likely to be a for-cause factor considered heavily by both labor
and employment arbitrators. With Case 9, there were two possible
problems with management’s case against the employee. First, there
was substantial evidence of discrimination. Second, the evidence of the
employee’s misconduct was modest at best. These are factors that
would be expected to be relevant to employment arbitrators with a for-
cause requirement and, as such, it is understandable that no difference
was observed between employment and labor arbitrators in this case.
It is interesting to note that Cases 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, and 12 contained
possible just cause concerns relating to the reasonableness of the rule,
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Table 5.7 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between Labor
Arbitrators and Employment Arbitrators with For-Cause
Requirements
Mean rating for
employment
Mean rating for arbitrators with for- t-value for mean
Case number labor arbitrators cause requirements difference
Case 1 2.89 2.22 3.52**
Case 2 3.00 — —
Case 3 5.92 — —
Case 4 5.05 4.12 4.27**
Case 5 4.25 4.05 1.24
Case 6 4.06 3.27 3.85**
Case 7 2.73 2.33 2.42*
Case 8 5.49 4.59 5.31**
Case 9 4.67 4.38 1.57
Case 10 4.57 3.71 4.71**
Case 11 5.56 4.26 7.26**
Case 12 4.70 3.62 5.44**
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
—  not applicable; *p  0.05; **p  0.01.
mitigating circumstances, or procedural compliance by the employer.
The significant difference between labor and employment arbitrators
for these cases could be explained by the argument that employment
arbitrators are less likely to consider some of these factors that are
traditionally a part of just cause determinations in labor arbitration,
even where a for-cause requirement exists. For example, we argued
earlier that reasonableness of the rule and employee work history might
be less relevant to employment arbitrators. While we expected that
procedural compliance on the part of the employer would be equally
relevant to both employment arbitrators with a for-cause requirement
and labor arbitrators, the labor arbitrators were significantly more
likely to rule for the employee where procedural compliance was ques-
tionable.
As with employment arbitrators evaluating statutory claims, em-
ployment arbitrators with a for-cause requirement were less likely than
labor arbitrators to overturn terminations when the case against the
employee was relatively strong and there were no obvious just cause
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violations on the part of the employer (Cases 1 and 7). It is difficult to
attribute this to differences in how the decision task is structured. As
such, it might be argued, consistent with points made earlier, that a
difference in the interests of the decision makers may be a relevant
explanatory factor.
Labor Arbitrators vs. Peer Review Panelists
Expectations
In thinking about how peer review panelists might differ from
labor arbitrators, it is important to consider differences in the way the
decision task is structured, as well as the interests and backgrounds of
the panelists. With regard to how the decision task is structured, peer
review panelists are asked to determine whether a termination is con-
sistent with disciplinary rules and procedures established by the firm
(Ewing 1989). In many ways, this is a narrower test of ‘‘cause’’ than
just cause standards applied within labor arbitration, and may produce
differences between labor arbitrators and peer review panelists in cer-
tain types of cases. For example, to the extent that peer review panelists
adhere to their guidelines, they would be less likely than labor arbitra-
tors to consider the reasonableness of the company rule.
With regard to differing interests, one must consider that peer re-
view panelists are reviewing a termination decision made by their em-
ployer. Permitting a problem employee to continue with the firm may
well be seen by them to be a threat to the safe and productive operation
of the firm. Thus, where the firm is able to offer substantial evidence
of wrongdoing, peers may feel that it is in their interest to support the
termination. This tendency among peers would be likely to check any
reluctance to terminate that might otherwise be present among decision
makers when the case against the employee is strong but not incontro-
vertible (Klaas and Feldman 1993). Further, while some might argue
that peers will identify psychologically with the employee who has
been terminated, that sense of identification might be limited if the
organization can provide evidence of wrongdoing. Peer review panel-
ists are not randomly drawn from the population. Both self-selection
and organizational selection (if only through past disciplinary and dis-
missal decisions) are likely to create a pool of individuals that have
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experienced the consequences of working with deficient employees
within their own work group (Ewing 1989). As a result of this experi-
ence, peer review panelists might well identify more with the managers
who initiated the termination than with the accused employee. This
tendency to identify with the manager bringing charges (rather than the
accused employee) may be even greater where it can be shown that the
employee has a history of problem behavior, and thus is increasingly
seen by productive members of the group as a ‘‘deviant’’ (Feldman
1984). Further, when employees are asked to serve on a peer review
panel, they are being asked to participate in a management function—
further increasing the tendency to identify with the management team
rather than the employee labeled as a ‘‘deviant’’ (Turner 1984; Tajfel
1979).
Exceptions to the expected tendency to favor management may
exist, however. Where the problem behavior cited by management is
seen as an aberration—caused by something largely beyond the em-
ployee’s control—peers may well be inclined to identify with the em-
ployee rather than management. Further, as members of the same
social organization as the employee, peers are likely to implicitly cal-
culate the employee’s idiosyncrasy credits (Hollander 1958; Feldman
1984). Where the employee has accumulated credits through a long
history of effective contribution, peers are likely to tolerate some level
of idiosyncrasy if it can be attributed to an aberration beyond the em-
ployee’s control. This suggests that peers would be expected to be
more likely to rule in favor of the employer than labor arbitrators,
unless the employee has accumulated idiosyncrasy credits and the em-
ployee’s deficiency can be treated as an aberration caused by events
beyond his or her control.
In sum, differences might be expected between peers and labor
arbitrators—with labor arbitrators expected to be more likely than peers
to rule in favor of the employee. Exceptions to this are expected, how-
ever, when the employee’s deficiency can both be attributed to an ex-
ternal cause and is inconsistent with a history of effective contribution.
Findings
Table 5.8 displays the pairwise comparisons between labor arbitra-
tors and peer review panelists. As was expected, based on differences
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Table 5.8 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between Labor
Arbitrators and Peer Review Panelists
Mean rating for Mean rating for peer t-value for mean
Case number labor arbitrators review panelists difference
Case 1 2.89 3.45 2.30*
Case 2 3.00 3.19 0.86
Case 3 5.92 5.44 2.72**
Case 4 5.05 3.88 4.62**
Case 5 4.25 3.01 5.48**
Case 6 4.06 3.96 0.40
Case 7 2.73 2.23 3.23**
Case 8 5.49 4.78 3.98**
Case 9 4.67 4.03 3.49**
Case 10 4.57 4.21 1.84*
Case 11 5.56 5.11 2.40**
Case 12 4.70 4.53 0.80
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
* p  0.05; ** p  0.01.
in the decision task, interests, and identification tendencies, the likeli-
hood of ruling in favor of the employee was significantly higher for
labor arbitrators in 8 of the 12 cases examined. In one case (Case 1),
peers were significantly more likely to rule in favor of the employee.
No significant difference was observed between peers and labor arbitra-
tors in Cases 2, 6, and 12. One possible explanation for the lack of
significance in Cases 6 and 12 is that both cases addressed situations
where the employee’s poor performance could easily be attributed to
personal problems that were beyond the employee’s control and were
unlikely to continue to be a problem in the future. While termination
may be consistent with company policy in such a circumstance, the
extenuating circumstances may have preempted any labeling of the
employee as a ‘‘deviant,’’ making it more likely that peers would iden-
tify with the employee. Further, in Case 6, the employee had long
tenure and no significant problems with his or her work record, which
suggests that peers (as members of the same social group) might have
been more willing to grant the employee idiosyncrasy credits when
making their decision.
While we expected labor arbitrators to be at least as likely as peers
to rule in favor of employees when the case against the employee was
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strong, the results were mixed in this regard. Cases 1 and 2 presented
strong cases against the employee. In Case 1, peers were significantly
more likely to rule in favor of employees. In Case 2, the same result
was present in the sample, although the results were not significant.
What these cases have in common is that, in both cases, the employee’s
case was based entirely on unsupported, self-serving assertions that
someone else was at fault. It may be that these lay judges are more
likely to give credence to such contentions than are professionals.
Where issues such as reasonableness of the rule, procedural com-
pliance, mitigating factors relating to the employee’s work history, and
evidence of discrimination were present in the case, labor arbitrators
were more likely than peers to rule in favor of the employee (Cases 3,
4, 5, 8, 9, 10, and 11). This might suggest, consistent with differences
in the way the decision task is structured, that labor arbitrators consider
a broader range of factors when determining whether termination is
justified.
Labor Arbitrators vs. Jurors
Expectations
Labor arbitrators and jurors are both third parties. Unlike peers,
jurors are not dependent on the employer. Further, neither self-selec-
tion nor organizational selection (through past discipline and dismissal
decisions) affect participation on the jury panel. Moreover, unlike
peers, jurors are not being asked by management to assist with an im-
portant management function. These points make it less likely that
jurors would identify with the management team. Indeed, anecdotally,
it is often suggested that jurors tend to identify with the plaintiff (Ab-
bott 1993). As such, some of the factors that are thought to create
differences between labor arbitrators and peer review panelists might
not be operative with regard to jurors. However, we would argue that
the structure of the decision task would result in jurors being less likely
to rule in favor of the employee across a number of different types of
cases.
In discrimination cases, jurors are asked to evaluate whether there
was illegal discrimination—not whether the termination was fair or
just. Judicial instructions typically emphasize what factors jurors are to
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consider when making their determination, and these factors differ
from what is typically considered in labor arbitration. Accordingly, in
termination cases where the employee claims that termination is not
justified and that there was illegal discrimination, labor arbitrators will
be more likely than jurors to find for the employee if there is little
evidence of discrimination but some evidence of a just cause violation
on the part of the employer. However, differences are not likely to be
observed between labor arbitrators and jurors when there is evidence
of discrimination. While labor arbitration is not typically viewed as a
forum for addressing statutory cases where the employee claims a fail-
ure to show just cause, plausible evidence of discrimination is likely to
call into question evidence of wrongdoing by the employee. As such,
differences would not be expected between jurors and labor arbitrators
when plausible evidence of discrimination is present.
It should be noted that differences exist between jurors and labor
arbitrators in terms of burden of proof. As is the case with employment
arbitration judging claims of a statutory violation, with juries the
plaintiff must provide the initial evidence of discrimination (Bennett-
Alexander and Hartman 2001). But with labor arbitration, the employer
bears the burden of proving just cause. We argued previously that, as a
result, labor arbitrators would be more likely than employment arbitra-
tors to find for the employee in cases where there is plausible but incon-
clusive evidence of discrimination and some indication of a just cause
violation by the employer. We do not argue, however, that such a dif-
ference will be observed with jurors. This argument is premised on the
assumption that jurors would be more likely to identify with the plain-
tiff and that they have no personal interest in the outcome. As such,
jurors are unlikely to be affected by the higher burden of proof standard
where plausible but inconclusive evidence of discrimination exists.
However, we would expect that the difference in the burden of
proof would affect decisions in cases where there is weak evidence of
discrimination and the case against the employee is substantial but not
incontrovertible. Under such circumstances, there would be little basis
for concluding that the employee met his/her burden of providing evi-
dence of discrimination. However, when there is still some ambiguity
about whether the employee committed the offense alleged, it is at
least plausible to conclude that the employer failed to demonstrate just
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cause. While we are not suggesting that labor arbitrators would—on
average—be likely to rule in favor of the employee, we are suggesting
that labor arbitrators—as a group—would be more likely to rule in
favor of the employee than would jurors.
Not all jury cases revolve around issues of discrimination; some
cases revolve around contract issues. Where there is an employment
agreement that stipulates that termination will be for-cause, we would
expect fewer differences between jurors and labor arbitrators.
In sum, we expect that labor arbitrators will be more likely than
jurors to rule in favor of the employee under different conditions. These
conditions include 1) when there is little evidence of discrimination,
combined with some evidence of a just cause violation by the em-
ployer, and 2) when there is weak evidence of discrimination, in com-
bination with substantial but inconclusive evidence of a just cause for
the termination. However, no difference would be expected when there
is plausible but inconclusive evidence of discrimination, and fewer dif-
ferences would be expected in cases that revolve around contractual
issues relating to for-cause provisions.
Findings
Table 5.9 presents the pairwise comparisons for labor arbitrators
and jurors. In 8 of the 12 cases, labor arbitrators indicated that they
were significantly more likely than jurors to rule in favor of the em-
ployee. Interestingly, and contrary to what we expected, labor arbitra-
tors indicated that they would be more likely than jurors to rule in
favor of the employee, even when there was substantial evidence of
discrimination (Case 9). However, consistent with what was suggested
earlier, labor arbitrators were significantly more likely to overturn ter-
minations in a number of instances where a possible just cause viola-
tion by the employer was present (Cases 3, 8, and 10). A similar
difference is observed in only one of the two cases where there was
weak or no evidence of discrimination, no lack of evidence of em-
ployee wrongdoing, and no other obvious just cause violations (Case
7). It was suggested that labor arbitrators might be more willing to rule
in favor of the employee under such conditions because of differences
in the burden of proof. The support for this is mixed, at best.
In those cases where both the jurors and labor arbitrators were
deciding whether there was a violation of an employment agreement
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Table 5.9 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between Labor
Arbitrators and Jurors from Employment Discrimination
Cases
Mean rating for Mean rating for t-value for mean
Case number labor arbitrators jurors difference
Case 1 2.89 3.15 1.10
Case 2 3.00 2.43 3.05**
Case 3 5.92 4.58 6.33**
Case 4 5.05 3.78 5.39**
Case 5 4.25 3.96 1.28
Case 6 4.06 3.40 2.67**
Case 7 2.73 2.28 2.22*
Case 8 5.49 4.60 4.80**
Case 9 4.67 4.07 2.83**
Case 10 4.57 3.70 4.32**
Case 11 5.56 5.36 0.90
Case 12 4.70 4.57 0.54
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
*p  0.05; **p  0.01.
that promised that terminations would be only for-cause (Cases 1, 4, 5,
and 6), labor arbitrators were more likely to rule for the employee in
two of the four cases—Case 4 (where reasonableness of the rule is in
question) and Case 6 (where personal problems were a possible miti-
gating factor). In Cases 1 and 5, the employees had short tenure. Also,
jurors, like their fellow nonprofessional peer review panelists, score
relatively high (3.15) on overturning the termination in Case 1, where
the only fact in the employee’s favor is an unsupported claim that
others are at fault.
Labor Arbitrators vs. HR Managers
Expectations
In many nonunion organizations, those performing the HR func-
tion play a key role in determining whether a termination is approved.
The HR role stems from a desire to ensure consistency across the orga-
nization and to prevent possible legal action against the organization.
In some cases, HR managers are assigned this role to help promote
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effective employee relations, and thus maintain a nonunion status
(Klaas and Feldman 1993). The HR manager is clearly part of the
management team, and therefore may identify with the needs and inter-
ests of managers bringing disciplinary action (Tajfel 1981). Further, as
agents of management, they have an interest (as do peer review panel-
ists) in ensuring the safe and effective operation of the workforce.
However, HR managers also have an interest in avoiding legal action
against the firm and remaining nonunion. Indeed, given the visibility
and salience of both legal action and union organizing drives (and the
degree to which they would be held personally accountable for such
events), HR managers are likely to be motivated to prevent termina-
tions if there is a significant risk of successful legal action or damage
to employee relations.
As a group, then, we would expect that HR managers would likely
be influenced by the presence of evidence regarding illegal discrimina-
tion. Where plausible but inconclusive evidence exists regarding dis-
crimination, we would expect that HR managers would be motivated
to avoid legal risks (Colvin 2003). In such cases, we would expect that
HR managers would be as likely as labor arbitrators to find for the
employee. Similarly, where there are significant just cause violations
by the employer, we would expect that concern for effective employee
relations would motivate HR managers to discourage termination, tak-
ing positions very similar to those of labor arbitrators.
We would, however, expect some differences between HR manag-
ers and labor arbitrators. Where the case against the employee is strong
(with no potential just cause violation by the employer and little evi-
dence of discrimination), we would expect that HR managers would
have a stronger incentive to terminate. When termination poses few
risks to the organization, we would expect that HR managers—
motivated by a desire to ensure the safe and effective operation of the
firm—would be more likely to overcome any reluctance to terminate
that might be present among other decision makers. We also would
expect that HR managers—as agents of management—would be more
likely to rule against the employee when the employee’s work history
creates concerns about the employee’s impact on the safe and effective
operation of the firm—even if there were concerns about the way man-
agement handled the case procedurally. This same tendency would also
be predicted if HR managers—as part of the same social organization
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as the employee—are more likely to apply the logic of idiosyncrasy
credits (Hollander 1958). To repeat what was suggested in the discus-
sion of peer review panelists, the idiosyncrasy credits argument holds
that persons may grant others in the same social organization credits
for past contributions. By the same token, where past difficulties create
a deficit status for idiosyncrasy credits, such decision makers may take
harsher action than would otherwise be expected.
Overall, then, while we expect some similarity between decisions
made by labor arbitrators and those made by HR managers, we expect
HR managers to be more willing to terminate when the case against the
employee is strong. We also expect HR managers to be more willing to
overlook procedural just cause violations when there is no lack of evi-
dence against the employee, and a negative work history.
Findings
Table 5.10 presents the results of the pairwise comparisons be-
tween labor arbitrators and HR managers. Here, we expected few dif-
ferences when there was plausible evidence of discrimination.
Consistent with this, no difference was observed in Case 9, the case
Table 5.10 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between Labor
Arbitrators and HR Managers
Mean rating for Mean rating for HR t-value for mean
Case number labor arbitrators managers difference
Case 1 2.89 2.75 0.56
Case 2 3.00 2.71 1.21
Case 3 5.92 5.19 3.47**
Case 4 5.05 4.43 2.36**
Case 5 4.25 3.15 4.64
Case 6 4.06 3.92 0.50
Case 7 2.73 2.07 4.06**
Case 8 5.49 5.19 1.64
Case 9 4.67 4.50 0.79
Case 10 4.57 4.19 1.73*
Case 11 5.56 5.17 1.93*
Case 12 4.70 4.80 0.45
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
*p  0.05; **p  0.01.
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where there was substantial evidence of discrimination. Both groups
were likely to overturn the termination. We also expected labor arbitra-
tors to be more likely to rule for the employee when the case against
the employee was strong, and there was little or no evidence of illegal
discrimination by the firm. While this was supported by Case 7, sig-
nificant differences were not observed in Cases 1 or 2. Differences
were observed in Case 3, where there was modest evidence of discrimi-
nation, modest evidence against the employee, procedural problems,
and a positive employee work record. Even where statistically signifi-
cant differences existed, however, labor arbitrators and HR managers
tended to agree with respect to overturning the termination decision
(Cases 3 and 11), supporting the termination decision (Case 7), or
being uncertain (Case 10). Similarly, in Case 4, where the case re-
volved around the reasonableness of the rule, labor arbitrators were
more willing to rule in favor of the employee. Finally, labor arbitrators
were more willing to rule in favor of the employee in Case 10, where
modest evidence against the employee is combined with provocation
by management, and Case 11, where modest evidence against the em-
ployee is combined with long tenure. It appears, then, at least to some
degree, that labor arbitrators were more likely to consider possible just
cause violations by the employer, and long tenure on the part of the
employee, than were HR managers. While the differences were not
large, they were statistically significant.
Employment Arbitrators Evaluating Statutory Claims vs.
Employment Arbitrators with ‘‘For-Cause’’ Requirements
Expectations
We would expect no difference in the interests, background, or
experience of employment arbitrators evaluating statutory claims and
those evaluating a case where a ‘‘for-cause’’ requirement exists in the
employment agreement. The primary difference would lie in terms of
how the decision task is structured. Where statutory claims are being
assessed, we would expect that the primary focus would be on evidence
regarding discrimination. Other factors may sometimes be seen as rele-
vant, but only to the extent that they inform judgments regarding the
presence or absence of discrimination. Thus, we would expect employ-
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ment arbitrators with for-cause requirements to be more likely to rule
in favor of the employee when there is little evidence of discrimination,
but questionable evidence of employee wrongdoing and/or evidence
that the firm failed to comply with its own policies and procedures.
The increased willingness to find in favor of the employee should be
heightened by the fact that where for-cause requirements exist, the ar-
bitrator can find for the employee by making the less controversial
finding that there was a lack of cause (rather than that there was dis-
crimination).
As discussed above, while there are other just cause tests used in
labor arbitration, such as requiring that actions be consistent with com-
pany policy and taking into account mitigating circumstances, it is un-
clear whether these other tests would be used in employment
arbitration where for-cause requirements exist (Cooper, Nolan, and
Bales 2000). While such tests might actually be used by those who
have experience as a labor arbitrator, the focus may be more restricted
for those with a background as a judge or an advocate. Accordingly,
we propose that differences due to the for-cause requirement will be
observed only when the case revolves around problems with evidence
against the employee or a lack of procedural compliance on the part of
the employer.
Findings
Table 5.11 presents the comparison between employment arbitra-
tors who received the statutory claim instructions and employment ar-
bitrators who received the for-cause instructions (for Cases 7 through
12). Of the six cases examined here, significant differences were found
in two cases (Cases 8 and 10), with employment arbitrators in the for-
cause condition being more likely to overturn termination. The primary
reason for expecting differences here are the differences in the way that
their decision tasks are structured. No difference was expected for Case
7 (because there was a strong case against the employee) or in Case 9
(where the presence of substantial evidence of discrimination would
mean that both sets of arbitrators would have had justification to rule
in favor of the employee). Differences were observed, however, with
employment arbitrators operating under the just cause requirement
being more likely to find in favor of the employee when only modest
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Table 5.11 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between
Employment Arbitrators Evaluating Statutory Claims and
Employment Arbitrators with For-Cause Requirements
Mean rating for
employment Mean rating for
arbitrators employment
evaluating statutory arbitrators with for- t-value for mean
Case number claims cause requirements difference
Case 1 — 2.22 —
Case 2 2.39 — —
Case 3 4.29 — —
Case 4 — 4.12 —
Case 5 — 4.05 —
Case 6 — 3.27 —
Case 7 2.22 2.33 0.75
Case 8 3.67 4.59 4.09**
Case 9 4.49 4.38 0.53
Case 10 3.32 3.71 1.82*
Case 11 4.05 4.26 0.86
Case 12 3.50 3.62 0.59
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
—  not applicable; *p  0.05; **p  0.01.
evidence against the employee was combined with procedural prob-
lems (Case 8), and when modest evidence against the employee was
combined with provocation by management (Case 10). These findings
provide some evidence that a for-cause requirement affects decisions
by encouraging the consideration of possible just cause violations on
the part of the employer.
Employment Arbitrators Evaluating Statutory Claims vs. Peer
Review Panelists
Expectations
Differences between employment arbitrators evaluating statutory
claims and peer review panelists would be expected because of differ-
ences in how their decision tasks are structured. It is the difference
between a decision maker who is asked to determine whether a statu-
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tory violation has occurred and a decision maker who is asked to deter-
mine if the termination is consistent with company policy and
procedures. Assessing whether a termination is consistent with com-
pany policy and procedures is likely to require that decision makers
give consideration only to whether the firm complied with its own pro-
cedures and whether there is evidence that supports the allegations
against the employee (Ewing 1989). However, these issues—by them-
selves—are less likely to be relevant in determining whether a statutory
violation occurred. We would therefore expect that peer review panel-
ists would be more likely to find for the employee when there is some
evidence of discrimination and weak evidence of employee wrongdo-
ing and/or evidence of a lack of procedural compliance by the em-
ployer.
While employment arbitrators and peer review panelists have dif-
ferent interest profiles, backgrounds, and reasons for identifying with
different parties to the termination case, in many instances these differ-
ences will result in similar evaluation tendencies. For example, the re-
peat-player argument (Bingham 1997) suggests that employment
arbitrators have an incentive to avoid ruling for the employee simply
out of sympathy. Similarly, as employees of the firm, peers have an
incentive to make decisions that support the safe and effective opera-
tion of the firm (Klaas and Feldman 1993), and thus, an incentive to
take harsh action if evidence suggests a pattern of behavior problems.
Having said this, different types of decisions might still be ex-
pected under specific circumstances, because of differences in inter-
ests, backgrounds, and reasons for identifying with the parties to the
termination. First, as noted above, as members of the same social orga-
nization as the employee, peers are likely to implicitly calculate idio-
syncrasy credits (Hollander 1958; Feldman 1984). Where an employee
has accumulated credits through an effective work history, peers may
be more lenient toward the employee if it appears that the recently
observed problems are likely to be corrected or are due to an external
cause. Second, following this same logic, where idiosyncrasy credits
are in deficit status, particularly where no external attribution is possi-
ble, peers may be more likely to terminate an employee even if there is
some other problem with management’s case against the employee.
Whereas employment arbitrators may focus more tightly on whether
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there is evidence of discrimination, as members of the same social
organization as the employee, peers may give weight to idiosyncrasy
credits and thus arrive at decisions that differ—in some cases—from
employment arbitrators.
Findings
Table 5.12 compares the decisions made by employment arbitrators
evaluating statutory claims to those made by peer review panelists. As
expected, in light of the way the decision task is structured, peer review
panelists were significantly more likely to rule in favor of the employee
in six of the eight cases analyzed, all of which are summarized in Table
5.1. Interestingly, the mean rating for employment arbitrators was sig-
nificantly higher in Case 9, where there was substantial evidence of
discrimination combined with modest evidence against the employee,
who also had a short tenure. This result might well be expected if
Table 5.12 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between
Employment Arbitrators Evaluating Statutory Claims and
Peer Review Panelists
Mean rating for
employment
arbitrators
evaluating statutory Mean rating for peer t-value for mean
Case number claims review panelist difference
Case 1 — 3.45 —
Case 2 2.39 3.19 4.37**
Case 3 4.29 5.44 7.08**
Case 4 — 3.88 —
Case 5 — 3.01 —
Case 6 — 3.96 —
Case 7 2.22 2.23 0.02
Case 8 3.67 4.78 5.00**
Case 9 4.49 4.03 2.33*
Case 10 3.32 4.21 4.11**
Case 11 4.05 5.11 4.67**
Case 12 3.50 4.53 4.66**
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
—  not applicable; *p  0.05; **p  0.01.
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indeed peers implicitly use the logic of idiosyncrasy credits to a greater
degree than employment arbitrators, taking the short tenure into ac-
count more strongly than did the employment arbitrators. Both sets of
decision makers were equally negative on the employee’s case in Case
7, where there was strong evidence against the employee and a history
of prior warnings.
Employment Arbitrators Evaluating Statutory Claims vs. Jurors
Expectations
The decision tasks for employment arbitrators evaluating statutory
claims and jurors are, in essence, the same. As such, no differences in
outcomes would be expected on this basis. There might, however, be
differences in interests, backgrounds, and psychological identification
tendencies. For example, some decision makers—when asked to deter-
mine whether there is a statutory violation—might be influenced by
whether they believed the termination was fair (independent of evi-
dence of discrimination). With employment arbitrators, however, there
are factors that might limit this tendency. First, their legal backgrounds
may make evidence of discrimination (or the lack thereof) more salient
to their decision process. Second, it is unlikely to be in their interest to
rule in favor of the employee if there is no evidence of discrimination.
The repeat-player argument (Bingham 1997) would suggest that arbi-
trators may face personal costs (in terms of acceptability by the em-
ployer community) if they do anything other than assess whether or
not there was a statutory violation. As such, we might expect that jurors
would be more likely than employment arbitrators to find for the em-
ployee in cases where there was a significant just cause violation by
the employer. While jury instructions may limit the degree to which
attention is given to such factors (MacCoun 1989), the incentives and
backgrounds of employment arbitrators lead us to believe that they will
be less likely than jurors to be influenced by the presence of possible
just cause violations by the employer.
Differences might also be observed when there is plausible but
inconclusive evidence of discrimination. Judgment would be required
to determine whether the employee met the burden of proof. It may be
that jurors would be more likely to err on the side of the employee than
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would the employment arbitrator. This difference would be expected
if, in fact, jurors would be more likely than employment arbitrators to
psychologically identify with the plaintiff (Turner 1984) and/or if there
is some legitimacy to the repeat-player argument.
Findings
Table 5.13 presents the differences between employment arbitra-
tors evaluating statutory claims and jurors. Of the eight cases where
comparisons are possible, jurors were significantly more likely to rule
in favor of the employee in four instances. These were instances where
there were mitigating conditions (procedural noncompliance, long ten-
ure, or the employee had family problems) or provocation present. A
significant difference in the other direction is observed in the case
(Case 9) where there was substantial evidence of discrimination. These
results suggest that jurors may have been more likely to pay attention to
Table 5.13 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between
Employment Arbitrators Evaluating Statutory Claims and
Jurors from Employment Discrimination Cases
Mean rating for
employment
arbitrators
evaluating statutory Mean rating for t-value for mean
Case number claims jurors difference
Case 1 — 3.15 —
Case 2 2.39 2.43 0.22
Case 3 4.29 4.58 1.45
Case 4 — 3.78 —
Case 5 — 3.96 —
Case 6 — 3.40 —
Case 7 2.22 2.28 0.32
Case 8 3.67 4.60 3.99**
Case 9 4.49 4.07 1.83*
Case 10 3.32 3.70 1.67*
Case 11 4.05 5.36 5.05**
Case 12 3.50 4.57 4.31**
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
—  not applicable; *p  0.05; **p  0.01.
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issues other than simply whether there was evidence of discrimination.
Given that the decision task is structured similarly for both employ-
ment arbitrators evaluating statutory claims and jurors, the differences
observed may be due to differences in interests and tendencies regard-
ing identification processes (with jurors being more likely to identify
with the employee, and employment arbitrators being more likely to
identify with the employer).
Employment Arbitrators Evaluating Statutory Claims vs.
HR Managers
Expectations
Because of differences in the way their decision tasks are struc-
tured, we would expect that HR managers would be more likely to
rule in favor of the employee in cases where there is little evidence of
discrimination if there are questions about evidence of wrongdoing or
compliance with organizational policies and procedures. Concern
about maintaining effective employee relations and consistency would
be likely to cause the HR manager to give weight to at least some just
cause considerations (Klaas and Feldman 1993). Differences might
also stem from the likelihood that HR managers (as part of the same
social organization as the employee) will apply the logic of idiosyn-
crasy credits. As such, they may give more weight to a positive work
history. Where there is evidence of discrimination, however, no differ-
ences are expected. Similarly, where the evidence against the employee
is strong and there is no evidence of discrimination, no difference is
expected between employment arbitrators evaluating statutory claims
and HR managers.
Findings
Table 5.14 displays the differences between employment arbitra-
tors evaluating statutory claims and HR managers. As can be seen,
significantly higher ratings were observed for HR managers in five of
the eight cases (summarized in Table 5.1) where comparisons were
possible. The only exceptions were two cases in which the employee’s
case was very weak (Cases 2 and 7), in which both sets of decision
makers supported the termination, and in the case where there was
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Table 5.14 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between
Employment Arbitrators Evaluating Statutory Claims and
HR Managers
Mean rating for
employment
arbitrators
evaluating statutory Mean rating for t-value for mean
Case number claims HR managers difference
Case 1 — 2.75 —
Case 2 2.39 2.71 1.60
Case 3 4.29 5.19 4.48**
Case 4 — 4.43 —
Case 5 — 3.15 —
Case 6 — 3.92 —
Case 7 2.22 2.07 1.16
Case 8 3.67 5.19 4.09**
Case 9 4.49 4.50 0.03
Case 10 3.32 4.19 3.48**
Case 11 4.05 5.17 4.34**
Case 12 3.50 4.80 5.24**
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
—  not applicable; *p  0.05; **p  0.01.
substantial evidence of discrimination (Case 9), in which both groups
favored the employee. This suggests that HR managers are more likely
to consider factors relating to potential just cause violations. This pat-
tern is consistent with what was predicted in light of differences in
the decision task, and also differences in interests and identification
tendencies.
Employment Arbitrators with ‘‘For-Cause’’ Requirements vs. Peer
Review Panelists
Expectations
Few differences would be expected between employment arbitra-
tors with a for-cause requirement and peer review panelists. Both are
instructed to consider factors that go beyond the issue of a statutory
violation, and as such, both would give consideration to whether there
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was evidence of employee wrongdoing and whether there was proce-
dural compliance by the employer. Further, decision maker interests
and identification processes would be likely to create similar evaluation
tendencies. Two exceptions might be expected: First, as argued pre-
viously, as members of the same social organization as the employee,
peers are likely to implicitly calculate idiosyncrasy credits (Hollander
1958). Where an employee has accumulated credits through an effec-
tive work history, peers may be more lenient toward the employee if it
appears that the problems recently observed are likely to be corrected
or are due to an external cause. Second, following this same logic,
where idiosyncrasy credits are in deficit status, particularly where no
external attribution is possible, peers may be more likely to terminate
an employee even if there is some evidence of discrimination (Feldman
1984). Whereas evidence of discrimination is likely to be highly salient
to employment arbitrators (regardless of whether the case is an at-will
or a for-cause case), since peers are part of the same social organization
as the employee, they may give more weight to idiosyncrasy credits (or
the lack thereof). As such, in some specific cases, employment arbitra-
tors with a for-cause requirement may arrive at decisions that would
deviate from decisions that would be made by peers.
Findings
Table 5.15 displays the pairwise comparisons for employment arbi-
trators with for-cause requirements and peer review panelists. Signifi-
cant differences are observed in the mean rating for likelihood of ruling
for the employee in 7 of the 10 cases. In 2 of these 7 cases (Cases 5
and 9), peer review panelists were less likely to rule in favor of the
employee. Case 9 is the only case that contains substantial evidence of
discrimination, which suggests that employment arbitrators were more
highly influenced by the presence or absence of this evidence. The
salience of this information for employment arbitrators is not surpris-
ing, given that employment arbitration is used as a substitute for judi-
cial proceedings, and given the legal background and training of the
arbitrators. Case 5 is a case in which there is both short tenure and a
negative work record. The weight given by peers to both short tenure
and a negative work record is consistent with what might be expected
if peers are more likely to make implicit use of idiosyncrasy credits.
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Table 5.15 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between
Employment Arbitrators with For-Cause Requirements and
Peer Review Panelists
Mean rating for
employment
arbitrators with for- Mean rating for t-value for mean
Case number cause requirements peer review panelists difference
Case 1 2.22 3.45 6.13**
Case 2 — 3.19 —
Case 3 — 5.44 —
Case 4 4.12 3.88 1.00
Case 5 4.05 3.01 5.44**
Case 6 3.27 3.96 3.34**
Case 7 2.33 2.23 0.70
Case 8 4.59 4.78 0.94
Case 9 4.38 4.03 1.82*
Case 10 3.71 4.21 2.35**
Case 11 4.26 5.11 4.03**
Case 12 3.62 4.53 4.18**
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
—  not applicable; *p  0.05; **p  0.01.
Consistent with the use of idiosyncrasy credits, peers were more likely
to rule in favor of the employee in Case 11 (where very long tenure
was a possible mitigating factor), Case 6 (where there is a long tenure
in combination with facts suggesting an external attribution for the
problem behavior), and Case 12 (where there were facts suggesting an
external attribution for the problem behavior). While not expected,
peers were also more likely to rule in favor of the employee in Case 1
(where the case against the employee was strong, with the basis for the
employee’s case being an unsupported accusation by others) and Case
10 (where there was evidence of provocation).
Employment Arbitrators with ‘‘For-Cause’’ Requirements
vs. Jurors
Expectations
The decision task for employment arbitrators in assessing whether
there is cause for termination is quite different from the task of jurors
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in discrimination cases. Based upon differences in the structure of the
decision task, we would expect employment arbitrators to be more
likely to rule for the employee when there is no evidence of discrimina-
tion, even where there is only weak evidence of misconduct against the
employee and/or a procedural violation by the employer. Instructions
typically provided to jurors direct them to limit their focus only to
factors relevant to determining if there was a statutory violation. We
are not suggesting that such instructions are likely to be completely
effective in limiting the focus of jurors; however, instructions are likely
to have some effect on their verdicts (MacCoun 1989). While we ex-
pect differences in the structure of the decision task to have a signifi-
cant effect, the likely magnitude of this impact might be limited by
differences between jurors and employment arbitrators with regard to
whom they are most likely to identify with in the case. We argued
earlier that jurors might be expected to exhibit a tendency to identify
with the employee, whereas the opposite might be expected among
some employment arbitrators. Where such tendencies exist, jurors may
sometimes be willing to consider factors relating to the overall fairness
of the termination (Guinther and Walter 1988), whereas employment
arbitrators may impose more lenient standards with regard to evidence
of wrongdoing or procedural compliance by the employer.
Differences might also be observed where there is plausible but
inconclusive evidence of discrimination. Judgment would be required
to determine whether the employee met the burden of proof, and it may
be that jurors would be more likely to err on the side of the employee
than would the employment arbitrator. This difference would be ex-
pected if, in fact, jurors are more likely than employment arbitrators to
psychologically identify with the employee (MacCoun 1989), or if
there is some legitimacy to the repeat-player argument.
When the case heard by the jury allows them to consider whether
a contractual obligation requiring cause for termination was violated,
we might expect jurors to be more likely to rule in favor of the em-
ployee. In such a situation, the decision task would be similar to that
for the employment arbitrator. This may allow for differences in inter-
ests and evaluation tendencies to play a more significant role, resulting
in jurors being more likely to find for the employee.
PAGE 123.......................... 10765$ $CH5 06-25-04 11:06:54 PS
124 Wheeler, Klaas, and Mahony
Findings
Table 5.16 displays the pairwise comparisons for employment arbi-
trators with a for-cause requirement and jurors. We suggested earlier
that jurors might be more likely to rule in favor of the employee when
there was substantial evidence of discrimination. This was not sup-
ported, however, as no significant difference was observed for Case 9.
We also suggested that employment arbitrators would be more likely
to rule for the employee in cases where evidence of discrimination is
modest but there are problems with the case in terms of evidence of
employee wrongdoing or procedural compliance. No evidence of this
was observed. A significant difference between employment arbitrators
with a just cause requirement and jurors was observed for only three
cases, and in each instance it was the jurors who were more likely to
rule in favor of the employee (Cases 1, 11, and 12). Here again, the
nonprofessionals were more likely to give credit to an employee’s un-
supported assertions (Case 1). In Case 11, the employee had long ten-
Table 5.16 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between
Employment Arbitrators with For-Cause Requirements and
Jurors from Employment Discrimination Cases
Mean rating for
employment
arbitrators with for- Mean rating for t-value for mean
Case number cause requirements jurors difference
Case 1 2.22 3.15 4.69**
Case 2 — 2.43 —
Case 3 — 4.58 —
Case 4 4.12 3.78 1.46
Case 5 4.05 3.96 0.44
Case 6 3.27 3.40 0.63
Case 7 2.33 2.28 0.24
Case 8 4.59 4.60 0.02
Case 9 4.38 4.07 1.37
Case 10 3.71 3.70 0.04
Case 11 4.26 5.36 4.47**
Case 12 3.62 4.57 3.86**
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
—  not applicable; *p  0.05; **p  0.01.
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ure, and in Case 12, there were family problems with which the jurors
might be more inclined to sympathize.
Employment Arbitrators with ‘‘For-Cause’’ Requirements vs.
HR Managers
Expectations
Few differences are expected between employment arbitrators with
‘‘for-cause’’ requirements and HR managers. Both would be expected
to give consideration to obvious violations of the for-cause standard.
While employment arbitrators would do so to comply with contract
requirements, HR managers would do so to maintain effective em-
ployee relations and ensure consistent application of disciplinary pro-
cedures. Both would be expected to give substantial weight to evidence
of discrimination. Further, decision maker interests would typically be
served by the same type of outcome, and both types of decision makers
would be expected to be similar in their tendencies to identify with the
employer.
As with peer review panelists, some differences between HR man-
agers and employment arbitrators are likely to be observed, owing to
the fact that HR managers are part of the organization in question. Just
as is the case with peers, HR managers are part of the same social
organization as the employee and, as such, are likely to implicitly cal-
culate idiosyncrasy credits (Hollander 1958). Employees with a strong
work history will be treated as having earned credits, particularly if it
appears that the problems recently observed are likely to be corrected
or are due to an external cause. Following this same logic, where idio-
syncrasy credits are in deficit status, particularly where no external
attribution is possible, HR managers may be more likely to support
termination even if there is some other problem with the case against
the employee (e.g., where there is a lack of procedural compliance on
the part of the employer). However, HR managers are unlikely to toler-
ate problems with the case that revolve around evidence of discrimina-
tion. Given that HR managers are personally accountable for such
matters, evidence of discrimination is likely to be highly salient for
them, regardless of idiosyncrasy credits.
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Findings
Table 5.17 displays the pairwise comparison between employment
arbitrators with for-cause requirements and HR managers. A possible
source of difference between employment arbitrators with for-cause
requirements and HR managers relates to idiosyncrasy credits and the
resulting importance of the employee’s work record for the HR man-
ager. Some support for this argument is found. For example, employ-
ment arbitrators were significantly more favorable to the employee in
Case 5, where a negative work record was present. In the contrary
direction, Cases 6 and 11, where long tenure suggests an accumulation
of idiosyncrasy credits, HR managers were significantly more favor-
ably disposed toward the employee’s case.
However, other significant differences were found. For example,
HR managers were more likely to rule in favor of the employee in Case
1 (where the case against the employee was strong, with the employ-
ee’s case being based upon unsupported allegations against others). In
Table 5.17 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between
Employment Arbitrators with For-Cause Requirements and
HR Managers
Mean rating for
employment
arbitrators with for- Mean rating for HR t-value for mean
Case number cause requirements managers difference
Case 1 2.22 2.75 2.37**
Case 2 — 2.71 —
Case 3 — 5.19 —
Case 4 4.12 4.43 1.13
Case 5 4.05 3.15 4.43**
Case 6 3.27 3.92 2.66**
Case 7 2.33 2.07 1.80*
Case 8 4.59 5.19 2.86**
Case 9 4.38 4.50 0.49
Case 10 3.71 4.19 1.98*
Case 11 4.26 5.17 3.93**
Case 12 3.62 4.80 4.94**
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
—  not applicable; *p  0.05; **p  0.01.
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Case 7, which is similar to Case 1, with the exception of some (albeit
weak) evidence of discrimination, employment arbitrators were more
likely to find for the employee. However, in Case 7, both groups were
unlikely to overturn the termination. HR managers were also more
likely to rule in favor of the employee in Case 8 (where there were
procedural problems) and Case 10 (where there was evidence of provo-
cation by management). These differences suggest that HR managers
may be more willing to consider a broader range of just cause viola-
tions, and that they may be more reluctant than employment arbitrators
to support termination, even when the case against the employee is
relatively strong.
Peer Review Panelists vs. Jurors
Expectations
As stated previously, jurors are assigned a more narrowly restricted
decision task, focusing primarily on whether there is evidence to sup-
port claims of a violation of the law. This differs from peer review
panelists, who are instructed to examine a broader range of issues relat-
ing to whether termination is consistent with organizational policy and
procedures. While it is sometimes argued that jurors show tendencies
to identify with the employee and that such identification increases the
willingness of jurors to consider the overall fairness of the termination
(Abbott 1993), we would expect peers (given the structure of their
decision task) to be more likely to rule in favor of the employee in
discrimination cases where there is little evidence of discrimination,
and either questionable evidence against the employee or a lack of
procedural compliance by the employer. This argument is based on the
idea that strong manipulation of the decision task (as is the case when
juries receive instructions from a judge regarding how to make deci-
sions) will have a more significant effect than tendencies to identify
with one side versus the other (MacCoun 1989).
Additionally, differences between peers and jurors might be ex-
pected because peers are part of the organization from which the em-
ployee is being terminated. This is relevant for two reasons: First, peers
have a greater incentive than jurors to protect the organization from
employees who may pose a threat to the safe and effective operation of
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the firm. Second, the firm is a social organization and members of the
same social grouping are thought to apply the logic of idiosyncrasy
credits. These differences would make it more likely that peers would
support termination if there were evidence of poor performance and as
well as a negative work history—even if there were some other prob-
lem with the case (e.g., evidence of discrimination). By contrast, peers
may be more likely to overlook performance problems if the employee
has built up idiosyncrasy credits and if the problems can be attributed
to an external cause or event. Under such conditions, then, peers may
be more likely than jurors to rule in favor of the employee.
If we are correct in arguing that peers have an interest in protecting
the firm and may identify more with the management team than some-
one labeled as a problem employee, it is possible that peers will also
be more likely to favor termination when there is little evidence of
discrimination but a strong case against the employee. While we would
expect that jurors would be as likely—on average—to support termina-
tion, there is less incentive for jurors to overcome any natural reluc-
tance to terminate an employee. Differences might also be observed
when evidence of discrimination is plausible but inconclusive. Differ-
ences in interests and in identification tendencies may make it more
likely that jurors would find for the employee. These same differences
in interests and identification tendencies may also lead to differences
when jurors are considering a case where the employer is alleged to
have violated a for-cause provision in an employment agreement.
Under such circumstances, peers would be more likely than jurors to
rule in favor of the employer when the case against the employee is
strong, and also when the employee in question has a negative work
history.
Findings
Table 5.18 displays the pairwise comparisons for peer review pan-
elists and jurors. Differences were expected between these two groups
because the decision task allows peers to consider a broader set of
factors when making their decision (at least for cases involving viola-
tions of discrimination statutes). Accordingly, we might expect that, in
instances where evidence of discrimination is weak, peers would be
more likely to rule in favor of the employee when obvious problems
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Table 5.18 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between Peer
Review Panelists and Jurors from Employment
Discrimination Cases
Mean rating for
peer review Mean rating for t-value for mean
Case number panelists jurors difference
Case 1 3.45 3.15 1.18
Case 2 3.19 2.43 3.62**
Case 3 5.44 4.58 4.12**
Case 4 3.88 3.78 0.36
Case 5 3.01 3.96 3.76**
Case 6 3.96 3.40 2.23*
Case 7 2.23 2.28 0.75
Case 8 4.78 4.60 0.90
Case 9 4.03 4.07 0.19
Case 10 4.21 3.70 2.23*
Case 11 5.11 5.36 1.19
Case 12 4.53 4.57 0.17
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
*p  0.05; **p  0.01.
exist with the firm’s case against the employee. Some limited support
was found for this in Cases 3 and 10, where significant differences
were observed (with peers being more likely to rule in favor of the
employee). In both of these cases, evidence of discrimination was mod-
est or weak, and questions existed regarding either procedural compli-
ance (Case 3) or provocation by management (Case 10).
It was also suggested that peers would be more likely to be influ-
enced by the work record of the employee. Some support for this is
found in Case 5, where peers were less likely to rule for the employee
because he or she had a negative work record. Support is also found in
Case 6, where very long tenure was combined with a family situation
that might have been a cause of the current performance problems.
However, we did not find support for this argument in Case 11, where
no significant difference is found.
Peers were also significantly more likely to rule for the employee
in Case 2, where the employee’s case is based entirely on accusations
of wrongdoing by others. A similar but nonsignificant result is found
in Case 1, which shares this characteristic with Case 2. Thus, even
PAGE 129.......................... 10765$ $CH5 06-25-04 11:06:55 PS
130 Wheeler, Klaas, and Mahony
compared to jurors, who are themselves likely to give weight to the
employee’s unsupported statements, peer review panelists tend to be
more highly inclined to find for the employee.
Peer Review Panelists vs. HR Managers
Expectations
We would expect few differences between peer review panelists
and HR managers, because the decision tasks are largely similar and
there is similarity in terms of interests and identification patterns. Both
are part of the same social organization, and thus are likely to be influ-
enced by the logic of idiosyncrasy credits, so we would expect little
difference between these types of decision makers.
Findings
Table 5.19 displays the pairwise comparisons for peer review pan-
elists and HR managers. Few differences were expected for these
groups. In two cases, peer review panelists were significantly more
Table 5.19 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between Peer
Review Panelists and HR Managers
Mean rating for
peer review Mean rating for t-value for mean
Case number panelists HR managers difference
Case 1 3.45 2.75 2.48**
Case 2 3.19 2.71 1.81*
Case 3 5.44 5.19 1.17
Case 4 3.88 4.43 1.72*
Case 5 3.01 3.15 0.52
Case 6 3.96 3.92 0.15
Case 7 2.23 2.07 1.12
Case 8 4.78 5.19 1.87*
Case 9 4.03 4.50 2.04*
Case 10 4.21 4.19 0.09
Case 11 5.11 5.17 0.25
Case 12 4.53 4.80 1.08
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
*p  0.05; **p  0.01.
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likely to find for the employee than were HR managers (Cases 1 and
2). In both cases, there was little basis for challenging the case against
the employee. It should be noted, however, that no significant differ-
ence was observed in Case 7, where the employee also had a weak
case. In three cases, HR managers were significantly more likely to
rule in favor of the employee. A significant difference was observed in
Case 4 (where reasonableness of the rule was at issue), Case 8 (where
procedural compliance was at issue), and Case 9 (where there was sub-
stantial evidence of discrimination).
Jurors vs. HR Managers
Expectations
Because of differences in how the decision task is structured, we
would expect that HR managers would be more likely to decide in
favor of the employee in cases where there is little evidence of discrim-
ination, combined with either limited evidence against the employee or
a lack of procedural compliance on the part of the employer. In addi-
tion, HR managers are part of the same social organization as the em-
ployee, and they—like peers—may be likely to apply the logic of
idiosyncrasy credits. As such, they also may be more heavily influ-
enced by the employee’s work history when determining whether ter-
mination is justified. As noted above, we think it is likely that jurors
will sometimes ignore the law and find for the employee if they believe
that the employee was treated unfairly. However, we would not expect
this tendency to be sufficient to overcome the differences created by
how the decision task is structured.
We would not expect differences when there is plausible but incon-
clusive evidence of discrimination. While jurors may be more likely
than HR managers to identify with the employee, HR managers are
likely to see themselves as being personally accountable for legal ac-
tion taken against the firm (Colvin 2003). As such, their self-interest
may affect how they evaluate evidence and, in turn, make it difficult
for them to discount evidence of discrimination—even when the em-
ployee in question has exhibited problems with his/her work for an
extended period.
When the jury case involves contract law issues (due to for-cause
requirements in the employment agreement), fewer differences be-
PAGE 131.......................... 10765$ $CH5 06-25-04 11:06:56 PS
132 Wheeler, Klaas, and Mahony
tween jurors and HR managers are likely to be observed when the case
against the employee is questionable. If differences are to be found, it
is likely to be when the case against the employee is strong. Under
such a circumstance, HR managers (as an agent of management) have
an incentive to overcome any natural reluctance to terminate. However,
that same incentive does not exist for jurors, who would be more likely
to favor the employee.
Findings
Table 5.20 presents the pairwise comparisons for jurors and HR
managers. As noted above, because of differences in the decision task,
we would expect HR managers to consider a broader range of factors
than jurors in a case in which the employee is alleging a violation of a
statute prohibiting discrimination. HR managers are also likely to be
influenced by both the need for consistency within the firm, as well as
employee relations concerns. Some support was found for this, in that
HR managers were significantly more likely to rule in favor of the
employee in cases where evidence of discrimination was modest or
weak, and where other types of challenges could be made to the em-
Table 5.20 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between Jurors
from Employment Discrimination Cases and HR Managers
Mean rating for Mean rating for t-value for mean
Case number jurors HR managers difference
Case 1 3.15 2.75 1.48
Case 2 2.43 2.71 1.29
Case 3 4.58 5.19 2.36**
Case 4 3.78 4.43 2.18*
Case 5 3.96 3.15 2.90**
Case 6 3.40 3.92 1.77*
Case 7 2.28 2.07 1.11
Case 8 4.60 5.19 2.60**
Case 9 4.07 4.50 1.61
Case 10 3.70 4.19 1.89*
Case 11 5.36 5.17 0.69
Case 12 4.57 4.80 0.82
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
*p  0.05; **p  0.01.
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ployer’s case (Cases 3, 8, and 10). This general argument is also sup-
ported by the significant difference observed with regard to Cases 4
and 6. While these cases involved contract issues rather than discrimi-
nation, the differences observed suggest a greater willingness by HR
managers to consider a broader range of factors (in these cases, reason-
ableness of the rule) when determining the appropriate outcome.
There were significant differences observed in Case 5 (short tenure
and a reasonable rule), where the HR managers were less favorable to
the employee, and Case 6 (possibly unreasonable rule and long tenure),
where the HR manager was more favorable to the employee. These
results support the idea that HR managers (as members of the same
social organization) are more likely to implicitly apply the logic of
idiosyncrasy credits, and thus place greater emphasis on the employ-
ee’s work history when making determinations.
Labor Court Judges: A Comparison Group
For the purpose of a cross-cultural comparison, we examined deci-
sions made by labor court judges and compared these decisions to
those made by labor arbitrators, employment arbitrators evaluating
statutory claims, employment arbitrators with for-cause requirements,
peer review panelists, jurors, and HR managers.
It should be noted that labor court judges are required to decide
whether there is cause for termination, so their focus is not limited to
determining whether a statutory violation has occurred. It should also
be noted that labor court judges are less dependent upon maintaining
their acceptability to either party to a case, since they are not selected
by the parties. Consideration should also be given to the fact that labor
court judges are not part of the organization involved with the case,
and that they (like labor and employment arbitrators) have significant
legal training and experience (Keller and Darby 2002). What is less
clear when looking across the multiple countries where labor court
judges are used is what role ideology (and therefore the willingness to
identify with management versus the employee) plays in the appoint-
ment or selection of labor court judges. Thus, it is difficult to predict
how labor court judges might compare with different types of decision
makers in the United States. Therefore, while we will compare labor
court judges with different types of decision makers within the United
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States, we posit no expectations regarding the nature of these differ-
ences.
Table 5.21 presents the results of the comparison between labor
arbitrators and labor court judges. Few differences were observed be-
tween labor arbitrators and labor court judges. Significant differences
were observed only for Case 1, where the case against the employee
was very strong, and labor arbitrators were more likely to rule in favor
of the employee, and in Case 5, where the evidence against the em-
ployee was more modest, and labor court judges were more likely to
rule in favor of the employee. In Case 1, however, both would be likely
to uphold the termination, and in Case 5, both would be likely to over-
turn it.
Table 5.22 presents differences between employment arbitrators
evaluating statutory claims and labor court judges. Labor court judges
had significantly higher ratings for the likelihood of ruling in favor of
the employee than did employment arbitrators in 5 of the 8 cases exam-
ined. This is not surprising, given differences in how the decision tasks
are structured for the two groups. Significant differences were not ob-
served in those cases where the employee’s case was particularly weak
(Cases 2 and 7), or where it was particularly strong (Case 9). The two
Table 5.21 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between Labor
Arbitrators and Labor Court Judges
Mean rating for Mean rating for t-value for mean
Case number labor arbitrators labor court judges difference
Case 1 2.89 1.71 2.21*
Case 2 3.00 2.62 1.06
Case 3 5.92 5.35 1.58
Case 4 5.05 4.57 0.72
Case 5 4.25 5.25 2.14*
Case 6 4.06 4.25 0.33
Case 7 2.73 2.54 0.22
Case 8 5.49 5.75 0.52
Case 9 4.67 5.14 1.07
Case 10 4.57 5.00 0.95
Case 11 5.56 5.57 0.03
Case 12 4.70 4.42 0.56
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
*p  0.05.
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Table 5.22 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between
Employment Arbitrators Evaluating Statutory Claims and
Labor Court Judges
Mean rating for
employment
arbitrators Mean rating for
evaluating statutory labor court t-value for mean
Case number claims judges difference
Case 1 — 1.71 —
Case 2 2.39 2.62 0.58
Case 3 4.29 5.35 2.56**
Case 4 — 4.57 —
Case 5 — 5.25 —
Case 6 — 4.25 —
Case 7 2.22 2.54 0.50
Case 8 3.67 5.75 3.90**
Case 9 4.49 5.14 1.39
Case 10 3.32 5.00 3.42**
Case 11 4.05 5.57 2.70**
Case 12 3.50 4.42 1.81*
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
—  not applicable; *p  0.05; **p  0.01.
sets of decision makers in the sample were in agreement as to whether
the termination should be upheld in those cases.
Table 5.23 displays the results of the comparison between employ-
ment arbitrators with a for-cause requirement and labor court judges.
As can be seen from the table, significant differences were observed in
7 of the 10 cases where comparisons were possible. In all 7 cases, the
labor court judges were more likely to rule in favor of the employee. It
should be noted that there were no significant differences in the two
cases where there was no problem with the case against the employee
(Cases 1 and 7).
Table 5.24 presents the results for the pairwise comparison between
peer review panelists and labor court judges. In one case (Case 1),
where the employee’s case was based on unsupported assertions, peer
review panelists were significantly more likely to find for the em-
ployee. In three cases (Cases 4, 8, and 9), labor court judges were
significantly more likely to find for the employee. In Cases 4 and 8,
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Table 5.23 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between
Employment Arbitrators with For-Cause Requirements and
Labor Court Judges
Mean rating for
employment
arbitrators with for- Mean rating for t-value for mean
Case number cause requirements labor court judges difference
Case 1 2.22 1.71 1.06
Case 2 — 2.62 —
Case 3 — 5.35 —
Case 4 4.12 4.57 0.71
Case 5 4.05 5.25 2.83**
Case 6 3.27 4.25 1.92*
Case 7 2.33 2.54 0.58
Case 8 4.59 5.75 2.90**
Case 9 4.38 5.14 1.76*
Case 10 3.71 5.00 2.84**
Case 11 4.26 5.57 2.85**
Case 12 3.62 4.42 1.75*
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
—  not applicable; *p  0.05; **p  0.01.
there are issues, respectively, with unreasonableness of the employer’s
rule, and the employer failing to comply with its own procedures. In
Case 9, there is substantial evidence of discrimination.
As can be seen in Table 5.25, there were significant differences
between jurors and labor court judges in five of the cases examined. In
Case 1 (one of the cases where the employee’s case is based upon
unsupported allegations), labor court judges were significantly less
likely to rule in favor of the employee. However, in Cases 5, 8, 9 and
10, labor court judges were significantly more likely to rule in favor of
the employee. Case 5 is one where it would seem that the employee
would have a relatively high chance of prevailing before either a jury
or a labor court. We are unable to explain why the jurors were not as
favorable to the employee in this case. Case 8 is one in which a legal
mind might be inclined to give greater weight to the failure of the
employer to comply with proper procedures, and in Case 9, substantial
evidence of discrimination is present. Perhaps the short tenure of the
employee influenced the peers to a greater degree than it did the labor
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Table 5.24 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between Peer
Review Panelists and Labor Court Judges
Mean rating for
peer review Mean rating for t-value for mean
Case number panelists labor court judges difference
Case 1 3.45 1.71 2.71**
Case 2 3.19 2.62 1.00
Case 3 5.44 5.35 0.17
Case 4 3.88 4.57 1.72*
Case 5 3.01 5.25 0.94
Case 6 3.96 4.25 3.78
Case 7 2.23 2.54 0.46
Case 8 4.78 5.75 2.04*
Case 9 4.03 5.14 2.27*
Case 10 4.21 5.00 1.44
Case 11 5.11 5.57 0.87
Case 12 4.53 4.42 0.19
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
*p  0.05; **p  0.01.
Table 5.25 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between Jurors
from Employment Discrimination Cases and Labor Court
Judges
Mean rating for Mean rating for t-value for mean
Case number jurors labor court judges difference
Case 1 3.15 1.71 2.44**
Case 2 2.43 2.62 0.49
Case 3 4.58 5.35 1.42
Case 4 3.78 4.57 1.22
Case 5 3.96 5.25 2.15*
Case 6 3.40 4.25 1.42
Case 7 2.28 2.54 0.49
Case 8 4.60 5.75 2.33*
Case 9 4.07 5.14 1.80*
Case 10 3.70 5.00 2.29*
Case 11 5.36 5.57 0.33
Case 12 4.57 4.42 0.22
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
* p  0.05, ** p  0.01.
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Table 5.26 Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Differences between HR
Managers and Labor Court Judges
Mean rating for Mean rating for t-value for mean
Case number HR managers labor court judges difference
Case 1 2.75 1.71 1.76*
Case 2 2.71 2.62 0.17
Case 3 5.19 5.35 0.37
Case 4 4.43 4.57 0.21
Case 5 3.15 5.25 3.87**
Case 6 3.92 4.25 0.50
Case 7 2.07 2.54 1.29
Case 8 5.19 5.75 1.29
Case 9 4.50 5.14 1.15
Case 10 4.19 5.00 1.39
Case 11 5.17 5.57 0.76
Case 12 4.80 4.42 0.64
NOTE: Ratings were on a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates a high likelihood of overturn-
ing the termination and 1 indicates a low likelihood of overturning the termination;
*p  0.05; **p  0.01.
court judges. In Case 10, the labor court judges may have been willing
to give substantially greater weight to the presence of provocation.
Our final pairwise comparison is between HR managers and labor
court judges. It is shown in Table 5.26, where only two statistically
significant differences are observed. In Case 1, where the employee
has a weak case on substantive merits, the labor court judges were less
likely to rule in favor of the employee. The reverse is true for Case 5,
where modest evidence against the employee is combined with short
tenure and a negative work record. Here again, the idiosyncrasy credit
explanation may work against an employee with short tenure and a bad
record, causing a member of the employee’s own organization to be
more negative toward his or her case.
Summary of Decisions by Type of Decision Maker
Table 5.27 presents a summary view of how the seven types of
decision makers varied across the 12 cases examined. We coded ratings
greater than four on the original response scale as an indication of a
likely ruling in favor of the employee. In Table 5.27, we report the
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Table 5.27 Percentage of Rulings Likely to be in Favor of the Employee, by Case and Decision Maker
Decision maker
Case
1
Case
2
Case
3
Case
4
Case
5
Case
6
Case
7
Case
8
Case
9
Case
10
Case
11
Case
12
Labor arbitration 14 13 92 79 48 47 8 88 62 58 90 65
Employment arbitrator
(statutory claims)
— 3 41 — — — 0 33 51 17 46 21
Employment arbitrator
(for-cause requirement)
4 — — 51 33 21 2 58 55 30 48 23
Peer review panelist 30 20 88 48 22 46 3 67 42 43 77 50
Juror 21 4 58 35 42 31 7 58 48 28 75 54
HR manager 17 13 85 58 23 38 2 75 63 48 75 57
Labor court judge 0 0 88 50 75 50 25 88 50 63 75 50
NOTE: A ruling was classified as likely to be in favor of the employee when a decision maker selected a response of 5 or higher on the
7-point response scale. Scale value 5 was anchored with ‘‘likely to rule in favor of the employee.’’ —  not applicable.
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percentage of rulings likely to be in favor of the employee, broken
down by case and decision maker type. This summary view offers
some insights—largely consistent with what was suggested by the pair-
wise comparisons—about how decision makers differed.
For example, when looking at Case 7—a discrimination case where
there is little basis for the employee’s challenge to the employer’s ac-
tion—one can see that employment arbitrators (both statutory claims
and for-cause), HR managers, and peer review panelists were rarely
willing to rule in favor of the employee. A small (but somewhat higher)
percentage of labor arbitrators and jurors were willing to rule in favor
of the employee, while the labor court judges were the most favorable
to the employee’s case.
Cases 8 through 12 are similar to case 7, except that they contain
some substantial basis for challenging the case against the employee.
For employment arbitrators evaluating statutory claims, a ruling in
favor of the employee was most frequent in Case 9 (51 percent), where
there was substantial evidence of discrimination, and Case 11 (46 per-
cent), where the employee had very long tenure (22 years). In Case 8,
where the employer failed to abide by its own procedures, the percent-
age was somewhat lower (33 percent). In Cases 10 and 12, involving
provocation and family problems, respectively, these percentages did
not approach what was seen for the other cases in this group. Among
those considerations other than the strength of the proof of discrimina-
tion, only tenure seemed to have swayed these arbitrators. Even here,
however, they—along with employment arbitrators in for-cause
cases—are far less likely to base a decision on long tenure than are any
of the other sets of decision makers.
Insights can also be gleaned from the analysis of employment arbi-
trators with for-cause requirements. Where there was weak evidence of
discrimination, employment arbitrators with a for-cause requirement
were much more likely to rule in favor of the employee if certain kinds
of challenges to the case against the employee existed. For example, in
Case 8, where there was both only modest evidence against the em-
ployee and procedural problems, the for-cause requirement seemed to
affect how the case was decided. By contrast, in Cases 11 and 12,
where work record and personal problems were crucial, the presence
of a for-cause requirement did not seem to have as great an effect.
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Comparisons between employment arbitrators and jurors are also
instructive. Interestingly, in Case 9, where there is substantial evidence
of discrimination, both employment arbitrator groups had a somewhat
higher percentage of employee-favorable rulings than jurors. However,
it appears that in some cases where factors not directly related to dis-
crimination were the crucial challenges to the employer’s case (Cases
11 and 12), jurors were more likely to rule in favor of the employee.
One might also argue that Table 5.27 suggests that both the struc-
ture of the decision task and characteristics of the decision maker affect
how decisions are made. For example, labor arbitrators must apply just
cause standards, and these standards involve giving importance to a
number of factors in assessing whether there was just cause for termi-
nation. And quite clearly, a high percentage of labor arbitrators (in
relative terms) were willing to rule in favor of the employee whenever
one of these factors supported a challenge to the case against the em-
ployee. Cases 3 (procedural problems), 4 (lack of reasonableness of
the rule), 10 (provocation), and 11 (long tenure) fit this description.
Characteristics of the decision maker groups also may have played
a role. For example, in cases where work record and tenure were crucial
factors, peer review panelists seemed to be influenced to a greater de-
gree than when other factors related to just cause were at issue. And
this is consistent with the argument that peers would be more likely to
apply the logic of idiosyncrasy credits because of their membership in
the same social group as the accused employee.
Looking at Table 5.27 suggests another interesting point: the pow-
erful effect of long tenure. Case 11 is one which is distinguished pri-
marily by this characteristic. Yet, among all of the decision makers
but employment arbitrators, the percent of rulings likely to favor the
employee in this case are quite high, ranging from 90 percent by labor
arbitrators to 75 percent by jurors, HR managers, and labor court
judges. Peer review panelists fall in the middle, at 77 percent. Even
employment arbitrators would find for the employee in 46 percent of
statutory cases or 48 percent of for-cause cases. This suggests that, in
practice, there is recognition of something like a property right in the
job, acquired over a long service with the employing firm. This is an
idea that has become unfashionable in the management and industrial
relations literatures, but may be very much alive in the real world.
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The Nature of the Award
We asked jurors and employment arbitrators to indicate, in more
detail, what rulings they would make if they decided in favor of the
employee. This method was applied to Cases 7 through 12.
Jurors and employment arbitrators evaluating statutory claims were
asked to choose between a finding: 1) for the employer, 2) of non-willful
discrimination by the employer, and 3) of willful discrimination by the
employer. These distinctions were explained to them, as were the finan-
cial implications of different findings for the employee and employer.
Employment arbitrators with the for-cause requirement were given an
additional option, namely, finding that the employer failed to show cause.
The results of our analysis of these awards are shown in Table 5.28.
As can be seen from the table, jurors were over twice as willing to find
that willful discrimination occurred than were employment arbitrators
evaluating statutory claims, although the percentage remained modest
in absolute amount (11 percent versus 5 percent). They were also some-
what more willing to find non-willful discrimination (36 percent versus
30 percent). This suggests that jurors would generally be more likely
to find for the employee, and that they would also be more willing
to find willful discrimination, which would result in more significant
financial damages being awarded.
Table 5.28 Percentages of Jurors, Employment Arbitrators Evaluating
Statutory Violations, and Employment Arbitrators with a
For-Cause Requirement Issuing Different Findings
Employment Employment
arbitrators arbitrators with a
evaluating for-cause
Finding Jurors statutory violations requirement
Finding for employer 54 64 58
Finding of non-willfull
discrimination 36 30 12
Finding of willful
discrimination 11 5 4
Finding of contract violation and
no finding of discrimination — — 27
NOTE: Only employment arbitrators with a for-cause requirement were allowed to
choose the contract violation finding. Columns may not sum to 100 percent, due to
rounding error. —  not applicable.
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It is interesting to observe that when the for-cause requirement
exists, employment arbitrators are somewhat more willing to find for
the employee. Moreover, it appears that having the for-cause require-
ment reduces the likelihood of a finding of discrimination. Under the
statutory claims condition, 30 percent of employment arbitrator deci-
sions found non-willful discrimination. When the for-cause require-
ment exists, only 12 percent of employment arbitrators make such a
ruling. This suggests that having the for-cause requirement may actu-
ally reduce findings of discrimination against the employer. It also sug-
gests that where just cause requirements do not exist, employment
arbitrators may find that there was discrimination even though they
would rather say that there simply was a lack of cause. It is not clear
whether this indicates that employment arbitrators sometimes use dis-
crimination law to enforce a for-cause requirement, or that employment
arbitrators find it more acceptable to rule that there was a lack of cause
rather than discrimination.
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an empirical method to
compare decisions of each category of decision maker. The result is 21
pairwise comparisons of seven separate categories of decision makers.
In the broadest sense, it appears that the type of decision maker impacts
the decision reached. This general finding can have consequences for
employees who seek to resolve employment disputes in general, and
disputes involving termination in particular. Employees with union
representation are the most likely to achieve a favorable ruling in the
well-established labor arbitration system. They can expect results that
are akin to those achieved by employees subject to a labor court or
similar system. According to our analysis, employees who are required
to go through employment arbitration, on the other hand, are the least
likely to have the case resolved in their favor. Outcomes for employees
decided by peers, jurors, or HR managers fall in between.
Peer review and employment arbitration can be used by employers
as mechanisms for attempts at union avoidance and suppression. Em-
ployment arbitration is credited with being less costly to employers,
while at the same time providing timely and final resolution to disputes
in a forum that is typically more private than a courtroom.
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Considering that mandatory employment arbitration is primarily a
substitute for litigation, it is fair to ask about the implications for work-
place justice when disputes are resolved outside the judicial realm.
The results presented here suggest that those employees who are, as a
condition of employment, required to waive their legal rights to resolve
employment disputes using litigation would expect to fare worse than
those who are free to exercise that right and have their claim decided
by a jury—if they are able to get to a jury. The results for employees
are only slightly better when the employment arbitrator is operating
under a just cause provision.
There is one important caveat to concluding that employees might
be better off in court than before an employment arbitrator. As we
noted in Chapter 3, the number of cases that actually make it to a jury
is extremely small, with an estimated 80 percent of cases settled at an
earlier stage (Howard 1995). What is more, it may be true that only a
small proportion of potential claims are accepted by attorneys. There-
fore, one should not conclude that employment arbitration is necessar-
ily less favorable for employees than going to court. What is clear,
however, is that labor arbitration offers employees the greatest advan-
tages of any of the systems that we have studied. This is because it not
only provides the best chance for an employee to win an adjudication
of the case, it is also the final step in a complex and sophisticated
process, whereby the union provides an advocate at the very earliest
stage of the employee’s grievance. This allows the facts of the case to
be developed in a way that is not to the employee’s disadvantage. Cases
are systematically settled in the early stages of the process, with the
employee having the assistance of a trained advocate.
Lastly, while HR managers, on average, had a lower likelihood of
overturning a termination decision than labor arbitrators in the pairwise
comparisons, the figures for the two groups of decision makers were
remarkably close. In 10 of the 12 cases, HR managers agreed with
labor arbitrators to either overturn or uphold the termination. Labor
arbitrators did, however, rule in favor of the employee more frequently
than their HR manager counterparts. Thus, while strong similarities
exist, one should not necessarily surmise that decisions reached by HR
managers are identical to those of labor arbitrators. Nevertheless, the
relative consistency between their decisions warrants further empirical
exploration.
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Is Justice Weeping?
The main purpose of this book is to assess the degree to which
workplace justice is present in the nonunion sector of the American
employment relations system. That is, to what extent are employees
free from arbitrary treatment? Also, how effective (for employees, em-
ployers, and society at large) are the processes that aim to provide
protection to employees? To address these questions, we began with a
review of the literature and data on the various systems of workplace
justice for employees who are not protected by a collective bargaining
agreement. In Chapter 5, we reported an empirical comparison of deci-
sion outcomes by persons who have been decision makers under vari-
ous systems.
In our study, much attention has been given to employment arbitra-
tion—the most visible and controversial of nonunion systems. Our
analysis has included a consideration of the literature on employment
arbitration and the debates over its virtues and failings, as well as the
state of the law on this subject. We concentrated on studies of the
characteristics and effects of employment arbitration, and placed our
inquiry into an international context. Finally, to better illustrate the
comparative functions of available arbitration procedures, we systemat-
ically compared the results that would be reached in identical cases by
employment arbitrators, labor arbitrators, jurors, managers, members
of peer review panels, and labor court judges.
SUMMARY
The baseline of law from which we begin is the American rule of
employment-at-will. This rule gives employers the unfettered right to
act in an arbitrary fashion, not only in terminating employees, but also
in otherwise disciplining and directing employees with the threat of
termination always looming in the background. Almost alone among
developed countries, the United States generally requires employees
claiming unjust termination to assert and prove a violation of a specific
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law, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The courts have moder-
ated this situation by developing, on a case-by-case basis, a law of
unjust termination. Terminations judged to violate public policy, be
abusive in manner, or violate either an implied-in-fact contract (usually
an employee handbook) or implied-in-law contract term (the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing) have been found by the courts to be
actionable. Unions have extended protection to about 16 million work-
ers against being terminated without just cause. This, however, leaves
much room for ‘‘the command of persons, where secrecy and arbitrari-
ness reign’’ (Wolterstorff 2001, p. 22).
Into this broad area of unfettered management flexibility, managers
have inserted a number of management-initiated organizational sys-
tems of justice. Some of these are mere ‘‘soft’’ system—such as open-
door policies, mediation, and ombudspersons—that do not produce
outcomes that are legally binding on the employer. Some firms have
gone beyond these to adopt ‘‘hard’’ systems—i.e., peer review panels
and employment arbitration—capable of coming to conclusions that
management is bound to accept, either by internal organizational jus-
tice rules or by external law.
In our work, we have concentrated mainly upon employment arbi-
tration as a means to workplace justice. The literature on it consists
mainly of legal analyses, debates about its pros and cons, and research
on its characteristics and outcomes. The law on employment arbitration
is clear in its major outlines, but highly unsettled as to its details. In
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001a), the U.S. Supreme Court
plainly declared enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
agreements between an employer and an employee that claims, includ-
ing those of a violation of the law, would be taken to arbitration. How-
ever, although a reading of the Federal Arbitration Act would lead one
to believe that the right of employers to set up and operate employment
arbitration structures is virtually unlimited, it appears that this is not
the case. Even in the Circuit City case itself, the agreement was eventu-
ally set aside by the lower court on the grounds of ‘‘unconscionability.’’
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review two other decisions
ruling that Circuit City, Inc. arbitration clauses were unenforceable
(Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ingle 2004; Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Mantor 2004).
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It is extremely difficult to say with any degree of certainty what
the minimum requirements are for an employment arbitration structure
to survive the scrutiny of the courts. It is clear that loading any substan-
tial amount of the cost of arbitration on the employee will place the
arbitration agreement in serious jeopardy. Literally as the finishing
touches were being put on this study, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a
case originating in South Carolina, has ruled that class-action suits may
be brought in consumer arbitration cases if the arbitrator believes it to
be appropriate (Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle 2003).
Also, it does seem that an arbitration system that complies with the
Due Process Protocol will probably be found to be valid. The AAA
procedures appear to meet these requirements, with the caveat that they
do not include a requirement for limited judicial review. In our view,
this is the most difficult standard for these systems to meet, yet it may
be the most important for assuring that public policy is not relegated
to private hands. Judicial review runs counter to the very nature of
arbitration as it has developed in the unionized sector. Indeed, the lack
of judicial review is one of the distinctive features of such arbitration,
making it quicker and cheaper than court proceedings and insuring that
expert arbitrators—rather than possibly inexpert judges—decide these
cases.
When one sorts through the various arguments for and against em-
ployment arbitration from the standpoints of public policy, employers,
and employees, a few stand out. The chief public policy concern ap-
pears to be the lessening of the workload of the federal courts. Federal
judges see themselves as overwhelmed with a flood of employment
litigation, and there is some basis for this perception. Employers would
seem to benefit from the avoidance of juries and the high verdicts
against them that may result from a jury trial, and they also stand to
gain from the relative speed and low cost of employment arbitration.
For employees, the chief advantages would appear to include a higher
probability of having access to a remedial system, even if they earn
only modest wages or have a case that is somewhat questionable. Em-
ployees also may have a higher probability of a successful outcome in
arbitration than in court, which may encourage employers to comply
with the law more strongly than the low probability of a large jury
verdict. The low cost and speed of arbitration are advantageous to the
employee as well as to the employer.
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On the negative side, there are two main problems in terms of
public policy. First, contrary to what is argued above, it may be the
fear of high verdicts (and the high costs of attorneys’ fees) that will
most encourage employers to comply with the law, and removing that
threat may eliminate such motivation. Second, the enforcement of fed-
eral and state law is being placed in the hands of unregulated employ-
ment arbitrators.
For the employer, there are several possible disadvantages of em-
ployment arbitration. One of these is the lower probability of winning
in arbitration than in court, particularly when one takes into account
the very large proportion of employee claims that will never even find
legal counsel to pursue them in court. In the legal system, the employer
has a significant advantage that may not be present in arbitration. While
fears of large jury awards are somewhat unfounded, the hoped-for sav-
ings in cost and time to the employer may not be present in all cases.
Finally, a point not usually considered is the possibility of the arbitrator
converting employment-at-will into a ‘‘for-cause’’ relationship, which
would take away the right of the employer to fire an employee without
being required to show a cause for the dismissal.
For the employee, employment arbitration has many disadvan-
tages. In the first place, it is a system created by the employer and
imposed on the employee in an adhesive contract, and as such, the
system may be carefully stacked against the employee. It may, as a
practical matter, allow employers to ‘‘opt out’’ of Title VII and other
antidiscrimination laws. The limits on the use of discovery may be a
disadvantage to the employee, since the employer is generally in pos-
session of most of the facts, and the employee needs this information.
The right to a jury trial is lost, as is the right to meaningful judicial
review. There are also concerns about the potential biases of arbitra-
tors, which can be avoided in the union system. These potential prob-
lems have led states, such as California, to attempt to regulate
employment arbitration providers such as AAA.
When one looks at the empirical studies of employment arbitration,
the evidence on a number of issues is quite mixed. Data on, and studies
of, win/loss rates in employment arbitration compared to other sys-
tems—e.g., the courts and labor arbitrators—are inconclusive. Our data
do show employment arbitration faring reasonably well when com-
pared to both labor arbitration and litigation in federal court; however,
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when employees win in court, they tend to get more money than they
would if they had won an arbitration case.
Our survey results from 176 employment arbitrators show them to
be relatively experienced and nearly always educated in the law. As
expected, they hear mostly statutory, employment contract, and hand-
book cases, although other types of cases make up a greater proportion
of their caseload (22.2 percent) than we expected. As expected, the
majority of their cases involved managerial and professional employ-
ees. Counsel representing employers was judged by the arbitrators to
be competent more often than lawyers representing employees. Al-
though not highly popular with arbitrators, discovery procedures are
more widely used.
A somewhat shocking finding was the frequency with which em-
ployees were paying either all of the costs (3.7 percent of the cases) or
a substantial part of them (22.6 percent of the cases). These procedures
would not be likely to stand up to a challenge in court. While 70 per-
cent of the employment arbitrators would place the burden of proof on
the employer to prove misconduct on the part of the employee, those
arbitrators who had experience as arbitrators were significantly more
likely to do this.
When asked about their decision rules, less than a majority (46.6
percent) of employment arbitrators would overturn a termination for
violation of a clearly unreasonable rule, whereas virtually all labor
arbitrators would do this. Also, a third of employment arbitrators would
uphold a termination so long as the employer acted in good faith, while
one would be hard-pressed to find a labor arbitrator who would use
such a rule. Employment arbitrators’ perceptions of how well the proc-
ess protects employer and employee rights and interests were positive
as to both sides; however, they generally viewed the process as better
for employers than for employees. This was especially true with re-
spect to cases involving nonbinding handbooks and policies.
When one places the American system in international context, it
appears that the U.S. system is truly exceptional. We are among only a
handful of countries in which employees do not have the protections
against termination of employment required by international labor
standards. The countries covered in depth in our study all require cause
for termination. Generally, cause must be proved by the employer by a
preponderance of the evidence or a similar standard, and the most com-
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mon mechanism for this is statutory law. Most of these countries re-
quire notice of termination to the employee, and special courts, or
special processes within ordinary courts, are common.
With respect to the operation of the courts in other countries com-
pared to employment arbitration in the United States, there were some
interesting differences and similarities. Both in the foreign courts and
in U.S. employment arbitration, the representation by counsel of both
sides was judged to be generally competent, but with the employer
having some advantage. Discovery, although not uniformly available,
was generally perceived somewhat more favorably by judges in other
countries than by U.S. employment arbitrators. The requirement in
some cases of a quantum of proof greater than a preponderance of the
evidence is utilized both in other countries and in employment arbitra-
tion. However, this is less common in both of these processes than in
American labor arbitration. A very high proportion of American labor
arbitrators would be expected to use a higher standard (at least clear
and convincing evidence) in the most serious cases.
American employment arbitrators were generally of the opinion
that employers had their interests better protected than employees, es-
pecially where nonbinding handbooks were concerned. Judges from
the other countries that were studied described the interests of both
sides as being about equally well-represented, with the exception of
Italy, where the judges felt that the interests of employers were not as
well-served. Our survey found the judges from outside the United
States to be not quite as approving of their systems as were the Ameri-
can employment arbitrators, yet these judges were somewhat more pos-
itive about the advantages of their specialized tribunals over ordinary
courts than were American employment arbitrators.
One of the weaknesses of nearly all of the literature that attempts
to evaluate different systems for resolving disputes over employment
termination is the failure to address the question of how the decision
makers in different systems would decide the same cases, as it is only
when we know this that we can make a sound evaluation. It is on this
ground that we believe our study may make its greatest contribution.
We examined here how decision makers from different institu-
tional forums responded to situations where an employee was challeng-
ing a termination, either on the basis of statutory grounds or on the
basis of a violation of contractual provisions, and clear differences
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were observed across a number of different types of disciplinary sce-
narios. Moreover, these differences raise provocative issues both from
the standpoint of public policy and from the standpoint of organiza-
tions evaluating their approach to resolving workplace disputes.
CONCLUSIONS
While we believe the differences observed here raise important
implications, it is important to stress that we are limited in our ability
to draw normative conclusions regarding whether a particular type of
institutional forum is better than another in balancing employee and
employer rights. For example, we found that labor arbitrators tended to
be more likely to make employee-favorable decisions than most other
decision makers examined here (with the exception of labor court
judges). By contrast, peer review panelists were less likely to make
employee-favorable decisions, and employment arbitrators with for-
cause requirements were even less likely to do so. But what normative
conclusions can be drawn about these differences? How one views the
tendency for peers or employment arbitrators to be less likely to make
employee-favorable decisions may well depend on how much protec-
tion from unfair dismissal is afforded to employees and how much
freedom management should have to direct and control its workforce.
If one believes that it is critical that employers be allowed substantial
discretion in managing its workforce—a discretion that has been un-
duly limited within many unionized organizations—the differences ob-
served may be seen as an indication that new forums for resolving
workplace disputes offer a more desirable balance between employee
and employer rights. Alternatively, if one believes that the balance
achieved between employee and employer rights within labor arbitra-
tion is appropriate, the differences observed might suggest a very dif-
ferent normative conclusion. In the broadest sense, then, we are limited
in our ability to draw conclusions about the relative merits of the differ-
ent forums for making decisions regarding workplace disputes.
That said, the differences observed here do address a number of
very important issues from both the standpoint of public policy and
organizational policy with regard to dispute resolution. To begin with,
as discussed previously, with the decline of unionization, workplace
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disputes are increasingly being addressed within the judiciary system,
often revolving around statutory claims. Any assessment of the chang-
ing face of workplace justice, then, would require that consideration be
given to the difference in outcomes between labor arbitration, the jury
system, and employment arbitration. As noted above, labor arbitrators
found for the employee more frequently than did jurors or employment
arbitrators. These latter forums are not explicitly designed to address a
broad spectrum of employment disputes, and it is not surprising that
differences are observed—particularly when evidence of a statutory
violation is more limited.
It has been suggested that jurors sometimes ignore the law and
impose their own sense of what is fair when making determinations. If
true, this would suggest that juries apply some form of a just cause
standard—regardless of whether they are permitted to do so under the
law. The pattern of differences observed here suggests that jurors may
sometimes consider factors that speak to the issue of fairness rather
than to the more narrow issue of whether there is evidence of a legal
violation. However, the pattern of differences also suggests that there
are significant limits on the degree to which jurors are willing to ignore
the law in favor of an implicit for-cause standard. As such, as one
might expect, access to the judicial system offers a more narrow set of
protections than does the labor arbitration system or the labor court
systems in countries where for-cause standards are enforceable. Admit-
tedly, the potential for juries to issue significant awards against an
employer may constrain employer behavior in some instances, encour-
aging them to carefully consider their ability to justify the termination
of an employee. However, our data do not suggest that juries apply—in
any consistent fashion—a cause standard that is similar to what is em-
ployed within labor arbitration.
Another issue raised by our findings relates to the trend toward
using employment arbitration as a substitute for the court system. For
many, this trend has raised questions about whether employee rights
are being limited in some fashion. While previous studies comparing
employment arbitration and the courts (summarized in Table 3.1) are
believed by us to be inconclusive, our own data on overall employee
win rates (shown in Table 3.2) show employment arbitration in a rather
favorable light. However, the results of our comparison of decision
makers’ reactions to the same cases (Chapter 5) suggests that employ-
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ment arbitrators are less likely to rule in favor of employees, particu-
larly when there is only limited evidence of discrimination. Our
research (summarized in Table 5.4) found that jurors were willing to
rule for the employee in 38 percent of the cases, compared to only 25
percent of the time for employment arbitrators in statutory cases. The
pattern of results also suggests that employment arbitrators (when eval-
uating statutory claims) are more likely than jurors to restrict their
focus to factors more closely related to evidence of discrimination.
Employment arbitrators were also less willing to find willful (as op-
posed to nonwillful) discrimination. This is consistent with our conclu-
sions in Chapter 3 about higher awards coming from juries than
employment arbitrators. It is also important to note that while employ-
ment arbitrators were less likely to rule for the employee than were
jurors, employment arbitrator decisions more closely resembled (in
terms of overall tendencies) those of jurors than they did those of peer
review panelists, HR managers, labor arbitrators, or labor court judges.
While employment arbitrators were less likely to rule for the em-
ployee than were jurors across the range of cases examined, in consid-
ering the implications of this it is important to recognize that a judge
must first allow a case to go before a jury. And given that many of the
cases examined here had relatively little evidence of discrimination, it
is unclear what percentage of cases would actually have been heard by
a jury. By contrast, employment arbitrators would have heard any of
the cases that an employee chose to pursue. As such, while employ-
ment arbitrators are less likely than a juror to find for the employee, it
is questionable whether significant differences in outcomes would have
been observed between employment arbitrators and the judicial system
taken as a whole. Further, in assessing the difference between jurors
and employment arbitrators, it is important to consider that in statutory
cases, differences appeared to be smallest when there was substantial
evidence of discrimination.
We noted above that, while jurors may have sometimes been influ-
enced by an overall sense of fairness when making a determination,
there clearly were limits on the degree to which they applied a for-
cause standard. One possible interpretation of the difference between
jurors and employment arbitrators is that employment arbitrators were
perhaps even less likely to apply a for-cause standard when evaluating
the merits of a case that revolved around statutory issues. And while
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this may affect the likelihood that an employee will receive a favorable
decision, it is consistent with the decision task assigned to employment
arbitrators.
Implications are also suggested by the differences observed be-
tween employment arbitrators evaluating statutory claims and those
with a for-cause requirement. While the for-cause manipulation clearly
had an effect, the effect was not as large as one might have expected.
Employment arbitrators with a for-cause requirement resembled (in
terms of overall evaluation tendencies) employment arbitrators who
evaluate statutory claims far more than they did labor arbitrators or
labor court judges. This raises intriguing questions in light of recent
public policy debates regarding the issue of employment-at-will work-
place justice. It has often been argued that society, organizations, and
employees would all benefit from a uniform standard relating to the
conditions under which termination would be permissible. Substituting
for-cause standards for employment-at-will on a universal basis has
been suggested as a way to reduce complex and costly litigation over
discrimination, ensure basic standards of justice across a broad spec-
trum of employees, and reduce uncertainty and confusion for an em-
ployer as to the likely consequences of terminating an employee.
However, the suggested requirement of a for-cause standard has gained
little traction in terms of public policy. In part, this is driven by a
concern that such a standard would reduce labor market flexibility and
interfere with management’s ability to operate in an efficient manner
(i.e., the power of management). Our findings regarding the impact of
the for-cause standard on employment arbitrators raises questions
about these concerns. While employment arbitrators with a for-cause
standard rule in favor of the employee more frequently than employ-
ment arbitrators in evaluating a statutory claim, the difference was
modest in comparison to other differences observed in this study. Em-
ployment arbitrators with a for-cause requirement still ruled for the
employee less frequently than did jurors, peers, HR managers, labor
arbitrators, and labor court judges. This suggests that the impact of a
for-cause standard will depend on who is interpreting the standard and
the institutional structure surrounding the interpretation of the cause
requirement. One plausible interpretation of our findings is that it might
be possible to have for-cause standards that offered some basic protec-
tion from unfair treatment, that offered clarity to employers regarding
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what is acceptable, that reduced the uncertainty often associated with
cases that work their way into a legal system, and that do not unduly
interfere with management’s ability to direct and control its workforce.
Quite clearly, everything involves trade-offs to one degree or an-
other. Implicit in our argument is that there may be institutional struc-
tures that would allow for a cause standard that would impose fewer
restrictions than those that result from labor arbitration. While some
might view this lessening of restrictions as an unfortunate reduction in
employee rights, it may increase the feasibility that a cause standard
could be applied more generally within the workforce.
A comparison of the outcomes under the systems of workplace
justice without unions, particularly peer review panels and employ-
ment arbitration, to the process—labor arbitration—that exists in the
unionized sector is of particular interest to this study. As we have
noted, employment arbitration is currently the more visible of the two
main nonunion sector systems. Policymakers as well as judges and
academic scholars, managers, and labor spokespersons are engaged in
a hot debate over the relative merits of the nonunion systems compared
to the unionized one. Although our analysis in Chapter 3 comparing
data on labor and employment arbitration awards would lead one to
believe that the results under the two systems are quite similar, particu-
larly when employment arbitrators are applying a just cause standard,
our decision-making research leads to a different conclusion.
In our decision-making analysis, across all cases, labor arbitrators
scored an average of 4.41, whereas employment arbitrators operating
in the for-cause condition averaged only 3.70 (Table 5.3). Labor arbi-
trators would rule in favor of the employee in 53 percent of the same
cases in which employment arbitrators with a for-cause condition
would rule in favor of the employee only 33 percent of the time. As
might be expected, this tendency is even greater when one compares
labor arbitrators’ decisions with those of employment arbitrators in
deciding statutory claims. There was an overall average score of 4.41
for labor arbitrators versus a 3.38 score for employment arbitrators
under this condition. Labor arbitrators decided in favor of employees
55 percent of the time, while employment arbitrators in statutory cases
decided in the employee’s favor only 25 percent of the time (Table 5.4).
It is worth repeating in our concluding chapter that labor arbitration
is only the last step in a grievance process. In a unionized setting, the
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employee has an advocate at the very earliest stages of the process.
Among other things, this means that the facts of the case develop in a
way that can work to the employee’s advantage. The union is required
by law to take meritorious cases to arbitration, and to pay the costs of
the arbitration. It is true that the case becomes that of the union rather
than that of the employee, so the employee loses some control. How-
ever, with this loss of control comes the benefits of collective represen-
tation. The employee is not limited, in the words of the old union
organizing song, to ‘‘the feeble strength of one.’’
Implications are also suggested by the differences observed be-
tween labor arbitration and both peer review panelists and HR manag-
ers. For example, peer review is sometimes seen as part of a union
avoidance strategy and, thus, the differences observed may well be
relevant to any assessment of peer review. Our results suggest that
while peer review panelists and HR managers rule in favor of the em-
ployee less frequently than labor arbitrators and labor court judges (45
percent for peer review panelists compared to 55 percent for labor
arbitrators and 51 percent for labor court judges), they rule in favor of
the employee more frequently than jurors (38 percent) or employment
arbitrators (33 or 25 percent). This suggests that these internal systems
of justice (while less codified) may offer employees more protection
than would be available through the judiciary system or even through
employment arbitration (both where employment-at-will exists and
where for-cause requirements exist). While their decisions sometimes
appeared to be influenced by their membership within the organization,
it does appear that peers and HR managers offer a middle position in
terms of the balance between employee and employer rights.
It is also worth noting that it is often recommended that peer re-
view be utilized by firms who make use of employment arbitration
(with the associated waiver of the right to sue). Given this recommen-
dation, it is important to consider how the balance of employee and
employer rights shifts when this particular combination is used. Rela-
tive to firms where the only alternative is to pursue concerns regarding
termination in court, our data might suggest that the balance shifts
toward the employee in at least some instances. In peer review, panel-
ists indicated a greater willingness to find for the employee across a
broad range of cases—even when there was limited evidence of dis-
crimination. Peers seemed, to a greater degree, to be utilizing some
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form of a for-cause standard—at least implicitly. And if an employee
received a favorable ruling from the peer review panel, no need would
exist for the matter to be considered within employment arbitration. If
the employee received an unfavorable ruling, employment arbitration
would still be available to ensure that the decision to terminate was
consistent with existing statute. One might argue that employment ar-
bitration would offer a more effective review of peer review if a for-
cause standard existed. But regardless, employment arbitration would
at least offer some review of the peer review process to ensure compli-
ance with the law. The results obtained here suggest that such a process
may well produce more favorable rulings for employees than would
systems dependent on the jurors—at least for cases similar to those
examined here. This possibility should be considered in light of two
additional considerations. First, our results suggest that jurors were
more likely to find willful discrimination and, thus, are more likely
to provide for greater damages. Thus, while more employee-favorable
outcomes might be expected under systems that combine peer review
and employment arbitration, it is also likely that there will be fewer
significant payouts for those employees who do obtain a favorable rul-
ing. Second, as was noted above, the fact remains that there is no judi-
cial review of employment arbitration rulings. While this might well
be seen as a necessary tradeoff, it remains a significant departure from
what is available through the judicial system. One interesting finding
of our decision maker comparisons is the tendency of peer review pan-
elists and jurors to be more likely than the professionals to find for an
employee whose case is based entirely on an unsupported, self-serving
claim that someone else is at fault. This is shown by the results of
the analysis in Chapter 5 of Case 1, where the employee claims other
employees committed the offense, and Case 2, where the employee
claims that racially biased statements were made. An employee with a
weak case based on such evidence might be better off before nonpro-
fessionals such as peers or jurors.
Some might well argue that such a combination of peer review and
employment arbitration offers at least a reasonable balance in terms of
employee and employer rights. It might also be argued that the willing-
ness of some firms to adapt such systems in the absence of unions
offers promise regarding the likelihood of a move toward a system
where there is some balance between employee and employer rights.
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However, it is clear that such systems depend on the willingness of
employers to adopt them. While such systems may be efficient for
many employers and contribute to the development of a world-class
workforce, it is likely that many employers will remain skeptical re-
garding the compatibility between formally protecting employee rights
and maintaining a competitive advantage.
When unions were a more dominant influence within the private
sector economy, organizing nonunion firms led to the increased use of
labor arbitration as a system of justice. Where firms paid too little
heed to the balance between employee and employer rights, organizing
efforts offered some prospect that—through unionization—labor arbi-
tration would become the mechanism for resolving disputes. Moreover,
many argue that organizationally based justice systems were intro-
duced to avoid such unionization.
Where the threat of unionization is minimal, then, one wonders
how frequently employees will have access to well-developed systems
that combine peer review and employment arbitration. When unions
played a more dominant role, their efforts and their existence fostered
the spread of workplace justice systems. As unions have declined in
their presence within the private sector economy, however, what mech-
anisms exist to ensure the diffusion of systems that seem to offer at
least some balance between employee and employer rights? Some
might argue that market pressure will force such efforts—building a
world-class workforce depends on committed employees, which in turn
depends on finding an appropriate balance between employee and em-
ployer rights. However, few informed observers argue that the market
is an efficient mechanism for enforcing the utilization of effective HR
practices. Some might argue then, that the threat of legal action will
encourage employers to develop effective systems. However, firms
solely concerned about legal challenges might simply introduce em-
ployment arbitration with an associated waiver of the right to sue. In
sum, while systems of justice may have emerged that offer some bal-
ance between employee and employer rights, it is unclear through what
mechanism one might expect to see widespread diffusion of these sys-
tems of justice.
Related to this, questions might also be raised about workplace
justice involving smaller employers where even the protections af-
forded by statutes prohibiting discrimination do not apply. Particularly
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in the secondary economy, where the link between human capital and
competitive advantage may be less obvious, concerns might exist re-
garding the balance between employee and employer rights for the
smaller employer. Indeed, the differences between systems such as
peer review and labor arbitration may pale in comparison to the differ-
ence between firms that have some formal workplace justice system
and those that are neither bound by statutes such as Title VII (because
of size), nor have any formal system in place to protect employee
rights.
Additional implications are suggested by the comparison between
peer review panelists and HR managers. While there may well be re-
luctance to utilize peer review for fear that peers will be more lenient
than managers, it is interesting to note that peer review panelists actu-
ally issued employee-favorable rulings less frequently than did HR
managers. This may be due to HR managers being more risk averse
since they may be held personally accountable if legal or employee
relations problems resulted from a termination, but it may also be that
peers were more likely to consider negative information about the em-
ployee’s work history or other factors that indicate that the employee
is not fully contributing. But regardless of the reason, the data reported
here does call into question assumptions sometimes made about
whether peer review panels are unduly lenient relative to the manage-
ment team.
With the decline of unionization has come significant changes in
workplace justice within this country. Here, we have examined how
outcomes might differ across varying institutional forums for resolving
disputes regarding employee terminations. We believe that some of the
differences observed raise provocative issues, both in terms of public
policy and in terms of issues to be addressed by organizations in evalu-
ating the appropriate design of workplace justice systems.
It is important to keep in mind that, from the standpoint of employ-
ees, all of the nonunion systems fail to stack up to labor arbitration,
which offers the best chance for workplace justice. Justice is least
likely to weep where there is a union. We are also inclined to believe
that this system works reasonably well for employers, and is consistent
with the kind of public policy that should prevail in a democratic so-
ciety.
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We might note that the broad sphere of workplace justice is cur-
rently a fluid area in the United States, with much opportunity for
experimentation and innovation. Indeed, some might argue that with
rapid moves toward globalization and a knowledge-based economy,
experimentation and innovation are necessary in striking an acceptable
balance between employee and employer rights. Achieving such a bal-
ance has critical implications for the performance of our economy, the
success of individual organizations, and the well-being of individual
employees and their families.
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This appendix consists of a summary of the laws of termination of
employment in 11 countries: Australia, Finland, Germany, Israel, Italy,
Malaysia, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.
AUSTRALIA
Most Australian employees are covered by the Workplace Rela-
tions Act of 1996, as supplemented by the Workplace Relations Regu-
lations of 1996. This legislation provides protection against unjust
termination by mandating that, in order to terminate an employee, the
employer must give the notice set out in the contract of employment
or, if there is none specified, reasonable notice. Certain classes of em-
ployees, including casual employees, trainees, and workers earning
more than a particular annual salary, are excluded from the coverage of
this national legislation. All of the states but one have unfair dismissal
legislation, and all have antidiscrimination laws.
For a dismissal to be valid under the Workplace Relations Act, the
employer must ensure that it is not ‘‘harsh, unjust or unreasonable,’’
that it is not on a prohibited ground, and that notice periods are com-
plied with. Prohibited grounds include temporary absence from work
because of illness or injury, membership or nonmembership in a union,
acting as an employee representative, participating in proceedings
against an employer, absence for parental leave, race, color, sex, sexual
preference, age, disability, marital status, family responsibilities, preg-
nancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin,
and refusal to consent to a workplace agreement.
Notice, or payment in lieu of it, need not be given if the employee
is dismissed on grounds of ‘‘serious misconduct.’’ Where required, the
period of notice ranges from one to six weeks. This depends on length
of service and age (greater when the worker is over 45 years old).
In reviewing a termination, the Industrial Relations Commission
must follow the standards set out in the ILO Termination of Employ-
ment Convention. That is, it must decide whether the termination is for
a reason based on the capacity or conduct of the employee or the needs
of the employer. It must further consider whether, if the reason relates
to the employee’s capacity or conduct, the employee was notified of
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the reason and given an opportunity to respond to the charges. For
terminations based on poor performance, it must inquire whether the
employee was warned about the employer’s dissatisfaction in advance
of being terminated.
Charges of harsh, unjust, or unreasonable dismissal are heard by
the commission. A claim of discrimination or breach of notice obliga-
tions goes to a federal court. If the case involves both, it is up to the
employee to choose the forum.
Remedies for harsh, unjust, or unreasonable dismissal granted by
the commission can include reinstatement, damages in lieu of reinstate-
ment, or compensation for lost pay. Compensation for lost pay can be
six months’ pay or A$32,000, whichever is the lesser. If a termination
is found to be discriminatory, the court may reinstate the employee,
award compensation, or assess damages (Crotty et al. 2000).
Practice in the Courts
According to the Australian judge in our sample, proof of em-
ployee misconduct must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence
rather than by clear or convincing evidence or proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. Prior to the case coming to a hearing, there would have
been both an attempt at conciliation by the court and a review by man-
agement initiated by the union, with the threat of possible collective
action.
As to the quality of practice in Australian courts, this judge said
that both the employer and the employee are usually competently rep-
resented. He also was of the opinion that the court usually had suffi-
cient information upon which to base a decision, and that pretrial
discovery proceedings, when used, were only sometimes worthwhile.
He agreed that the Australian system generally does a good job in
protecting both employee and employer rights, is an efficient way of
resolving workplace disputes, and is better at this than if there were not
specialized courts. The most important advantage of the labor court
system in Australia, according to him, is that it provides an objective
and respected third party who resolves the dispute in a relatively timely
way. It is worth noting that he listed no disadvantages of this system.
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FINLAND
Under the Finnish Employment Contracts Act, an employment
contract that is not binding for a fixed period can only be terminated
by either side by giving proper notice. This period may be set by con-
tract, but must not be longer than six months, or longer for the em-
ployee than for the employer. If no express term of notice is set by
contract, it is set by statute—ranging (for employers) from one month
for employees with up to 1 year of service to six months for employees
with 15 or more years of service.
An employer cannot give notice of termination of employment,
except in the situations mentioned in the Employment Contracts Act
(or the Seaman’s Act). This can be only for ‘‘an especially weighty
reason,’’ and this must be connected either with the capacity or conduct
of the employee. It cannot be for any of the following reasons: 1)
illness, so long as it has not caused a substantial and permanent reduc-
tion of the employee’s capacity to work; 2) participation in a strike; or
3) the employee’s political or religious views or participation in the
activities of an association. It is also prohibited to terminate an em-
ployee because of her pregnancy. A union shop steward, or a member
of a labor protection committee, can only be terminated with the con-
sent of employees or if the work that he/she performs is totally elimi-
nated. If a steward is wrongly dismissed, an employer is subject to
a fine in addition to the ‘‘normalized indemnity’’ (discussed below)
(Suviranta 1999). There are also restrictions on collective terminations.
The contract of employment can be rescinded by either the em-
ployer or the employee if the other ‘‘has misled the other party in any
material respect at the conclusion of the contract or if one of the parties
through his carelessness jeopardizes safety at the workplace or assaults
the other party or grossly insults him’’ (Suviranta 1999, p. 112). The
contract of employment cannot be rescinded because of a strike or
lockout, unless it is in violation of legal provisions for mediation of
disputes, the Collective Agreements Act, or a collective agreement. If
an employee is absent from work for one week without presenting
an acceptable excuse within that time, the employer may consider the
contract rescinded. If a rescission is found to be without a sufficient
reason, the relationship is nevertheless ended, but the wronged party
may sue for damages (Suviranta 1999).
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In individual termination cases, an employee must be given an op-
portunity to be heard, and told the reasons for the termination, before
being fired. The employee is entitled to have someone with him at a
meeting with the employer. Notice of termination has to be served on
the employee within a reasonable time after the grounds for it are
known to the employer. On demand, the employer must furnish to
the employee the reasons for the termination and the date upon which
employment will end (Suviranta 1999).
Ordinary courts of the first instance handle disputes over individual
employment contracts, and disputes over matters that are not tried by
the labor court. The labor court handles matters connected with collec-
tive agreements. Generally, claims arising under the Employment Con-
tracts Act are heard by general courts.
If an individual termination is found to be unlawful, the employee
is entitled to a ‘‘normalized indemnity’’ of at least three, and at most
four, months’ wages. The employer may be given the option to rein-
state the employee or withdraw the termination. The remedies available
may be varied by a collective agreement.
Practice in the Courts
According to the judge who responded to our questionnaire, he
would place on the employer the burden of proving cause for termina-
tion by clear and convincing evidence. Prior to coming to court, there
is usually a grievance procedure that consists of meetings at both the
local and federation levels.
As to the quality of the proceedings, our respondent is of the opin-
ion that both parties are usually competently represented, the court
usually has sufficient information upon which to base its decision,
there is always pretrial discovery, and it is always worth the time and
costs involved.
The Finnish judge agreed that the Finnish court systems do a good
job of protecting both employee and employer rights. He agreed that
the system is an efficient way of resolving workplace disputes, but was
neutral as to whether it was better at this than ordinary courts would
be.
In Finland, the most important advantages of the labor court sys-
tem, according to the judge, are its professionalism, the possibility of
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a quick result, and the trust that the parties have in the system. Its chief
disadvantage is that it is not open to workers who are unorganized.
GERMANY
Under both the Civil Code (CC) and the Protection Against Dis-
missal Act (PADA), which was most recently amended in 1996, there
is protection for German workers against both summary termination
and ordinary termination with notice. To be protected under PADA, an
employee must work for an employer with more than five employees,
and have worked for the employer for six months. If there is a Works
Council or Staff Council, the Works Commission Act or the Federal
Staff Representation Act covers them as well. Fixed-term contracts,
once quite restricted, are now (since the Employment Promotion Act
of 1985) not strictly limited as to the types of work to which they
apply (Crotty et al. 2000). Being on a fixed-term contract deprives the
employee of protection against dismissal at the end of the term, while
being a temporary employee means that termination can take place at
any time (Kittner and Kohler 2000).
Under PADA, even a routine dismissal is considered prima facie
socially unjustifiable and therefore unlawful. PADA sets out three rea-
sons for a justifiable dismissal: 1) the person of the employee (personal
incapability or ill health); 2) the conduct of the employee (breach of
obligations, violation of plant regulations or collateral obligations,
breach of confidence); and 3) redundancy. Even if dismissal is for one
of these reasons, the termination is socially unjustifiable if the worker
can be transferred to another job after reasonable training (Crotty et al.
2000; Kittner and Kohler 2000).
The CC, which covers small employers, provides that summary
dismissal must be based on ‘‘grave misconduct of the employee or
severe economic circumstances unrelated to the behavior of the em-
ployee’’ (Crotty et al. 2000, p. 154; Kittner and Kohler 2000). A sum-
mary dismissal is lawful only if is ‘‘intolerable’’ for the period of notice
to be worked (Sec. 626, Civil Code). Examples of grave misconduct
include committing a crime, persisting in refusal to perform the work-
er’s duties in spite of warnings, and deceiving the employer as to job
qualifications. For white-collar employees, a summary dismissal must
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take place within two weeks of the occurrence of the events giving rise
to the termination (Sec. 27, White Collar Employees Act).
There is a body of court decisions from which a set of principles
on termination can be derived. The first of these principles is that a
termination must be justified by a ‘‘negative prognosis.’’ That is, past
events must show that a continuation of the misconduct is likely in the
future. Second, there is the ultima ratio principle, which holds that
termination is only a last resort, and is to be avoided if a lesser action,
such as transfer, will solve the problem. These two principles have led
to the rule that an employee must be warned before being terminated
for a conduct-related reason. The third principle is that the interest of
the employer in terminating the employee and the interest of the em-
ployee in keeping the job must be weighed. This involves considering
the employee’s age, seniority, and job market prospects (Kittner and
Kohler 2000).
Dismissal is unlawful if it is because of participation in a trade
union, or discriminatory on the basis of sex, race, origin, language,
national origin, creed, religious and political beliefs, pregnancy and
maternity, child care leave, or compulsory military or community ser-
vice. Members of worker representative bodies (such as works coun-
cils), workers who have completed apprenticeship programs, and some
groups privileged under collective bargaining agreements are accorded
special protection (Crotty et al. 2000).
For ordinary dismissals, there is a statutory period of notice that is
at least four weeks before the 15th of any calendar month. Longer
notice is required after certain periods of service and after the worker’s
25th birthday. For 2 years’ service, one month’s notice is required; for
5 years’ service, two months; for 10 years, five months; and for 20
years, seven months. For probationary employees, the period of notice
is two weeks (Crotty et al. 2000).
For summary dismissals, the employee must have been given no-
tice that continuing the misconduct will result in dismissal. Notice of
dismissal must be given within two weeks of the time that the employer
had knowledge of the grounds for termination.
When a works council or staff council is present, the employer
must consult with the council prior to either an ordinary or summary
dismissal. In the case of ordinary dismissals, the council has one week
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to respond. As to summary dismissals, the council has three days to
state its objections, with agreement being presumed if it does not re-
spond. If the council states objections, the employer is required to give
these to the employee at the same time that he/she is given a document
effecting the dismissal (Crotty et al. 2000).
An employee can challenge a dismissal in a labor court, which
may declare the termination to be invalid, dissolve the relationship,
and order compensation for job loss. The amount of compensation is
determined by the court but must not exceed 12 months’ pay (18
months for employees over 55 years old). The amount of the award
depends upon the worker’s social status (marital status, dependents,
health), prospects in the job market and economic situation, and the
extent of unfairness of the dismissal. The employee can choose be-
tween keeping a new job and returning to the employer, and if he/
she returns to the employer, he/she receives compensation for lost pay
(Crotty et al. 2000).
Practice in the Courts
The German labor court judge said that the burden is placed on the
employer to prove misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt. Prior to
going to the trial of the case, there is a ‘‘special consideration’’ hearing
held solely before the professional judge.
According to our German judge, both employers and employees
usually have competent representation, the court usually has sufficient
information upon which to base an adequately informed decision, and
there is no pretrial discovery process.
The German labor court judge respondent agreed that the labor
court system does a good job of protecting both employer and em-
ployee rights. He also agreed that the labor court system was efficient
and was better than ordinary courts would be in handling workplace
disputes.
The most important advantages of the labor court system were seen
as being its autonomy, its being at the same level and having the same
standards as other German courts, and its having both professional and
lay judges. The principal disadvantage is that many professional judges
do not have practical experience in industrial matters.
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ISRAEL
In Israel, employment termination is mainly regulated by collective
agreements. As in the United States, there is no general statute requir-
ing that dismissals be for just cause. Only recently (2001) have some
procedural requirements been adopted (Keller and Darby 2002). Except
for these procedural requirements, an employee outside of a collective
agreement is at-will, unless it can be shown that the employer violated
the contract of employment or acted in bad faith. There is no regulation
of fixed-term or temporary contracts (Crotty et al. 2000). However,
given a union density of approximately 85 percent, the vast majority of
Israeli employees have protection against unjust termination through
collective agreements.
It is generally provided, in collective agreements, that an employee
cannot be terminated without a valid reason in accordance with an
established procedure. Reasons that justify a worker being dismissed
include being incapable of doing the job, or engaging in any serious
misconduct. There are statutory prohibitions against terminations for
particular reasons, including pregnancy and maternity, sex, race, reli-
gion, and nationality. Trade union officials are given special protection.
It has long been customary for employers to give notice of termina-
tion to employees. This was incorporated into law in 2001 by the Law
of Early Notice for Termination. Under the terms of this legislation,
employers and employees are both required to give notice of termina-
tion of the employment relationship. Salaried employees are entitled to
up to 15 days of notice during their first year of employment and up to
30 days after that. Hourly employees are entitled to up to 21 days of
notice during their first three years of employment, and up to 30 days
after three years of service. Employees must give the same amount
of notice upon their resignation from employment (Keller and Darby
2002).
Collective agreements provide for workers to be informed of the
grounds for their dismissal and to have an opportunity to defend them-
selves against allegations made against them. Severance pay is required
for all but seasonal employees with at least one year of service. Sea-
sonal employees are entitled to severance pay only after working for
the employer for two seasons (Crotty et al. 2000).
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Companies and unions have private arbitration processes that do
not involve the courts. If an employee claims a breach of the employ-
ment contract, this goes to an ordinary law court. Damages may be
awarded for breach of a contractual obligation. If the claim arises from
an industrial dispute, the labor court has jurisdiction. The remedies
available to the labor court do not include reinstatement of the em-
ployee (Crotty et al. 2000).
Practice in the Courts
Three Israeli labor court judges responded to our questionnaire,
and there was some disagreement among them on a few issues. For
example, one of them stated that he/she would favor finding for the
employee if the employer failed to prove misconduct, while the other
two said that they would find for the employer if the employer proved
that the termination was made in good faith. They split three ways on
the quantum of proof required: one said that misconduct had to be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence, another said that clear and
convincing evidence was required, and the third said that proof had to
be beyond a reasonable doubt. There was also disagreement about the
processes that take place before a case comes to labor court.
As to the quality of the process, there was also disagreement. Two
judges said that employers usually have competent representation,
while the other said that this was only true sometimes. As to employee
representation, two said that there was competent representation only
sometimes, while the other said that this was usually the case. There
was agreement, however, between the two judges who responded to the
question that the court usually has sufficient information to make an
adequately informed decision. As to pretrial discovery, one answered
that this was done always, one said usually, and one said sometimes.
Two judges agreed, and one strongly agreed, that employee rights
were well protected; two agreed and one strongly agreed that employer
rights were well protected; two strongly agreed and one agreed that the
labor court system is an efficient way of resolving workplace disputes;
and two strongly agreed and one agreed that the labor courts were
better at this than ordinary courts.
The advantages of labor courts noted by these judges included the
participation of lay judges from both sides, their specialized nature for
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the special problems of workplace relations, the court’s experience in
dealing with a wide range of workplace relations, and employees
knowing that they have a place to apply for a remedy. Two of the
judges listed as a disadvantage the court’s lack of speed.
ITALY
Italy’s workers have some of the strongest protections in the world,
and these laws are the object of strong feelings on the part of workers
and unions. Attempts to weaken these in 2002 led to both a general
strike and the murder of a distinguished Italian labor law scholar,
Marco Biagi, who was involved in work on legislative reform.
In Italy, contracts for employment are regulated by the Italian Civil
Code (CC), including Act 604 (July 15, 1966)—the Act on Individual
Dismissals, as amended by Act 108 (September 11, 1990), and Act
300—the Workers’ Statute (May 20, 1970). Almost all employees are
covered by industry-wide collective agreements that bind all employers
and employees in the industry. Although employers are not parties to
them, interunion agreements to codes of practice are treated as stan-
dards for practice by employers as well as by unions (Crotty et al.
2000).
The Individual Dismissals law (Act 108/1990) gives both manual
and white-collar workers protection against dismissal. Domestic work-
ers, executives, and workers over 60 years of age are excluded.
The definition of an employment contract set down in the CC is
one in which a person engages himself to ‘‘cooperate for remuneration
in an enterprise by working manually or intellectually under the direc-
tion of the entrepreneur’’ (Crotty et al. 2000, p. 191). Contracts of
employment that are not both full time and of indefinite duration are
labeled as ‘‘special.’’ Fixed-term contracts are limited to seasonal work,
replacement of employees who are ill or on maternity leave, or for
extraordinary or casual work. Temporary employment is also limited.
It can be used for replacing absent employees, or in other instances
permitted by a collective agreement. Temporary work is not permitted
for dangerous work, striker replacement, or where a firm sheds workers
and hires temps to do their work. Work-training contracts can be en-
tered into with young workers for up to two years. Probationary periods
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must be put in writing and can last between 12 days and six months,
depending on the job involved (Crotty et al. 2000).
Termination of an employment contract of indefinite duration can
only be for a ‘‘justified reason’’ and in compliance with the required
period of notice, or for ‘‘just cause’’ without notice. Employers may
terminate fixed-term contract employees before the end of the term
only for ‘‘just cause.’’ Termination at will is limited to employees in
trial periods, domestic workers, workers who have reached retirement
age, and directors. Grounds for dismissal are frequently spelled out in
collective agreements. In all dismissals, the employer must pay sever-
ance pay (Crotty et al. 2000).
‘‘Just cause,’’ which is required for termination without notice, has
been made specific by court decisions. In broad terms, the principle set
out in the statute is that termination ‘‘requires very grave conduct
which, when evaluated both subjectively and objectively, constitute a
serious and irremediable breach of the contract of employment’’
(Crotty et al. 2000, p. 192). A court will determine whether such a
breach has occurred, considering all the relevant facts. ‘‘Justified rea-
son,’’ which is required for termination with notice, is defined by stat-
ute as ‘‘the obvious failure of the employee to fulfill contractual
obligations; or reasons inherent in the production process, the organi-
zation of the work or the smooth running of the undertaking’’ (Crotty
et al. 2000, p. 193). Dismissals are considered unfair unless the em-
ployer shows that there was either just cause or justified reason.
A number of particular grounds are declared by statute to be unfair.
These include political opinions, union membership, sex, race, lan-
guage, pregnancy, marriage, and religious affiliation. Members of
worker committees are given special protection.
Where dismissal is for just cause, no notice is required. Where it
is for justified motive, however, there must be a notice in writing, and
the employer must wait 5 days for the dismissal to be effective. During
the 5-day period, the employee has the right to be heard by the em-
ployer. Within 15 days the worker can ask for the reason for the dis-
missal and the employer has seven days to provide it (Crotty et al.
2000).
Either party may terminate a contract of employment of unspeci-
fied duration by giving the notice contained in applicable regulations,
or according to custom and practice or principles of equity, although
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the employer’s right to do this is limited by the necessity to have a
justified reason. A party failing to give the required notice is liable for
pay for the prescribed period. The periods of notice are established by
collective agreements at the national industry level, and vary across
sectors and by type of employee and length of service (Crotty et al.
2000).
One of the defining features of employment protection in Italy is
severance pay. An employee can request the maximum amount of sev-
erance pay after eight years of employment, so long as he has not
made prior requests for other expenditures, such as the purchase of the
employee’s first residence. Employees are entitled to a year’s salary
divided by 13.5, plus 1.5 percent for each year of service, including
compensation for inflation (Crotty et al. 2000). Not counting inflation,
this would amount to approximately $2,500 for an employee with 10
years of service who makes an average of $30,000 per year. An em-
ployee is entitled to this payment regardless of the reason for the termi-
nation. An additional payment, called a seniority indemnity, is paid to
the employee at termination (Crotty et al. 2000).
Within 60 days after notice of dismissal, the employee may chal-
lenge it in the ordinary courts. Conciliation and arbitration are pro-
vided for in establishments with less than 15 workers, or where the
overall workforce is less than 60 employees. Also, a worker can request
through his/her trade union that his/her case be heard through a concili-
ation or arbitration tribunal (Crotty et al. 2000). A special procedure
exists for dismissals for union activity.
A judge may order reinstatement in cases of ‘‘unjustified, discrimi-
natory or formally vitiated dismissal’’ (Crotty et al. 2000, p. 195). Em-
ployers with 15 or more employees in an establishment of 60 or more
workers overall are liable for reinstatement and damages equal to a
minimum of five months’ wages. If the employer offers reinstatement
and the employee fails to accept the offer within 30 days, the contract
of employment is deemed automatically terminated. If the employer
has less than 15 employees in the establishment and fewer than 60
overall, and the court concludes that the dismissal was unlawful, the
employer will be required to reinstate the employee or pay damages in
the amount of between 21/2 months’ and 14 months’ pay. If the em-
ployer refuses to comply with a reinstatement order, it must continue
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to pay the employee the full amount of her wages until it complies with
the reinstatement order (Crotty et al. 2000).
Practice in the Courts
From Italy, as was the case with Israel, there were three respon-
dents, all of whom agreed that the employer had the burden of proving
misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence. Prior to coming to
court, the employee and employer must have gone through a concilia-
tion process.
As to the quality of the process, the three judges agreed that both
employees and employers always have competent representation, that
courts usually have sufficient information upon which to base a deci-
sion, and that there is no pretrial discovery process.
The three Italian judges agreed that their system does a good job
of protecting employee rights, but they were neutral as to whether it
did the same thing for employer rights. They all shared the view that
their court system was not an efficient way of resolving workplace
disputes.
MALAYSIA
In Malaysia, there is no statutory prohibition of unfair dismissal,
but the courts have developed the principle that dismissals cannot be
without ‘‘just cause.’’ Termination of employment is governed by com-
mon law, with some regulation by the Employment Ordinance of 1955,
the Industrial Relations Act of 1967 (IRA), and the Employment Ter-
mination and Lay-Off Benefits Regulations of 1980. The EA covers all
employees paid less than a specified rate and all laborers regardless of
pay level, whereas the IRA covers all employees who have a contract
of employment (Crotty et al. 2000).
Dismissals with notice can be made for operational reasons. Also,
if an employee covered by the Employment Ordinance of 1955 is con-
tinuously absent for more than two days without leave or reasonable
excuse, he can be terminated. Dismissals without notice on the grounds
of misconduct are permitted after ‘‘due inquiry,’’ and an employee can-
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not be dismissed for union activity or union membership (Crotty et al.
2000).
In Malaysia, statutory notice periods are enforced, except when the
employee is discharged for misconduct. These range from four to eight
weeks, depending on the employee’s length of service. Employees dis-
missed for performance reasons must be given notice ranging in length
from 10 to 20 days. In either event, there can be a payment to the
employee in lieu of notice. Severance pay, the amount of which de-
pends on years of service, must be paid for terminations for operational
reasons or for employee performance (Crotty et al. 2000).
Fixed-term contracts are permitted, but they must be in writing and
for less than six months. Nonrenewals are examined by the courts to
insure that they are genuine and not just for purposes of circumventing
the law. An employee can be terminated during a probationary period,
unless it is shown that the employer acted out of malice (Crotty et al.
2000).
Employees covered by the IRA can complain to the Industrial Re-
lations Department that a dismissal was not for just cause. If concilia-
tion fails, the case will be referred to the Minister, who may send it to
the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court may either award reinstate-
ment or compensation which would include one month’s wages for
every year of service. In practice, it rarely awards reinstatement. A
question of law can be taken to the Malaysian High Court, although
alternative paths to a remedy may be taken by an employee by suing
in civil court for damages for wrongful dismissal, or by suing for un-
paid wages in the labor court (Crotty et al. 2000).
Practice in the Courts
The Malaysian judge said that the burden was on the employer to
prove cause for termination by a preponderance of the evidence. Prior
to coming to court, a matter will have been reviewed by several levels
of management and handled by an agency of the court in a conciliation
procedure.
As to the quality of the proceedings, the judge stated that the em-
ployer usually has competent representation, but that the employee
only sometimes does. He claims that the court usually has adequate
information upon which to base a decision, and that there is sometimes
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a pretrial discovery process which is usually worth the time and cost
involved.
The judge agreed that the Malaysian system does a good job of
protecting both employee and employer rights, but he was neutral as to
whether the labor court system was an efficient way of resolving work-
place disputes. He strongly agreed that it was better than the ordinary
courts would be at this. The advantages of the labor court system were
said to be the inexpensive and expeditious nature of the proceedings,
as well as the fact that it is a specialized court.
NORWAY
Norway provides employees with statutory protections against un-
fair dismissal. The Norwegian Worker Protection and Working Envi-
ronment Act (WEA) (2001) states that: ‘‘Employees shall not be
dismissed unless this is objectively justified on the basis of matters
connected with the establishment, the employer or the employee’’ (Sec.
60). Summary dismissal may be done where the employee is ‘‘guilty
of a gross breach of duty or other serious breach of the contract of
employment’’ (Sec. 66). There are court precedents holding that sum-
mary dismissal is lawful for drunkenness on the job, theft, insubordina-
tion, and constant tardiness (Schjoldager 1976), but an employee may
not be discharged for absence from work because of illness for either
6 months or 12 months (depending on length of service), pregnancy,
or military service.
Dismissal with notice is allowed where there are not grounds for
summary dismissal, but nevertheless appropriate reasons for dismissal.
In addition to rationalization of production, plant closings, and produc-
tion cut-backs, dismissal with notice has been held to be appropriate
for poor performance (Schjoldager 1976). In such a case, the employer
is required, where possible, to discuss the matter with the employee
and his elected representative before making the decision to terminate
the employee. The notice is required to contain information on the
employee’s rights to negotiate with the employer, to demand legal pro-
ceedings, and to remain on the job (WEA, Sec. 57). Unless otherwise
agreed to by the employer and employee, or provided for in a collective
agreement, one month’s notice must be given by either party before
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terminating the employment relationship. Periods of notice increase to
two months after 5 years of service, and three months after 10 years of
service. Employees 50 years of age and older are entitled to longer
notice, while employees in trial periods are entitled to 14 days’ notice
(WEA, Sec. 58).
Temporary contracts of employment are permitted only under cer-
tain conditions. These include situations where the work is different
from the work ordinarily done in the establishment, the employee is a
trainee, there is a labor market scheme in place through the Ministry,
the employee is a chief executive officer, there is an engagement for a
fixed term with a foreign state or international organization, or the
employee is an athlete or other worker in organized sports (WEA, Sec.
58A).
Where a summary dismissal has occurred, the employer is re-
quired, as in the case of ordinary dismissals, to discuss the matter with
the employee and her representative prior to making the decision,
where possible (WEA, Sec. 66). In a summary dismissal case, the em-
ployee is not entitled to remain at her post while the case is progress-
ing, unless a court rules otherwise. If the summary dismissal is found
to be unlawful, the court will declare it to be invalid (which would
entitle the employee to reinstatement). However, in ‘‘special cases,’’
the court may weigh the interests of both parties and determine that ‘‘it
is clearly unreasonable that employment should continue’’ (Sec. 66). If
the court finds the dismissal to be ‘‘objectively justified,’’ it will declare
the employment relationship to be terminated (Sec. 66). If it is unlaw-
ful, the employee will be awarded compensation in such amount as the
court ‘‘considers reasonable in view of the financial loss, the circum-
stances of the employer and employee, and other facts of the case’’
(Sec. 66).
In the case of ordinary dismissals, if the matter is not settled by
negotiation, the employee may institute legal proceedings. The em-
ployee may remain on the job until an enforceable judgment is handed
down by a court. However, a court may find that it is ‘‘unreasonable
that employment should continue while the case is in progress’’ and
deny the employee this right (Sec. 61). If the court finds that the em-
ployee has been unfairly dismissed, upon demand by the employee the
dismissal will be ruled ‘‘invalid.’’ However, as in the case of summary
termination, if the court finds that it is ‘‘clearly unreasonable that em-
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ployment should continue’’ it will be held to be terminated. Compensa-
tion will be awarded in the same manner as for summary dismissal
(Sec. 62).
Disputes involving termination of employment are heard by ordi-
nary municipal or district courts, rather than in labor court. The Norwe-
gian Labor Court hears only cases arising out of collective agreements
(Evju, undated). However, the municipal courts have special proce-
dures for dismissal cases. In each county there is a panel of lay judges
who participate, along with professional judges, in deciding dismissal
cases. At the lowest level, the professional judge will sit with two lay
judges, and in the appeals court, there will normally be four lay judges
involved (WEA, Secs. 61B, 61C).
Practice in the Courts
The Norwegian judge confirmed that the Norwegian courts require
the employer to prove cause for termination by a preponderance of the
evidence. Prior to going to court, there will have been consultation with
the employee before the termination decision was made, and ‘‘dispute
negotiation’’ afterwards.
As to the quality of the proceedings in Norwegian courts in termi-
nation cases, the judge was of the opinion that both the employer and
the employee always have competent representation. He also said that
the court always has sufficient information upon which to base a deci-
sion. Although there are no pretrial discovery proceedings, legal briefs
that are exchanged prior to trial indicate the evidence that will be pre-
sented at trial, including documentary evidence.
The judge agreed that the Norwegian court system does a good job
of protecting both employer and employee rights. As these cases are
handled by special processes in the ordinary courts rather than the
labor court, it is not possible to speak of labor court advantages or
disadvantages. The judge did say that the cost of litigation that a non-
unionized employee must bear can sometimes be very burdensome,
particularly if the employee loses.
SOUTH AFRICA
In South Africa, workers have a constitutional right to fair labor
practices, which includes the right not to be unfairly dismissed. Be-
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cause the constitution requires the courts and arbitration tribunals to
consider international law, South African courts have referred to the
documents of the ILO, including the Termination of Employment Con-
vention of 1982, in defining this right. The constitutional right not to
be dismissed unfairly is effectuated by two statutes: The Labor Rela-
tions Act of 1995 (LRA) provides a remedy for unjust dismissal, while
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 provides for notice
of termination and severance pay (for dismissals related to operational
requirements of the employer). These two statutes cover most South
African employees, but for those few who are not covered, there re-
mains the constitutional right that can be enforced in court. Collective
agreements provide alternative procedures for enforcing this right
(Crotty et al. 2000).
The LRA distinguishes between ‘‘unfair dismissals’’ and ‘‘auto-
matically unfair dismissals’’ (Crotty et al. 2000, p. 290). An other than
automatically unfair dismissal exists whenever the employer fails to
prove that the reason for a dismissal was a fair one. Fair reasons include
those connected with the employee’s conduct or capacity, or with the
employer’s operational requirements. For example, participation in an
illegal strike can be considered a fair reason. Also, the dismissal must
utilize a fair procedure in order to be considered fair (Crotty et al.
2000).
Dismissals are automatically unfair if they are for the following
reasons: 1) union or workplace forum membership or participation; 2)
an applicant for employment being requested to avoid or give up such
membership or activity; 3) participation in a legal strike; 4) exercising
a right under the LRA; 5) the employer compelling the employee to
accept its demands on a subject of mutual interest; 6) race, color, ethnic
or social origin, gender, marital status, family responsibilities, sexual
orientation, religion, conscience, belief, political opinion, or disability
(unless based on an inherent requirement of the job); 7) pregnancy or
maternity; or 8) age, unless the employee has reached the normal or
agreed retirement age (Crotty et al. 2000).
Dismissals must be with notice to the employee, and the standard
notice period varies from one week of notice during the first four weeks
of employment to four weeks’ notice for service of more than one year.
The employer may make a payment in lieu of notice. Notice cannot be
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given while the employee is on leave, and it must be in writing unless
the employee is illiterate (Crotty et al. 2000).
As to misconduct, the statutory Code of Good Practice of Dis-
missal, contained in the LRA, requires that employers adopt disciplin-
ary rules appropriate for the size and nature of their business. These
should promote certainty and consistency, be clear, and be made avail-
able to employees. In deciding on a disciplinary penalty, the employer
must take into account all relevant facts, including the employee’s
record of discipline, length of service, and personal situation. Although
the discipline procedure does not have to be a formal one, the employee
has a right to be informed of the charges against her and have a chance
to respond to them. There is provision for the employee having the
assistance of an employee representative (Crotty et al. 2000).
The Code of Good Practice provides that it is generally not appro-
priate to discharge an employee for a first offense. Usually, the em-
ployee should be given a written warning or, for more serious offenses,
a final warning. Dismissal is only for cases of serious misconduct or
repeated violations of rules that make a continuation of the employ-
ment relationship ‘‘intolerable’’ (Crotty et al. 2000, p. 292). Examples
of serious misconduct include gross dishonesty, willful damage to
property, willfully endangering others, assault, and gross insubordina-
tion. Disciplinary action cannot be taken against a trade union repre-
sentative without first consulting with the union (Crotty et al. 2000).
When incapacity is used as a basis for dismissal, the LRA makes a
distinction between poor performance and incapacity due to illness or
injury. As to poor performance, during probation an employee must be
given proper instruction, and dismissal must be preceded by the em-
ployee, with the assistance of her trade union representative, being
given the opportunity to respond to the allegations of poor perform-
ance. After the probationary period, the employee cannot be dismissed
for incapacity unless the employer has given him proper instruction,
training, and counseling, and a reasonable time for improvement. The
employer should make an investigation of the matter before firing the
employee and should also consider any viable alternatives to dismissal
(Crotty et al. 2000).
Where an employee is dismissed because of incapacity stemming
from illness or injury, the employer’s investigation must include deter-
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mining the extent of the incapacity and the prognosis. Counseling and
rehabilitation must be considered as an alternative to dismissal.
An employee claiming unfair dismissal can bring a case to the
tripartite Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration or
to the labor court. Usually, the case goes to the commission, which
first attempts to settle the matter through conciliation. If conciliation
fails, the case is referred to arbitration where a final, unappealable,
decision is made. Automatically unfair dismissal cases must be filed in
the labor court. Also, the commission may refer a case to the labor
court if it is claimed that the dismissal was for discriminatory reasons,
the case is very complex, there are conflicting arbitration cases on the
issue, it is believed by the commission to be in the public interest, or a
question of law is involved. Decisions of the labor court can be ap-
pealed only to the labor appeal court, but no farther. A common law
claim in ordinary civil court is also an option for a dismissed employee
(Crotty et al. 2000).
The remedy that is favored by the LRA is reinstatement. Tempo-
rary reinstatement may also be given where the need for interim relief
is urgent. As an alternative, the arbitrator or labor court may order
compensation to be paid to the employee. The maximum amount avail-
able is the equivalent of 12 months’ wages. The LRA leaves the door
open for the employee to claim other damages based on law, contract,
or collective agreement.
Practice in the Courts
The South African labor court judge stated that it was up to the
employer to prove that there was cause for termination, and that it had
to be shown that the ‘‘balance of probabilities’’ favored the employer’s
case. This would seem to be similar to the preponderance of evidence
standard that is common in other countries. Cases usually go through
a conciliation process before they come to trial.
As to the quality of the proceedings, the judge responded that the
employer usually has competent representation, but that this is only
sometimes the case for the employee. The court usually has sufficient
information upon which to base an informed decision, and there is
always pretrial discovery that is usually worth the time and cost in-
volved.
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The judge agreed that the South African system does a good job of
protecting the rights of both employees and employers. He agreed that
the specialized court system was an efficient way of resolving work-
place disputes, and strongly agreed that it was better at this than the
ordinary courts would be.
The advantages of the specialized tribunals are that the judges are
experts in labor law, matters are generally dealt with expeditiously,
employers and employees have a say in the appointment of judges, and
the labor court system is credible. The disadvantages include the in-
ability of a party who is not represented by a lawyer to force the other
side to also do without a lawyer. Also, the formalism of a court is still
present, as it is in other courts.
SPAIN
The Spanish Constitution (Art. 35) provides that all workers have
both the duty and the right to work, free selection of career, advance-
ment through their work, sufficient pay to satisfy their needs and those
of their family, and freedom from sex discrimination. Rights specific
to termination of employment are given in the Workers’ Charter and
the Labor Procedure Act (Crotty et al. 2000).
Under the Workers’ Charter, the employer may terminate an em-
ployee’s contract of employment for the following ‘‘objective rea-
sons:’’ 1) lack of aptitude for the job, but if it is observed during a
probationary period and not acted upon at that time, it cannot be as-
serted later; 2) failure to adapt to technical modifications of the job, if
the changes are reasonable and the failure continues for two months
after the adoption of the change; and 3) absence from work for 20
percent of the working days in two consecutive months, or 25 percent
in any 4 months in a 12 month period, if the rate of absenteeism in the
work force exceeds 5 percent during these periods (Workers’ Charter,
Sec. 54) (Crotty et al. 2000).
In addition, the employer may terminate the employee for disci-
plinary reasons that amount to ‘‘culpable non-performance’’ by the em-
ployee. These include the following: 1) repeated and unjustified
absence or lateness; 2) indiscipline or disobedience; 3) verbal or physi-
cal offenses against the employer, employees, or members of their fam-
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ilies living with them; 4) violation of ‘‘contractual goodwill, and abuse
of confidence in the discharge of duties’’; 5) intentional and continued
reduction of output below normal or agreed levels; and 6) ‘‘habitual
drunkenness or drug addiction if it adversely affects’’ work perform-
ance (Workers’ Charter, Sec. 54) (Crotty et al. 2000, p. 296).
By provision of the Workers’ Charter [Secs. 4 (2), 17 (1)], termina-
tions are prohibited on the basis of sex, ethnic origin, marital status,
race, social status, religious or political beliefs, membership or non-
membership in a trade union, or language. Discharge on account of
disability is prohibited in a separate statute (Crotty et al. 2000).
The protections of the Workers’ Charter extend to workers who
‘‘voluntarily provide remunerated services’’ for an employer (Crotty et
al. 2000, p. 294). Excluded are employees in government, civil, or
community service; those who are giving advice to a corporation’s
governing body; workers performing work ‘‘in the name of friendship,
benevolence or good neighborliness’’; family workers; and persons en-
gaged in trading operations on an employer’s behalf (Crotty et al. 2000,
p. 294).
Contracts of employment can be either of indefinite duration or for
a fixed term. Contracts for a fixed term of over four weeks must be in
writing. Fixed-term contracts, which have become increasingly preva-
lent in Spain, may be for the completion of a particular set of tasks or
services, to meet market demands, to replace a worker temporarily, or
for the launching of a new activity. It is permitted to have probationary
periods that vary in length depending on whether the worker is skilled
or unskilled (Crotty et al. 2000).
Where there is a termination for objective reasons, a written com-
munication containing the reasons must be given to the employee. The
employer must pay the employee an amount equal to 20 days’ pay for
each year of service up to a maximum of 12 months’ pay. In addition,
the employer must give the employee 30 days’ notice [Workers’ Char-
ter, Sec. 53 (1)]. If the termination is a disciplinary dismissal for mis-
conduct, there must be a written notice setting out the facts on which
the dismissal is based, and stating the date on which employment is to
end [Workers’ Charter, Sec. 55 (1)] (Crotty et al. 2000).
If a dismissed worker is a member of a trade union and the em-
ployer knows about this, the employer must give a trade union repre-
sentative an opportunity to be heard on the matter in advance of the
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termination. If the worker is a trade union officer, ‘‘formal adversarial
proceedings’’ must be held in which both the worker and the trade
union are entitled to be heard (Crotty et al. 2000, p. 297).
Workers properly dismissed are entitled to 20 days’ severance pay
for each year of service up to a maximum of 12 months’ pay. This is
prorated if the employee has been employed less than one year [Work-
ers’ Charter, Sec. 53 (1) (b)]. Workers who are unlawfully dismissed
are entitled to 45 days’ pay for each year of service up to a maximum
of 42 months’ pay. Here, also, there is proration if the employee has
been employed less than one year. There will also be compensation for
lost wages from the date of the dismissal to the date that the employer
is notified that the dismissal is unlawful, or until the worker has found
another job if this happened before the case was decided [Workers’
Charter, Sec. 56 (1) (a), (b)] (Crotty et al. 2000).
An employee may seek redress before a labor court within 20 days
of termination. In the case of dismissal for objective reasons (not disci-
plinary), if the employer fails to meet the requirements of notice and
payment required by law [Workers’ Charter, Sec. 53 (1)], the termina-
tion will be declared null and void and the employer will be require to
pay compensation as if there had been an improper disciplinary dis-
missal. However, mere failure to give notice will not nullify the dis-
missal—it will only require the employer to pay wages for the notice
period.
If a dismissal is declared unlawful, the employer will have five
days to make a choice between reinstating the worker and paying com-
pensation, but the option to elect compensation only exists where the
employee was a trade union representative. If no option is selected, the
court will order reinstatement. If a worker is found to have been dis-
missed in violation of antidiscrimination laws (sex, race, etc.), the dis-
missal will be null and void and the employer will be required to
reinstate the employee or pay his wages indefinitely. The employer
may also be subject to other civil liabilities (Crotty et al. 2000).
Practice in the Courts
The Spanish judge responded that, in order to be justly terminated,
the worker had to be found guilty of serious noncompliance with the
employment contract. In his response, the judge did not indicate what
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quantum of proof would be required. Prior to the matter going to trial,
a conciliation proceeding would always take place.
As to the quality of the process, the judge responded that both the
employer and the employee usually have competent representation. It
was his opinion that the court usually has the information that it needs
to make an informed decision. He said that there is always pretrial
discovery, which he believed to be usually worth the time and cost
involved.
The Spanish judge agreed that his country’s system does a good
job in protecting the rights of both employees and employers, and also
agreed that the labor court system was an efficient means of resolving
workplace disputes. He strongly agreed that labor courts did this better
than ordinary courts would.
The advantages of the Spanish labor court system include special-
ization, speed, and judges who are knowledgeable about social reali-
ties, while a disadvantage is the routine nature of some cases.
SWEDEN
Under the Swedish Security of Employment Act of 1984, which
covers virtually all private contracts of employment, dismissal of an
employee is legal only if notice is given and there is a valid reason.
The notice of dismissal must be ‘‘materially justified’’ (Crotty et al.
2000, p. 307). Valid reasons include: 1) reason related to the conduct
of the employee—e.g., refusal to obey orders (which has been held to
be a valid reason for summary dismissal), and lack of punctuality, but
these offenses must be sufficiently serious to constitute just cause; 2)
in small undertakings, failing to cooperate with the employee’s fellow
workers; 3) incapacity to do the work, although this ground is restricted
after the probationary period has been completed; and 4) criminal of-
fenses against the employer (Crotty et al. 2000).
In general, employment is required to be for an indefinite period.
Exceptions are: 1) if the nature of the work justifies employment for a
set period, season, or job; 2) temporary replacement as a trainee or a
holiday worker; 3) for a period of up to 12 months over two years if
the work accumulates in a temporary way; 4) up to the date an em-
ployee begins military or comparable service for more than 3 months;
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and 5) work performed after an employee’s retirement date (Crotty et
al. 2000).
Dismissal can be with immediate effect, but ‘‘this form of dis-
missal is unusual because the courts consider such dismissal appro-
priate only in the event that no other solution is possible’’ (Crotty et al.
2000, p. 308). Dismissal with notice, which is more common, requires
a notice period ranging from 2 months (if the employee is 25 years
old) to 6 months (if the employee is 45 years old). The employee must
be notified of the impending dismissal two weeks before the notice
period begins to run, and the employer must notify the local union two
weeks before taking steps to terminate an employee. The notice must
be in writing and tell the employee about the procedure to be followed
if he wishes to contest it. If the union and the employee wish to discuss
the termination with the employer, the termination cannot occur until
this discussion has taken place.
When the discussions with the employee and trade union fail to
produce a settlement, a suit may be brought in the labor court. The
employer must retain the employee on the job until the case is decided,
and has the burden of proving that the reasons for termination are valid.
This includes showing that the continuation of the employment rela-
tionship is untenable for the firm and that alternative employment can-
not be offered (Crotty et al. 2000).
If the labor court finds the dismissal to be unjustified, it may order
reinstatement or financial compensation. Damages take into account
the employee’s length of service, age, and capacity to find alternative
employment. If an employer fails to comply with a reinstatement order,
the employment relationship is terminated and the employee can claim
additional compensation as follows: 16 months’ wages for less than 5
years of employment; 24 months’ wages for 5 to 10 years of employ-
ment; or 32 months’ wages for 10 or more years of employment. The
amount increases if the employee has reached the age of 60. If the
employee has less than 6 months of service, the amount of compensa-
tion is 6 months’ wages (Crotty et al. 2000).
Practice in the Courts
In Sweden, the labor court requires the employer to prove cause
for termination by a preponderance of the evidence. Before coming to
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court, a worker who is a trade union member would be represented by
a union, which has the duty to negotiate with the employer before filing
suit in labor court. Other employees may file a suit in an ordinary court
without first negotiating with the employer.
As to the quality of the process, the judge responded that both the
employer and the employee usually have competent representation, the
court always has sufficient information upon which to base an in-
formed decision, and there is always pretrial discovery, which is always
worth the time and money involved.
The judge strongly agreed that the labor court system does a good
job of protecting both employee and employer rights, and that the labor
court system is an efficient way of resolving workplace disputes. He
agreed that it was better at this than ordinary courts would be.
The advantages of the Swedish labor court are the specialized na-
ture of the judges—in particular the lay judges—and the swiftness of
the procedure. Although there are no general disadvantages of the sys-
tem cited in the study, it might be seen by some as a disadvantage
that workers have legal security of employment (lack of flexibility for
employers). Also, nonorganized employees and employers may not
like to have their cases heard by lay judges selected by employer and
worker organizations.
UNITED KINGDOM
Under the Employment Rights Act of 1996 (ERA), British employ-
ees are given the right not to be dismissed unfairly. The ERA protects
workers with two years of service with their employer, or who have
been employed for shorter periods if the dismissal is for union mem-
bership, health and safety activities, sex, or race. Excluded from its
protection are persons of normal retirement age (65 if there is no nor-
mal age for that job), share fishermen, persons who work outside the
United Kingdom or are not ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom,
members of armed forces, police officers, and workers under fixed-
term contracts for one year or more if they have waived their ERA
protection in writing (Crotty et al. 2000).
Dismissals are fair if they are because of reasons set out in the
ERA. These include aptitude, personal incapacity or ill health, conduct,
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taking part in an industrial action and not being rehired within three
months, not having the legal capacity to meet the employer’s needs
(e.g., not having a driver’s license), ‘‘dismissal for some other substan-
tial reason’’ that justifies dismissal, and redundancy (Crotty et al. 2000,
p. 333). The employer must show cause for termination, and the Indus-
trial Tribunal will then decide whether, considering all the circum-
stances, the employer ‘‘acted as a reasonable employer’’ (Crotty et al.
2000, p. 333).
Some grounds for dismissal are ‘‘automatically unfair’’ (Crotty et
al. 2000, p. 333). These include trade union membership or office;
refusal to join a union; unfair selection to be made redundant; preg-
nancy and confinement; discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or
disability; for raising health or safety questions; seeking enforcement
of a statutory right pertaining to employment; transfer of the undertak-
ing (unless justified); conviction of an offense or failure to disclose
conviction where it is protected by law; to avoid threatened industrial
action; refusal of Sunday work; and being a trustee of an occupational
pension scheme (Crotty et al. 2000).
In all cases other than those that involve ‘‘automatically unfair’’
grounds for dismissal, the dismissal must be for a fair reason and be
‘‘reasonable’’ (Crotty et al. 2000, p. 334). An employer is allowed con-
siderable discretion as to what is reasonable, and the Industrial Tribunal
is loathe to substitute its judgment for that of the employer. The inquiry
by the Tribunal will be whether the dismissal falls within the range of
‘‘reasonable responses which a reasonable employer might have
adopted’’ (Crotty et al. 2000, p. 334).
Notice of termination must be given to employees who have been
employed continuously by the employer for one month. The amount of
notice is based on the employee’s length of service and age. The em-
ployee is entitled to one and a half weeks’ notice for each year of
service that the employee was not below 41 years of age, one week’s
notice for each year of employment when the employee was not below
21 years of age, and a half week’s notice for each year of employment
not falling under either of the first two conditions.
An employee may bring a claim before the Industrial Tribunal
within three months of his termination. In 2001, the Labour govern-
ment proposed charging employees a fee, which could be as high as
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£100, to file a case with the Industrial Tribunal (Bureau of National
Affairs 2001b).
In the Industrial Tribunal, conciliation is first attempted. If this
fails, the matter goes to a hearing before the Industrial Tribunal. The
Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act of 1998 provides for ar-
bitration as an alternative to the Industrial Tribunal. Arbitration under
the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) system has
been seldom used (Neal 2001). An employee may also sue in civil
court, and may ask for an injunction. In the Industrial Tribunal, the
employer must establish that the principal reason for the termination
justifies it. The Industrial Tribunal decides whether the reason did in
fact justify the termination (Crotty et al. 2000).
The ERA provides that reinstatement should be the primary rem-
edy for an unfair dismissal. However, the Industrial Tribunal has broad
discretion in determining whether this is a practical remedy in a partic-
ular case. It may render a special award not to exceed £27,500. The
amount of the basic award is based upon age and years of service, with
a maximum of £6,150. In addition, there may be a compensatory award
that compensates the employee for loss of earnings, pension rights,
injury to the employee’s feelings, etc. This compensatory award is lim-
ited to £12,000, except in cases of race or sex discrimination, where
there is no limit. If an employee is not granted reinstatement, he/she is
entitled to an additional special training award, not to exceed £27,500.
An employee may sue in civil court and recover damages for mental
distress, anxiety, and illness (Crotty et al. 2000).
Practice in the Courts
Two Industrial Tribunal judges from the United Kingdom re-
sponded to our questionnaire, and both agreed that the burden was on
the employer to prove cause for termination. One of them said that this
needed to be by a preponderance of the evidence, and the other claimed
that there had to be a ‘‘balance of probabilities’’ on the side of the
employer. These opinions appear to be very similar.
The United Kingdom judges agreed that a case would usually be
reviewed by several levels of management before making its way to
court. One of them also mentioned ACAS conciliation as a regular
occurrence.
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As to the quality of the process, they agreed that the employer
usually has competent representation. As to the competence of em-
ployee representatives, one of them said that employee representatives
were usually competent, while the other responded that this was true
only some of the time. One said that the court usually has sufficient
information, while the other said that this was always the case. One
responded that there was always pretrial discovery that was always
worth the time and cost, while the other said that pretrial discovery
only usually occurred, and that it was only usually worthwhile.
One of the judges strongly agreed that the system does a good job
of protecting both employee and employer rights, while the other sim-
ply agreed with this. One agreed that the system is an efficient way
of resolving workplace disputes, while the other was neutral on this.
However, one agreed and the other strongly agreed that this system
was preferable to that of the ordinary courts.
Advantages of the system include specialization and legitimacy
(based upon tripartism), speed, and low cost. The disadvantages are
the interface with nonemployment civil litigation, and the expense to
employers in defending against ‘‘hopeless’’ employee claims. Even if
the court awards the employer costs against the employee, this will
rarely be enforceable as a practical matter.
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THE SAMPLE
Our goal in constructing the sample for this research was to obtain
responses from experienced labor arbitrators, employment arbitrators,
peer review panelists, jurors with experience in employment discrimi-
nation cases, and human resources (HR) managers. In order to allow
for a cross-cultural comparison, we also wanted to collect data from
labor court judges in countries where for-cause standards are mandated
by law. With regard to the labor arbitrators, we randomly sampled 200
labor arbitrators from the National Academy of Arbitrators Directory.
Arbitrators were mailed the survey instrument and asked to mail the
completed surveys to the researchers. Arbitrators were offered financial
compensation for completing the survey, to ensure an adequate re-
sponse rate. Eighty-two arbitrators provided responses, resulting in a
response rate of 42 percent.
Employment arbitrators were identified from a list provided by the
American Arbitration Association. In addition, we identified some 27
employment arbitrators who had published employment arbitration
awards or otherwise identified themselves as employment arbitrators.
Surveys were mailed to a random selection of 450 of these employment
arbitrators (who were not already included in the survey of labor arbitra-
tors). Half of the arbitrators were sent surveys that required the evalua-
tion of cases from the standpoint of statutory claims. The other half
were sent surveys that contained a for-cause standard in the instructions.
Seventy-two surveys were received from employment arbitrators who
received the survey with the statutory claim manipulation, resulting in
a response rate of 32 percent. Sixty-eight surveys were received from
employment arbitrators who received the survey with the for-cause ma-
nipulation, resulting in a 30 percent response rate. Again, financial com-
pensation was offered to encourage responses to our survey.
With regard to peer review panelists, we identified two large manu-
facturing organizations that have active peer review systems at a num-
ber of their operations. Management officials cooperated with the
research effort by sending the survey instrument to 141 employees who
had served as peer review panelists in disciplinary cases. The peers
were drawn from 11 different manufacturing facilities located in differ-
ent parts of the country. All peers had been trained to evaluate disci-
plinary cases by their organizations, and had experience participating
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in peer review panels. We received surveys from 91 peers, resulting in
a response rate of 64 percent.
With regard to jurors, with the cooperation of a federal district
court judge, we obtained the names and addresses of jurors who had
served in discrimination cases over the last several years within his
district, which is located in the southeastern United States. Surveys
were mailed to 112 jurors, and we received responses from 83, result-
ing in a response rate of 74 percent. As with most other parts of the
sample, jurors were also offered a financial incentive to participate.
With regard to HR managers, we identified individuals with the
titles of ‘‘HR Director’’ or ‘‘HR Manager’’ from a directory of manu-
facturing organizations located in the southeast. We also identified HR
directors and HR managers based on job title listings in an alumni
directory from a graduate program in human resources. From this list-
ing of individuals, we randomly selected 200 individuals and mailed
them the survey. We received 59 surveys, resulting in a response rate
of 30 percent. A financial incentive was offered to encourage participa-
tion.
With regard to labor court judges, we relied on personal contacts
to identify possible participants. Labor court judges were drawn from
several countries (primarily in Europe) where judges were responsible
for enforcing for-cause standards in termination cases. At their request,
no financial compensation was offered to the labor court judges. In
total, we received responses from 12 labor court judges from eight
countries, giving us a response rate of 46 percent of the judges in 53
percent of the countries included in the survey.
THE TERMINATION CASES
Case 1 Summary
Case 1 does not involve allegations of illegal discrimination. In-
stead, it involves allegations of a violation of a contractual requirement
that termination will be for-cause. Labor arbitrators were to evaluate
the case from the standpoint of a labor contract, whereas jurors and
employment arbitrators were to evaluate it from the standpoint of a
provision in an employment agreement. Peer review panelists and HR
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managers were also told about the employment agreement requiring
cause for termination. In this case, the alleged offense is severe (theft
of valuable company property), and evidence against the employee is
substantial. There are two witnesses to the offense, both of whom have
long work histories with the employer. While the accused employee
claims that the witnesses themselves are responsible for the theft, there
is no evidence to support this. Further, evidence is presented that
would suggest that it would have been difficult for the witnesses to
have stolen the equipment. To the contrary, evidence is also presented
to suggest that, given the nature of the accused employee’s job, it
would have been feasible for him to have stolen the property. Informa-
tion presented about the employee indicates that he has a relatively
short tenure with the firm. There is no evidence of any procedural
problems with the dismissal or with the investigation.
In sum, evidence against the employee is strong, the alleged of-
fense is severe, the employee’s work history is relatively short, and
there is no evidence of procedural problems with the termination or the
investigation.
Case 2 Summary
Case 2 is similar to Case 1 on many dimensions. One key differ-
ence is that, except for decision makers who would normally have a
for-cause standard (e.g., labor arbitrators and labor court judges), the
case makes clear that this is an employment-at-will situation. The case
contains an accusation of racial discrimination. As such, labor arbitra-
tors and labor court judges would make a determination as to whether
they were to find for the employee based on cause (influenced directly
or indirectly by the alleged discrimination). Peer review panelists were
to assess whether the termination was consistent with company policy
and procedure (again, influenced directly or indirectly by the alleged
discrimination). HR managers were to determine whether they sup-
ported termination in light of the alleged discrimination and other fac-
tors relevant to employee relations and organizational productivity.
Finally, jurors and employment arbitrators were asked to determine
whether they would find for the employee in light of the alleged dis-
crimination. The facts remained constant across the different decision
makers.
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The employee is accused of theft by two long-term employees of
good standing. The employee denies stealing the property and claims
that the employees who accused him may have been responsible. Fur-
ther, he claims he is being accused of theft because of racial discrimi-
nation. While the employee (a racial minority) states that he has heard
racially oriented jokes, there is no other evidence available to support
this claim—no corroboration regarding racial comments or jokes is
provided. While the employee in question was in a position to steal
the property, the two employees accusing him of theft were not well
positioned to engage in theft.
In sum, the case involves a situation where racial discrimination is
alleged but there is little evidence available to support the claim. The
evidence against the employee is substantial, the employee has been
with the firm a relatively short period, and there are no procedural
problems with the termination or the investigation of the alleged of-
fense.
Case 3 Summary
In Case 3, an employee is terminated for insubordination, but
claims that the decision is due to discrimination on the basis of gender.
For labor arbitrators and labor court judges, the case is one requiring
cause. For other decision makers, it is an employment-at-will setting.
Evidence with regard to discrimination is ambiguous. While the em-
ployee claims that she was treated with little respect by her supervisor,
and that her male supervisor made inappropriate remarks about
women, interviews with other employees fail to provide corroboration
for this allegation. However, all other employees in the work unit are
male.
Evidence of insubordination is limited to testimony provided by
the supervisor. The alleged insubordination occurred during a private
discussion regarding the need for the subordinate to assist another em-
ployee with his job responsibilities. The manager claims that the em-
ployee became abusive and insulting and refused to accept the order.
The employee admits to challenging the need for obeying the supervi-
sor’s request, but denies becoming abusive or refusing the order. In-
stead, the employee claims that her challenge enraged her supervisor,
resulting in the termination. The employee’s work record is relatively
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short (four years). However, productivity data show that she is highly
effective. Company policy states that termination for insubordination
requires one written warning, and the supervisor claimed that he pro-
vided the employee with a verbal warning.
In sum, substantial ambiguity exists with regard to the evidence of
discrimination and evidence of wrongdoing by the employee. Compli-
ance by the employer with its own procedures is in question. Also, the
employee is one with relatively short tenure with the organization.
Case 4 Summary
Case 4 does not involve allegations of illegal discrimination. In-
stead, it involves allegations of a violation of an employment agree-
ment which stipulates that termination must be for-cause. Labor
arbitrators were to evaluate the case from the standpoint of a labor
contract, whereas jurors and employment arbitrators were to evaluate
it from the standpoint of a for-cause provision in an employment agree-
ment. Peers and HR managers were also informed of the for-cause
provision in the employment agreement. In this case, the alleged of-
fense is severe (theft of company property) and evidence against the
employee is substantial. Indeed, the employee admits to the theft. Com-
pany policy states that theft of any company property, regardless of
value, makes the employee subject to termination. However, the em-
ployee explains that he took property from the trash bin and assumed
that doing so was acceptable behavior. The employee also points out
that he has been with the firm for 20 years and has a good work record.
No evidence is provided to show that there was inconsistency in how
the firm has applied the rule. The focus, instead, is on the reasonable-
ness of the rule, and what might be seen as disproportionate conse-
quences for the employee, given the value of the property. There is no
dispute about the facts of the case, and there are no concerns about
the employer’s compliance with contractually mandated procedures, or
about the manner in which the firm investigated what happened.
Case 5 Summary
Case 5 does not involve allegations of illegal discrimination. In-
stead, it involves allegations of violation of an employment agreement.
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Labor arbitrators were to evaluate the case from the standpoint of a
labor contract, whereas jurors and employment arbitrators would evalu-
ate the case from the standpoint of a for-cause provision in the employ-
ment agreement. Peer review panelists and HR managers were
informed of the for-cause provision in the employment agreement. In
this case, the rule is reasonable, in that it prohibits fighting within the
workplace and makes fighting a basis for immediate employment ter-
mination.
An employee is accused by another employee of starting a fight,
and there is only one witness (i.e., the employee making the accusa-
tion). The accused employee has a negative work history and a rela-
tively short tenure with the firm. There are no obvious procedural
problems with this case, no evidence of inconsistent treatment of em-
ployees, and no evidence that management failed to conduct a proper
and appropriate investigation. The employee is challenging the termi-
nation by questioning the evidence against him. As stated above, there
is only one other witness to the events: the other employee engaged in
the altercation. While the employee being terminated contends that the
other employee is only trying to get him in trouble, there is no evidence
of any such motive.
In sum, the alleged offense is severe, there are no procedural prob-
lems with the case, and the employee has a negative work history.
While there is evidence of employee wrongdoing, it is not conclusive.
Case 6 Summary
Case 6 does not involve allegations of illegal discrimination against
the employee. Instead, it involves allegations that the employer vio-
lated an employment agreement that stipulates that termination must
be for-cause. Labor arbitrators were to evaluate the case from the stand-
point of a labor contract, whereas jurors, employment arbitrators, and
others would evaluate the case from the standpoint of the for-cause
provision in the employment agreement.
The employee was terminated for absenteeism problems that oc-
curred over the prior year. The organization is in compliance with
clearly stated policies regarding absenteeism. The employee received
two written warnings during the last two months of employment and
continued to have attendance problems after the final warning. No evi-
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dence exists to suggest that the firm was inconsistent in how the em-
ployee was treated, and there was no other indication of any procedural
problems with manner of the termination. Mitigating circumstances are
present, however: The employee is a long-term employee, and she had
never received a disciplinary sanction prior to the last year. She also
contends that the absenteeism was caused by family problems (illness
of a parent, ending in death, combined with illnesses of her children).
In sum, termination is likely to be justified, in this case, unless
mitigating circumstances are deemed to be relevant.
Case 7 Summary
Case 7 involves allegations of age discrimination. The employee
in question was over 50 and was replaced by an employee below the
age of 40. For labor arbitrators, labor court judges, and the appropriate
subsample of employment arbitrators, there was a for-cause require-
ment for termination. Peer review panelists were instructed to ensure
that the termination was consistent with company policy and proce-
dures.
The employee, who was terminated for poor performance and in-
subordination, had received a below-average rating in the prior year
and, according to his manager, had not improved his performance fol-
lowing this. Thorough documentation exists regarding the performance
problem. Productivity statistics are provided and the performance eval-
uation form from the previous year contains a detailed explanation
regarding the nature of the employee’s deficiencies and the improve-
ments needed. Company policy requires a written warning about per-
formance problems before termination, and that written warning was
provided. While the employee had not had performance problems prior
to his last year employed, the job is one that changes over time and
requires ongoing learning and development to perform effectively. In-
subordination was alleged to have occurred in a meeting designed to
discuss the performance problem. Two managers were present during
the meeting, and both confirm that the employee became abusive and
refused to follow suggestions made about how to improve perform-
ance. Nothing said or done by the managers in the meeting was deemed
unprofessional. The employee had been with the firm for four years,
and had received warnings for absenteeism. Evidence of discrimination
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is limited to a claim by the employee that the supervisor had made
jokes about older workers, and no corroboration of this claim is pro-
vided.
In sum, the organization has strong evidence of wrongdoing in this
case and has complied with its own procedures. Further, there is little
basis for questioning the reasonableness of the rule, the employee’s
work history is not outstanding, and evidence of discrimination is lim-
ited.
Case 8 Summary
Similar to Case 7, Case 8 involves allegations of age discrimina-
tion. The employee in question was over 50 and was replaced by an
employee below the age of 40. For labor arbitrators, labor court judges,
and a subsample of employment arbitrators, there was—in addition to
the claim of discrimination—a for-cause requirement for termination.
And, as with all four cases, peer review panelists received instructions
saying that the termination must be consistent with company policy
and procedures.
The employee was terminated for poor performance and insubordi-
nation. He received a below-average rating in the prior year and, ac-
cording to his manager, had not improved his performance following
this. Other than the below-average rating, the performance evaluation
form contains little specific information about actual productivity lev-
els, or the nature of the employee’s deficiencies. Testimony is provided
by a coworker, indicating that the employee is good at solving techni-
cal problems and is frequently sought out by others for technical assis-
tance. Company policy requires a written warning about performance
problems before termination, and no warning was provided. While the
employee had not had performance problems prior to the last year be-
fore termination, the job has changed over time and requires ongoing
learning and development to perform effectively.
Insubordination is alleged to have occurred in a meeting to discuss
the performance problem. Only the employee and his manager were
present during the meeting. According to the manager (but denied by
the employee), the employee became abusive during the meeting and
refused to follow suggestions about how to improve performance.
Nothing said or done by the managers in the meeting was deemed
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unprofessional. The employee had been with the firm for four years,
and during that period, received warnings about absenteeism. Evidence
of discrimination was limited to a claim by the employee that the super-
visor had made jokes about older workers, but no corroboration of this
claim was provided.
In sum, evidence of wrongdoing was modest in this case, and the
organization failed to comply with its own procedures as they relate to
termination for performance. However, there is little basis for question-
ing the reasonableness of the rule, the employee’s work history is not
outstanding, and evidence of discrimination is weak.
Case 9 Summary
Case 9 involves an allegation of age discrimination, although the
issue of cause would also be relevant for some types of decision mak-
ers. The employee was terminated for poor performance and insubordi-
nation. He received a below average rating in the prior year and,
according to his manager, had not improved his performance following
this. Other than the below-average rating, the performance evaluation
form contains little specific information about actual productivity lev-
els or the reasons for the employee’s deficiencies. Testimony provided
by a coworker indicates that the employee is skilled at complex tasks
and is frequently sought out by others for technical assistance. Com-
pany policy requires a written warning about performance problems
before termination, and a written warning was provided one month
prior to the termination. While the employee had not had performance
problems prior to last year, the job is one that changes over time and
requires on-going learning and development to perform effectively.
Insubordination is alleged to have occurred in a meeting to discuss
the employee’s performance problem. Only the employee and his man-
ager were present during the meeting. According to the manager (but
denied by the employee), the employee became abusive during the
meeting and refused to follow suggestions made about how to improve
his performance. Nothing said or done by the managers in the meeting
was deemed unprofessional. The employee had been with the firm for
four years, and had received warnings about absenteeism. The claim
of discrimination is supported by two recently retired employees who
confirm that they heard managers talk about the need to get rid of
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‘‘old, deadwood employees.’’ They also confirm that they heard the
employee’s supervisor make jokes about older employees.
In sum, evidence of employee wrongdoing was modest in this case,
and there was some supporting evidence to justify the claim of discrim-
ination. However, there is little basis for questioning the reasonableness
of the rule, the employee’s work history is not outstanding, and the
organization is in compliance with its own policies and procedures.
Case 10 Summary
Case 10 involves an allegation of illegal age discrimination, al-
though the issue of cause would also be relevant for some types of
decision makers. The employee was terminated for poor performance
and insubordination. He had received a below-average rating in the
prior year and, according to his manager, had not improved his per-
formance following this. Other than the below-average rating, the per-
formance evaluation form contains little specific information about
actual productivity levels or the nature of the employee’s deficiencies.
Testimony provided by a coworker indicates that the employee is
skilled at complex tasks and is frequently sought out by others for
technical assistance. Company policy requires a written warning about
performance problems before termination, and a written warning was
provided one month prior to the termination. While the employee had
not had performance problems prior to the last year before termination,
the job is one that changes over time, and thus requires ongoing learn-
ing and development to perform effectively.
Insubordination is alleged to have occurred in a meeting designed
to discuss the performance problem. Only the employee and his man-
ager were present during the meeting. According to the manager (but
denied by the employee), the employee became abusive during the
meeting and refused to follow suggestions made about how to improve
his performance. The employee says that during the meeting, the super-
visor became insulting toward him. The manager confirms this, but
indicates that he did this in an effort to motivate the employee. The
employee had been with the firm for four years, and during that period,
he had received warnings about absenteeism. The employee claims that
he had heard the supervisor make jokes about older employees. The
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supervisor denies this, and there is no evidence corroborating this
claim by the employee.
In sum, evidence of wrongdoing is modest in this case. Further-
more, there is some indication that the supervisor’s behavior might
have provoked the behavior defined as insubordination. However, there
is little basis for questioning the reasonableness of the rule, the em-
ployee’s work history is not outstanding, the organization is in compli-
ance with its own policies and procedures, and there is little evidence
to support the claim of discrimination.
Case 11 Summary
Case 11 involves an allegation of illegal age discrimination, al-
though the issue of cause would also be relevant for some types of
decision makers. The employee, who was terminated for poor perform-
ance and insubordination, received a below-average rating in the prior
year and, according to his manager, had not improved his performance
following this. Other than the below-average rating, the performance
evaluation form contains little specific information about actual pro-
ductivity levels, or the reason for the ratings that were given. Testimony
of a coworker indicates that the employee is skilled at complex tasks,
and is frequently sought out by others for technical assistance. Com-
pany policy requires a written warning about performance problems
before termination, and a written warning was provided one month
prior to the termination. While the employee had not had performance
problems prior to last year, the job is one that changes over time, and
thus, requires ongoing learning and development to perform effec-
tively.
Insubordination was alleged to have occurred in a meeting to dis-
cuss the performance problem, but only the employee and his manager
were present during the meeting. According to the manager (but denied
by the employee), the employee became abusive during the meeting
and refused to follow suggestions about how to improve his perform-
ance. There was agreement that the supervisor behaved professionally
during the meeting. The employee had been with the firm for 22 years
and had never received a disciplinary warning prior to the termination
year. Prior to the last year, the employee always received above-aver-
age performance evaluation ratings. The employee claims that he had
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heard the supervisor make jokes about older employees. However, the
supervisor denies this, and there was no corroborating evidence.
In sum, evidence of wrongdoing is modest in this case. One possi-
ble mitigating factor is that the employee has a long and outstanding
work history with the organization. However, there is little basis for
questioning the reasonableness of the rule, the organization is in com-
pliance with its own policies and procedures, and there is little evi-
dence to support the claim of discrimination.
Case 12 Summary
Case 12 involves an allegation of illegal age discrimination, al-
though the issue of just cause would also be relevant for some types of
decision makers. The employee, who was terminated for poor perform-
ance and insubordination, received a below-average rating in the prior
year and, according to his manager, had not improved his performance
following this. Other than the below-average rating, the performance
evaluation form contains little specific information about actual pro-
ductivity levels or the reasons behind the rating that was given. Testi-
mony provided by a coworker indicates that the employee is skilled at
complex tasks and is frequently sought out by other employees for
technical assistance. Company policy requires a written warning about
performance problems before termination, and such warning was pro-
vided one month prior to the termination. While the employee had not
had performance problems prior to last year, the job is one that changes
frequently, and thus requires ongoing learning and development to per-
form effectively.
Insubordination was alleged to have occurred in a meeting de-
signed to discuss the performance problem, but only the employee and
his manager were present during the meeting. According to the man-
ager (but denied by the employee), the employee became abusive dur-
ing the meeting, and refused to follow suggestions about how to
improve his performance. There is agreement that the supervisor be-
haved professionally during the meeting. The employee had been with
the firm for four years, had received average performance ratings prior
to the last year, and had received two warnings relating to absenteeism.
The employee claims that he heard the supervisor make jokes about
older employees, but the supervisor denies this, and there is no evi-
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dence corroborating this claim. The employee had some personal prob-
lems in the year prior to termination that might explain some of his
recent performance problems. Nine months before his termination, the
employee’s wife developed a serious illness. She died prior to his ter-
mination.
In sum, evidence of wrongdoing is modest in this case. There is
one possible extenuating circumstance relating to the recent illness and
death of the employee’s spouse. However, there is little basis for ques-
tioning the reasonableness of the rule, and the organization is in com-
pliance with its own policies and procedures. Furthermore, the
employee’s tenure is relatively short, and his record was not outstand-
ing during this time. Lastly, there is little evidence to support a claim
of discrimination.
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of the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was estab-
lished in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by the late Dr. W.E. Upjohn,
founder of The Upjohn Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of em-
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